UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-1996

Ethics and the moral limits of policy
Marlene Beverly Khosropur
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Khosropur, Marlene Beverly, "Ethics and the moral limits of policy" (1996). UNLV Retrospective Theses &
Dissertations. 3282.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/dd2g-9mtn processed, response: 201

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter fiice, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
The quality o f this reproduction is dependent upon the quality o f the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

ETHICS AND THE MORAL LIMITS OF POLICY

by

Marlene Beverly Kbosropur

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Ethics and Policy Studies

Institute for Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 1997

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

UMI Number: 1385180

Copyright 1997 by
Kbosropur, Marlene Beverly
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 1385180
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

©1997 Marlene Beverly Kbosropur
All Rights Reserved

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

The Thesis of Marlene Beverly Khosropur for the degree of Master of Arts in Ethics and
Policy Studies is approved.

Chairperson, Craig^Waltotj, Ph D

Exaiw^fig Committee Member, Gary Palmer PirD.

Exanumn^onimittee Member, Jerry Simich, Ph.D.

Graduate Faculty Representative, Andrea Fontana, Ph.D

Dean of tfié Graduate College, Ronald Smith, Ph D

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May, 1997

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

ABSTRACT

Implementation is often the orphan of the policy creation process, causing problems that
raise ethical warning flags. When drafting policy, flexibility is often absent from programs.
Discretionary powers are denied to implementors, resulting in a condition of abstracted judgment
that can cripple or derail the original intent. For example, government policies toward the aging often
create and form perceptions that radiate outwardly, becoming assimilated by corporations and
institutions, and hardened into programs that are often implemented unsoundly. The moral
composition of a community is affected. Society absorbs fi-agments of thought generated by these
policies and forms biases and prejudices that it, in turn, often uses negatively in assessing the value
and rights of older citizens. Mandatory retirement at age 65 and more specifically, the Social Security
program, are examples of policies that may have once held merit but have either become obsolete or
harmful, or both.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis considers three intermeshing topics that could have been looked at
individually and each given far more time and space than has been done here. However, 1
found it interesting to tie their sometimes tenuous and sometimes blatant threads of
dependency on each other together while at the same time defining each topic in its own right.
Briefly stated, then, this thesis is looking at 1) how policies should be monitored and by
whom, and by what kind of individuals during implementation - the most important time in
the life of a policy; 2) the differences and similarities between the individual and the
community in their perceptions and attitudes toward what ethical behavior is; and focus these
two discussions by looking at 3) how our society perceives aging. I will seek to discover if
treatment of the elderly is fair in relation to that of the rest of society; and if ageism affects
the policies we create and the programs we enact on their behalf.
Ultimately, I hope to determine if there are indeed moral limits beyond which public,
corporate, or institutional facilities cannot or should not range in order to be effective. In
order to give focus to the issues addressed here I will look at policy toward the elderly, and
the more specific recommendations will, in fact, be in that particular area. I hope to present
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ideas that will be relevant to policies in general as well as to the aging and Social Security
policies I have targeted within the body of this work. For instance, one recommendation will
be that policies all contain built-in review systems that assess initial policy goals in relation
to conditions existing at the inception of implementation. In doing this, it will address the
actuality of changes as they occur within and outside of all dynamic systems, whether sooner
or later, but which, nevertheless, impinge upon a policy’s effectiveness and continued success.
Another important factor to be addressed in relation to general policy efficacy is that every
policy should build in measures that allow implementors to have a certain amount of
discretion so that they can use their best hands-on judgment in order to immediately handle
on-site problems and adjustments as these changes impact upon the function of their
programs. So although this thesis focuses on and makes specific recommendations for policy
regarding the elderly it also contains more general suggestions that developers of policy in
other areas could consider.
Chapter Two first explores the concept of ageism in the United States. It then moves
on to historical perspectives, from Cicero and Juvenal to our own Colonial times. We will
touch on how the industrial era has had an impact on forming our current aging policies and
programs as well as attitudes toward the elderly which tend to set them apart from the rest
of society. These basically negative attitudes fostered a pessimistic outlook toward aging in
general, while at the same time it was woven into the development of programs and the
institutions that would oversee them.
The role of industrialization (as we shall see according to Simone de Beauvoir), has
made it possible for the community to supersede the family in importance for an individual
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in old age. For at this time of life needed services, even shelter, are provided, in many cases
not by the family, but by the government. John Dewey will continue this theme and debate
de Beauvoir’s premise by promoting the family as a sort of nurturing community based on the
gathering and sharing of food, with different types of families evolving in different types of
communities based on the economic theme that holds each together, i.e. industrial, nomadic,
etc. Consequently, we often find that the femily in a given society will, to a degree, mirror the
society in which it is situated. This theme will recur later in Chapter 4 as we delve into the
relation of a person to his or her community, as well as to the differences between the
individual and the community regarding duties and morality.
De Beauvoir and Carole Haber will show how social attitudes are impressed upon the
individual by the community in which he or she dwells. Along with this comes the status we
hold within the community. If negative connotations relate to any segment of a society
difficulty will ensue when attempts are made to deal with their particular problems. As such,
either independence or dependency can ensue as a prevailing attitude in a targeted population
segment. Artificial definitions come to replace those which arose from the natural aging
process - a process that occurs earlier for some and later for others. Foner will counter this
view in her assessment that these circumstances existed prior to both industrialization and
urbanization. The chapter concludes that imposing derived characteristics on a group or class
of people seldom correctly identifies individual attributes or differences, making it difficult for
communities to adequately address the needs of all within such classifications, and poorly or
unjustly serving many.
Effectual policy implementation is discussed in Chapter Three. It looks at policy
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development as a two-stage process, and finds that implementing any policy creates an effect
on its targeted population segment. But aside fi’om this obvious manifestation, unwanted or
unforseen effects can occur, rippling through the community at large. These “externalities”
can be, in some instances, benign or even beneficial, but often, due to lack of forethought in
planning or attention during implementation, they produce undesirable side-effects.
Intellectual and moral competence are inseparable requirements in policy
implementors. Deficiencies in either area will injure both the effectiveness and integrity of a
program. In addressing these areas of ability, experience, and moral excellence we turn to
Aristotle who provides a solid base from which to venture into assessment and exploration.
Here, and throughout this thesis, Aristotle’s guidance will gently weave its way, sometimes
directly, other times through the voices of his later followers and modem advocates. But
always, there will be an echo of his insightful urging to follow the mean.
Garry Brewer and Peter de Leon provide a look into the nuts and bolts of policy
making and its implementation process, pointing out how it can be affected by government
and outside activity.
This is followed by a discussion of “ends”, how we seek to achieve and evaluate
them, how we engage our policies with certain “ideals” in mind. Two points of view, those
of Sherman and Edel, are discussed here; each viewing the subject from a different
perspective. Yet in the end each viewpoint can be seen to enhance the other rather than to
create polar opposition.
Chapter Four looks at the various ways we view moral virtue, and the institutions that
help to fi-ame and define our social values. Since the material covered here is so far-ranging.
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it is necessary to divide the chapter into two parts. Many voices will be heard here, each
highlighting a different perspective in this multi-faceted discussion which ranges from how
judgment is formed, to differentiation of moral duties between an individual and a society, an
individual and a citizen.
The chapter begins by discussing the moral life, what it is that comprises a virtuous
act, and the components that are necessary for such action. How do we think when we
undertake to evaluate an ethical situation? The ideas of Mark Johnson will explain the
importance that metaphorical reasoning contributes to our understanding of how we act and
why. He discusses two somewhat extreme, opposed points of view - moral absolutism and
moral relativism - and suggests that positive fecets of each view can be assimilated into a new
formula when combined with imagination, to create a new viewpoint for assessing moral
problems.
As the chapter proceeds, moral codes and rules are discussed by Emile Durkheim. We
see that many codes operate side by side within a society such as ours, and are derived from
the various religions as well as the ethnic roots of those who make up our diverse society. We
see how the rules governing the morals of an individual can differ from those governing a
society. This leads to a look at moral virtue, what comprises it or how it is formed, and how
it leads us to make the right or best choices under a set of given circumstances. In this section
the ideas of Aristotle and William Galston merge to highlight the similarities and differences
between a good person and a good citizen, keeping in mind that justice is an important
element of this whole. Dewey will join in to explain the importance o f family relationships
and how they influence our value systems. The family is the first source of socialization for
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the individual. Yet, the social outlook of the individual is made up of input that comes from
more than one source - family, ethnic origin, and religion to name a few.
But, how do we know what is good? Ends - specifically the definition of ends and
how we choose and define them - are important. This is a skill or an art that is taught by
example. It requires that a system of social order functions in a fashion that fosters the ability
to discern the difference between what is and what is not good. Thus we find that without
proper education and preparation each new generation of young people will have difficulty
arriving at decisions which are morally good for themselves and the society within which they
are a part.
The next segment of this chapter attempts to define a “good” society. It begins by
defining the concept of the good itself. Prompted by Robert Bellah, et al., we then inquire if
a “great” society can also be a “good” society.
Input from various sources is assessed through a dialogical approach that touches on
moral pluralism, the contrasts and similarities between modem and ancient ethics, and moral
particularism. All moral viewpoints discussed in this important chapter help to give us a
picture of the intricacies involved in defining the moral make-up of this country, while also
showing why it is important to not let any extreme or even moderate view prevail in
influencing our policies. Extreme viewpoints are generally held by a minority of the
population. They have the capacity to harm a majority, while even moderate stances, if
allowed to harden into dogma, have the ability to harm based on the fact that they no longer
contain the elasticity necessary to accommodate changes in the environment and/or
demography of the affected population. We will find, then, that in our country there are many
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areas - from churches to professional organizations - which offer definitions of correct moral
conduct.
The importance of critical thinking to the formation of good judgment is discussed
next. This ability to judge well is the vital core for policy implementors. We look at the many
crucial steps that allow this talent to form and emerge.
Thus, Part One of Chapter Four focuses on how a society is composed, its many
facets. Yet we, as individuals, reflect the type of society in which we live, even while that
society reflects to all others, in a sense, the type of individuals it contains.
Part Two will begin by looking at the concept o f ‘fi’eedom’, its various definitions, and
how the meanings of the word have subtly changed over time as has the environment in which
we live and the institutions that guarantee freedom itself. Dewey will point out why greater
freedom requires greater responsibility and care in the interaction between institutions and
individuals.
An in-depth look at institutions - from simple customs to formal government
structures - is presented by Bellah, et al. Then, an example of how institutional change can
be effected is considered. This is followed by an historical overview of how and why certain
of our current institutions originated. We will find that individuals do not exist apart from
institutions, nor do institutions exist without people to form and affect them. Problems arise
when we attempt to solve social challenges by excising ethics from technical acumen, rather
than using the whole of knowledge in an integrated fashion by which we draw on each part
as the need arises. Moral reasoning is equally as necessary as engineering ability and analysis
when we are attempting to understand and solve the challenges of living in a society.
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In the section titled “Moral Experience, Argument, and Beliefs”, Aristotle highlights
the differences between the community or political society and the family or daily
companionship. Dewey, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, and Abraham Kaplan introduce a look at
morality - its language and our reactions to it. Different ‘languages’ - dogmatism, or
liberalism, for example - can evoke different reactions dependent on the type of person
exposed to each, and under what circumstance the exposure occurs. Social conditioning plays
into this, so it is necessary, especially in a multi-cultural society such as ours, for
implementors to be able to judge the good for society without being influenced by personal
conditioning. Wisdom is required.
A main thrust o f this chapter is to present and highlight the idea that the moral quality
of the policy implementor him- or herself is every bit as important as having a policy that is
well-thought-out.
Implementors are themselves an important part of the process of implementation. The
quality of their abilities should therefore be as high as the quality one seeks in any product one
purchases. In this case the quality to be optimally found in an implementor is multi-faceted
yet cannot be broken down into component parts that can effectively be used alone. Each
facet contributes to the whole of an implementor’s ability.
Chapter 5 looks at other cultures’ beliefs and ways of dealing with problems,
particularly those arising with old age. Here, we find that some cultures revere rather than
ridicule the elderly. In particular, we will take an in-depth look at Japanese society to see how
another industrial culture views aging. Similarities as well as differences between Japanese
and American aging views will be considered. Other societies are briefly touched on in order
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to present the diversity of old-age belief-systems found throughout the globe in non-industrial
countries. In doing this we will also be summarily looking at the ethical systems that guide
these small-scale societies. Inequalities between young and old will be seen to exist even in
simple social milieus.
However, we will also find that improved global communications as well as
technological advances are altering the basic systems that have been in place in these societies
for centuries, so that we must be careful to not be too quick to look to them for ‘utopian’
solutions. Ruth Benedict provides important insights into perceptions of ‘normality’ as it
relates to a pan-cultural setting.
Abraham and May Edel provide much of the input for the discussion of how morality
drives a given culture under a variety of conditions. So from culture to culture, myriad
differences are seen in how old age is defined and treated. The importance of our culture in
how we understand our world is highlighted by Christine Fry.
Looking at these many cultural differences on a global level may give us, on a national
level, a new insight into how our multi-cultural country operates, and perhaps how it can
improve operation where aging policies are concerned.
Chapter Six pulls together the three main areas of discussion in this thesis - policy
implementation, perceptions of aging in our society, and how moral attitudes and ideas are
fi’amed. These three areas are used as a basis from which to examine a specific aging policy Social Security. Questions are posed which probe whether or not this government ‘pension’
system can be improved or if it should be abandoned. Alternative measures are considered.
Here, we analyze what prompted this policy and how it has come to affect both employed and
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retired Americans. In many cases, we will find that the elderly wealthy and middle class are,
in effect, receiving a generous and unnecessary entitlement fi-om Social Security. We will see
how and why social conditions have changed since the inception of the program so that it no
longer fits the purpose for which it was originally fashioned. This, it will be found, has
occurred in part because designers and implementors of the program, in its early stages, did
not have the foresight or preparation necessary to allow for flexibility based on demographic
changes and other events that could, and obviously did, cause unforeseen externalities relating
to its effectiveness.
In this chapter we will also be looking further at ageism, its positive and negative
aspects, how it is defined, and how the existence of ageism itself can affect the very programs
that are designed to aid the elderly. We shall see how value conflicts arise between
generations and how these contribute toward a build-up of resentment on both sides of the
generational gap. Views will be presented as to why aged individuals can now be perceived
as being better off, financially and physically, than those of preceding generations.
Since policy recommendations are included in this chapter, making it rather lengthy,
I have divided it into two sections, as I did with Chapter Four. In this case, the
recommendations comprise most of Part Two.
Part One of Chapter Six examines the State and its obligations and duties toward its
citizens. Looking at Social Security in this light, we will find that it is not serving our society
as well as it could in some instances. As it is currently set up, it appears to penalize the few
for the benefit of the many. But, as shall be seen, it is also serving a large segment of society
which does not nor should not benefit fi’om it. In other words, the ‘whole’ of working society
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is not being considered in the big picture, for all are summarily required to deposit part of
their wages with the government rather than with the investment instrument of their choice,
where retirement security is concerned. This, I believe, is a great wrong as well as a great
disservice to all employed Americans. The lack of choice stifles personal responsibility and
enterprise, and it encourages reliance on the State by the individual, in effect, allowing the
government to make an important personal decision.
Mandatory retirement at a specific age regardless of physical condition or financial
necessity is an institutional requirement that also needs to be reconsidered. Alternatives that
could be beneficial to both employers and employees are explored.
According to Peter Uhlenberg we find that life is centered in three areas for most
people: education, work, and leisure. In actuality, we will see that these areas are too rigidly
defined in terms of age in our country. Consequently, removing age-specific tags from these
activities is an area we need to concentrate on, for they only serve to promulgate ageism and
to foster generational resentment. Yet this does not mean that we should generalize rules or
do away with them, for they are necessary for handling moral problems that arise. I intend to
show that our government-managed ‘pension’ has lost its connection to the environment,
where its many ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ are concerned. This lapse, in my opinion, is greatly
responsible for the moral and financial challenges that Social Security now faces.
Allowing private retirement fund systems to operate in lieu of Social Security for
those employed individuals who do not wish to participate in the govemment-run program
is, as will be argued, the only reasonable and fair way to salvage, supplement, or phase out
the crippled, existing program. We will see that other government resources on the local.
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State, and national level are already in place to provide necessary programs for those elderly
individuals who are truly indigent and/or unable to handle their own affairs.
Since many persons are now being provided a “service” that they neither need nor
want, I propose that it is now time to seriously consider alternative approaches to the current
Social Security policy.
The concluding Chapter Seven takes up a discussion that will center on the title of this
thesis, “Ethics and the Moral Limits of Policy”. Drawing on what has been discussed in the
preceding chapters, and adding to it with input from Elizabeth Wolgast, we shall consider “the
moral limits of policy” as these may relate to the roles and actions that government takes in
a society, and how these act upon the autonomy of the individual.
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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND

Ageism has been referred to as the ultimate prejudice, the final discrimination, the
most merciless rejection.*
Age stratification is a system by which people are classified by their age. Most
societies incorporate this system into their structure, using other classifications such as race,
socio-economic status, and sex as well. There is either an implicit or explicit ranking, from
higher to lower, in all of these sj'stems. The elderly hold the highest position in gérontocratie
societies while the youngest hold the lowest. In our society, according to Erdman Palmore,
the middle-aged tend to hold the most power and prestige, children the least, and the young
and old rank in between. This ranking is a form o f ageism which is implicit with age
stratification systems.^
Most Americans exhibit prejudice against seniors in several ways. This comes out in
various studies which have continually discovered that most of those participating believe
erroneous stereotypes about the elderly, such as;
—the majority of aged are not able to adapt to change;
—most are lonely, bored, often irritated and angry, and live alone;
—most live in poverty, or in nursing homes;
—the aged are more often victims of criminal acts than
13
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younger persons; and
- the aged are injured more often than others/
Ageism is mirrored by use in our society of such idiomatic expressions as "old crock", "old
duffer", "old fogey", "old goat", "crone", "coot", "geezer", and "hag", to name a few/
Sociologists speculate whether or not the elderly should be classified as a minority
group. Perhaps they should, because, like Blacks and Hispanics, they too are subjected to
discrimination and prejudice. Gerontologists have noted that mere stereotyping does not
represent older adults nor does it measure our responses to them. Like all facets of any
culture, we see in the elderly a variety of representations; the wise and foolish, the nice and
mean, the rich and poor, the strong and weak. Stereotypes are not a real measure of
discrimination for or against the elderly nor of prejudices relating to them, for these are
complex reactions.^
The elderly in our culture are expected to retire at a specific time, take care of their
assets and health, and to reap the rewards and privilege of receiving Social Security benefits.
Such age norms can be construed as ageism depending on whether the assumptions in which
they are grounded are prejudicial or not, and whether or not those assumptions and
expectations are appropriate and realistic. When age conflict occurs it is usually over values
or scarce resources. A disadvantaged age group may desire more power or goods while the
more privileged seek to retain and protect what they already have. While this usually takes
place within such institutions as the family or the workplace®, it also extends to the wider
community at times. For instance, recent concerns have been aired by young adults over their
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doubts that they will ever see any of what they are currently paying in to the Social Security
system.
A newspaper article recently noted the scepticism felt by the young, due to the deficit
and "bleak economic times". The elderly are seen as now receiving more than their fair share
of the "economic pie". Their interests are seen as being in collision with those of the young,
and they are perceived as holding too much power and wealth. In turn, some elders reject this
view stating that they worked hard for what they have, and the young do not carry as much
responsibility as they did when they were young. ^
Twenty years ago, Simone de Beauvoir pointed out that Americans have removed the
word "death" fi’om their vocabulary while also avoiding allusion to great age. She notes,
however, that this has become a phenomenon of all Western industrialized nations. Aging is
perceived as a sort of shameful, forbidden subject bound by a "conspiracy of silence". In such
circumstances the elderly become outcasts in their own societies; and she sees this social
neglect as a criminal offence.* This "fallacy", as de Beauvoir calls it, is further endorsed by
legislators and economists when they refer to the non-active segment of society as burdening
the active segment, forgetting that today's elderly raised and educated today's middle-aged;
and those who are currently active will, soon enough, join the ranks of the non-active. She
believes that this short-sighted point of view does not recognize that when they take care of
the elderly they are insuring their own futures.®
Many other cultures tend to admire the characteristics of old age while ours tends to
equate old age with ugliness and youthfulness with beauty. In Japan, for example, wrinkles
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and silver hair are frequently associated with maturity, wisdom, and long years of community
service.*”
On one hand. Western society offers the aged a "purified image" of themselves as
white-haired, venerable sages rich in experience and elevated above the common state of life,
but if they should deviate from this unreahstically perceived standard of how they must be,
they then seemingly fall below it,** and somehow fail.
Many people decide that the elderly are unable to carry on with their jobs, and that
the ones who do not retire are unproductive. One third of college students surveyed think
"older workers usually cannot work as effectively as younger workers". This prejudice is the
framework for the policies of compulsory retirement and discrimination which are still seen
in hiring, retraining, and promoting elderly workers.*^ How have we arrived at these views?
Is there rational justification for holding them, or have we unthinkingly gone along with
popular sentiment and misperceptions? And how have our public policies added to the
practice of ageism?

Historical Perspectives
In the U. S. in colonial times, according to Palmore, "positive ageism" was practiced.
This was based on several factors; elders' control of land and crafts; elders as a primary source
of information; a relative paucity of elders; and the power o f the family, traditions (dominated
by elders), and the church. He sees these factors as having been reversed irrevocably in
current times since neither church, tradition, nor family are as powerful in society as they once
were. Television, magazines, educational institutions, and books are all perceived as now

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

17
eclipsing the role of the elder as a source of information.*^ But this does not necessarily
indicate that information emanating from the media is equal to or better than wisdom or good
judgment.
In order to better understand the roles that seniors now have in our society it is
necessary to look at the roles they have had in Western culture in the past. Depending on the
era depicted, observers and historians present varying perspectives on aging as well as on the
treatment of the elderly within their particular social spheres.
Cicero, the Roman author, orator, and statesman (106-43 B.C.), wrote of old age as
a time of great attainment, particularly for men, during which they were capable of providing
important contributions to society. He likened old men to the pilots of ships:
Just because they sit quietly does not mean they are idle, for great
things are accomplished by deliberation, influence, and judgment, qualities
with which old age is usually blessed.
Old men have been active intellectually. Some say that memory
becomes weaker with age. Certainly that may be true if the individual is not
too bright to begin with, or fails to use his memory.
Old men are active in educating. Nor does old age prevent study.
Solon prided himself on learning something new every day. Socrates mastered
the lyre when an old man. Cato... learned Greek...
Old age makes the body weaker. Physical strength is relative. Athletes
certainly can become flabby. However, it is ridiculous to mourn an inevitable
change. Each age has its own characteristic, e.g. weakness in childhood,
strength in youth, maturity in old age. Since life is lived only once, man must
make the most of whatever each period offers.
Proper attention to physical and mental health will counter the
negative aspects of old age. Intellect activity is a must. A man who spends
his life in intellectual pursuits will not feel old age creeping up on him.
Man has been given no better gift than his mind; nothing is more
inimical to it than bodily pleasure. Where pleasure rules, virtue cannot exist.
Nor can a man under the influence of pleasure use his mind for thought and
reason.
Old age has its privileges. These privileges derive from the authority
and prestige which crowns old age. However, certain types of prestige will
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only be enjoyed by those who lay the groundwork for it in their youth. It is
the result of a life well-spent. Sparta honored old age best. In the college of
augurs at Rome, the oldest is respected even more than those holding the
highest curule oflBce, and is always asked to speak first. There are no sensual
pleasures which can compare to those which emanate from prestige.
Defects of old age are due to character. The elderly are often accused
of being peevish, irritable, difficult, even avaricious, but all old men are not
this way.
Nothing lasts forever. Nor can we turn back the clock. Therefore each
must be satisfied with his allotted span and live it as best he can. Nature
decrees that the old shall die. Whatever happens according to nature should
be considered a blessing.
However, a little over one century later the poet and playwright Juvenal (55-140
A.D.), depicts the elderly Roman male in quite a different light:
Yet how grisly, how unrelenting are longevitie's ills! Look first at your
face, you'll see an ugly and shapeless caricature of its former self: your skin
has become a scaly hide, you're all chapfallen, the wrinkles scored down your
cheeks now make you resemble nothing so much as some elderly female
baboon in darkest Africa.
But old men all look alike, all share the same bald pate, their noses all
drip like an infant's, their voices tremble as much as their limbs, they mumble
their bread with toothless gums. It's a wretched life for them, they've become
a burden to their wives, their children, themselves; the noblest and best of
them become so loathsome that even legacy hunters turn queasy. Their taste
buds are ruined, they get scant pleasure fi'om food or wine, sex lies in long
oblivion —or if they try, it's hopeless... What can the future hold for these
impotent dodderers? Nothing very exciting...
Other senses deteriorate: take hearing, for instance. How can the deaf
appreciate music? The blood runs thin with age, too: now nothing but fever
can warm that fiigid hulk, while diseases of every type assault it by battalions.
But worse than all bodily ills is the senescent mind. Men forget what
their own servants are called, they can't recognize yesterday's host at dinner,
or, finally, the children they begot and brought up.*’
On the surface, it is difficult to believe that each author is speaking of the same
culture. However, in the intervening century between the two, cultural influences could have
subtly changed the outlook toward the old. But perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that
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each writer approaches the subject from a different perspective; each, obviously, was serving
his craft in his own way. Cicero was a statesman, used to influencing people and being treated
with respect. Juvenal made his living by making people laugh, by pointing out the ridiculous.
Yet each portrayal of aging is probably true for certain types of people. Cicero gives the most
thoughtful and well-rounded assessment, while Juvenal has used caricatures that emphasize
the worst possible scenario. Whatever the reasons for these differences may be, it is evident
that we can draw parallels between perspectives held in ancient Rome and those currently
held in our society regarding aging. It is not difficult to find ample evidence of both
veneration and satirization of the elderly in our society.
According to Haber, around the middle of the nineteenth century the unique problems
of the elderly became the focus of businessmen, charity workers, doctors, social workers, and
social theorists. The writings of these "experts" showed the elderly to be without much
purpose within the framework of an industrial society, and were centered particularly upon
those elderly who no longer were shielded by traditional justifications of prestige. These
policies resulted in tending to further segregate the elderly from their communal origins. The
experts saw the elderly as having little of significance to contribute to society, and this
outlook was extended beyond the realm of those suffering from illness and poverty.** But
perhaps it is now past time to challenge the scope and direction of this extension.
This attitude became institutionalized in programs which were begun to assist the
elderly and manifested themselves in the form of institutions and asylums, geriatric medicine,
and pension plans. These programs all focused on the removal of the aged from industrialized
society, seeking to house them in an environment purposely set apart from the younger

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

20

generations. These measures, in their formulation, reflected the beliefs of the experts that
usefulness and productivity were ended for this segment of society.

Ironically, these

pessimistically based views of aging had been created as a means to "assist" the elderly. The
problems of the elderly had created an awareness and concern that was, in fact, genuine.*’
Social Security, as we know, was enacted; retirement homes began, and focused on the
special needs of the elderly. This was all done because of a seemingly newly developing social
conscience that could not sanction the perceived outright abandonment of the aging. But
some policies which affected the aging had been implemented without fiill consideration of
the far-reaching effects they might induce. Chapter Six will concentrate on and further
develop this theme. Once a policy is in place it needs to be evaluated to be sure that it is doing
what it was meant to do, to be sure that it is being used the way it was meant to be used. This
will be more widely explored in the following chapter on policy implementation.
Nancy Foner points out that in pre-industrial America adulthood merged with old age
without "institutionalized disruptions". Work and parenthood were the two major social roles
for adults, and these periods flowed over an entire lifespan. Compulsory retirement and an
"empty nest" were unheard-of terms. It was only after older people were gradually ousted
from the labor force along with the decline of parental functions, in their later years, that a
new awareness of old age led to age segregation.**
Even during the colonial period of the U. S. certain types of people were always
characterized as outdated or overaged. Among these were elderly individuals who did not
have wealth, family, or occupation to back them up. They were a powerless group. Many
were boarded out with neighbors, passed from town to town, or were placed in almshouses
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to pass their final years in poverty and weakness. These superannuated elders retained
tenuous ties by which they could stay integrated within society.*® Yet we are often told that
old age connoted esteem and honor in the colonial era.’**This disparity between descriptions
of conditions experienced by the elderly does not necessarily mean that one is true and one
is false. We would have to examine the points of view taken by each historical recorder to
find the underlying reason(s) for such opposing views. I believe that the description varies
depending on the race and social class to which particular elders belonged. Then, one would
have to weigh the possible differences in class and race between the recorder and the
recorded. Finally, we would have to find out if the accounts given were written during the
time being written about or if they were written during a later period and perhaps tinged with
romanticism or other prejudicial leanings.
In contrast to these colonial measures, the programs later enacted during the
industrialized era of the mid-nineteenth century did far more than rescue the elderly from the
almshouses. These policies did not call on the elderly to do piecemeal work for charity
organizations based on their abilities.

Rather, the elderly simply found themselves

institutionalized. Age restrictions calling for mandatory retirement actually were part of a
rational effort to alleviate myriad problems. In a sense, using age as a determining factor
eliminated many uncertainties in an era where urban and industrial growth seemed to magnify
the complexities of society. This became a way to measure one's place in the world. As each
year passed, a person moved through planned stages. In large urban areas, during the mid
nineteenth century, children were placed in grades at school according to their chronological
ages’*rather than their abilities, as had previously been done.
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Our current concept of adolescence did not start to assume its present meaning until
the late nineteenth century. It was at this time that entry into the work force was delayed due
to prolonged schooling.” The effects of sweeping age-based regulations began to be more
fully felt in the aged population by the early twentieth century.” These regulations, in some
respects, were not a bad thing in and of themselves, because of child labor laws, which
addressed the exploitation of school-age children.
Due to the trend of supplanting the wisdom of the elders by way of the mass media
and educational institutions, positive ageism became greatly reduced. This also came about
in part because after the American Revolution an emphasis on secularism, equality, the free
market, and individual achievement began to accelerate. Positive ageism was affected by these
ideological developments. In addition, negative ageism was spurred, after the Civil War, by
modernization trends whereby the skills of older workers were rendered obsolete.”

The Industrial Factor
According to de Beauvoir, the advance of industrialization as a whole has led to a
"progressive dissolution of the family unit". In industrialized countries the marked aging of
the population since the 1920s has led to the community taking the place of the fam ily-^ The
economy of industrialized countries was founded on profit and this has come to rule our
entire civilization. De Beauvoir strongly believes that humans are of interest [to society] only
in so far as they are profitable, being otherwise tossed aside and regarded merely as rejects
and scraps in the final fifteen or twenty years of their lives. This treatment of the elderly
reveals what she calls "the failure of our civilization". She believes that society would be
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profoundly moved if only it could see this obvious truth.’* However, one has to wonder how
"the community" delivers a comforting hug, wipes away a tear, provides a sympathetic ear,
or delivers any other of the practically indefinable comforts engendered within a loving family
circle. Perhaps de Beauvoir's point is that it cannot, but this is not made clear. Does it not
seem that what the community attempts to provide are services? And at the base of policies
providing these services, do we not find an ambience that promotes a shift away from family
stability toward fiscal reliance? The community can supply medical treatment, food to the
hungry, and schools in which to learn a new trade or to update an old one. But never can we
truly believe that it takes the place - or even attempts to do so - of the "family unit". If some
elders are ignored by their frunilies public assistance can and will care for them physically but
is incapable of providing the loving care and attention that can only emanate from one's
personal circle of friends and relatives. Love and caring has to be every bit as important as
community services to the health and well-being of an elder. I suspect that de Beauvoir did
not address this because it would have blurred the lines of her argument, for she was intent
on showing that the elderly are, in many cases, discriminated against.
Dewey enlarges on and investigates this theme more deeply. Looking at the concept
of family itself, he sees the family as being, first and foremost, a food association on which
the notion of community is based. He backs up this central idea by referring to anthropologi
cal research findings that clearly place the family unit as a centralized community for locating
and distributing food. Thus we find that, in principle, there is a family wherever community
action is taken together for the sake of food. The special impetus for the community has been
an economic one. This principle holds true, in general, for various kinds of family life.
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Consequently, in his view, if we have an industrial society, under certain relations, we will be
quite certain to find a given family type, whereas an agricultural life will offer up a particular,
and different, type of family life. It follows that the nomadic life would engender yet another
style of family life. We see by this that the element of stability in family life has a direct
relation to that present in the economy. The evolution of family life is, therefore, concurrent
with the evolution of economic stability.” Thus, we can have many concepts for the "stable
family", none of which may attain an ideal, but where, within all given family systems, the
basic necessities - such as food, shelter, and protection - are met.
Up until the introduction of the fiictory system the family was essentially an economic
unit, according to Dewey. It is still a unit of consumers, which points out what he presents
as "the organic interaction" between the economic and the family institutions. Economic
difficulty related to old age is simply another aspect of this interaction. If economic worries
were an isolated matter, this would be relatively simple to resolve. But the ability to save is
also tied into this problem. These issues, therefore cannot be solved at the individual level
but must be addressed at the social level.” And, it appears that they must, in being thus
addressed, be viewed not as, for instance, "the problem of the elderly", but as a series of
related issues in a continuum. Expressing this another way, we must see the problems of the
elderly as individual subsets (financial, health, nutrition, mobility) of the issue of the elderly
in society, which is itself only a facet of the greater issue of the overall health of that society.
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Social Attitudes
Old age, according to de Beauvoir, not only changes the individual's relationship with
time, but also with his or her own history, and with the world. Since we live in a society
rather than "in a state of nature", in old age as well as in the preceding periods of life, the
society to which we belong imposes our status upon us. Thus we become "conditioned" by
society's practical and theoretical attitudes toward us.” As long as our elders are perceived
as being apart from the community there will be problems in dealing with them and difficulty
in resolving their problems.
Haber believes that there is no doubt that age-based measures and the beliefs on which
they were based have had a great impact on the elderly. By 1970, three fourths of all men
over age sixty-five were retired. Ironically, these measures have ensured the dependence of
a great number of the elderly in an attempt to assist those suffering from illness and poverty.
The programs of this policy have separated many of the elderly from the means that once
assured their ongoing prestige.’®In effect these programs, although well-meaning, end up
defining the natural aging process as something suddenly defined artificially. Age becomes
analogous with decline and uselessness. An individual who is productive and active at sixtyfour is suddenly, upon becoming sixty-five, no longer a valid contributor to society. His or
her talents have just dissipated. This social attitude appears to be a matter of perception that
is engendered by the language and impersonal administration of the programs themselves. It
also presents an image of elders as so many sheep docilely waiting to be herded. Surely that
cannot be.
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A different perspective, however, is aired by Foner who states that the premise that
changes in age relations occurred after industrialization is now being challenged by historians
of aging. She cites studies which show that, for instance, in the English population, extensive
shifts in the proportion of the aged did not come about until more than a century after
industrialization occurred. And in the U. S., the noticeable undermining of the authority of
the elderly was begun well before urbanization, industrialization, or mass education had any
effect here. The elderly in Europe and American never existed in idyllic circumstances in
preindustrial eras, according to this view. Their actual condition was a mixture of some real
power, cultural derision, official respect, and ample economic and physical degradation which,
therefore, saw improvements in some respects while it deteriorated in others with the
beginnings of modernization.’* In pre-industrial Western societies, for instance, the condition
o f the elderly was varied according to class, racial group, and sex. These variations were
found not only among those societies but within them. We can also see many continuities
between the past and present conditions of the elderly, and cannot absolutely state that they
were better provided for in pre-industrial times than they are now. Foner states emphatically
that;
There is no reason to suppose that in the traditional era deliberate provision
was made for the physical, emotional or economic needs of aged persons,
aged relations or aged parents in a way which was in any sense superior to the
provision now being made by the children, the relatives and the friends of
aged persons in our own day, not to speak of the elaborate machinery of an
anxiously protective welfare state.”
Foner appears to have a more realistic view here of the condition of the elderly with respect
to historical changes. Realistically, their condition would have to be a mix since people differ
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so completely in areas of economy, power, class, background, education and mind-set. Social
change is never wholly bad nor wholly good. Certainly some individuals will benefit while
others are not affected by policy implementation. The challenge is, I believe, to have policy
facilitators administer their programs with these differences in mind. Affixing a stereotype on
a whole class or group of people rarely targets anyone correctly.
Before delving further into policies regarding the elderly we need to take a break and
look at the components of policy implementation and its importance in the attempt to create
better ways of dealing with social issues.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE ART OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The art of policy implementation might well be modeled after Aristotle’s sense of the
art of moral well-being. We should approach our moral challenges in a manner of enthusiastic
investigation, fitting the right program to the right purpose, at the right time, and for the right
reasons.* Not directly facing these challenges out of a fear of change or from a desire to
maintain the status quo can be readily seen to be self-limiting and potentially maladaptive or
even destructive to the community. Consequently, certain systems within the substrate of the
social structure can and will fail, or at the least, falter and get off track, and they will no
longer fulfill their original agenda. Aristotelian concepts are at the base o f my argument as to
what constitutes the art of effectual policy implementation.
Due to the complexity of social systems, unexpected "externalities" often occur that
were neither intended nor foreseen. These unanticipated results of policies and their programs
can, however, be calculated, to a limited extent, prior to implementation, by the practically
wise diligent policy planner. It is unrealistic to expect the sheer force of reason to produce
perfect foresight and total reduction of uncertainty in this respect.’ However, imagine that
a particular policy has been fashioned in as conscientious a manner as possible, attention

30

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m i s s io n o f t h e c o p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p ro h ib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

31

given to all readily foreseeable consequences, and the implementation process has begun. At
this point the policy has been tightly crafted to address a particular problem, offering wellthought-out solutions and attention to costs as well as to benefits. In short, we are supposing
that it is as close to being ‘perfect’ as it can be. We could refer to this as ‘stage one’ in a
two-step process, ‘stage two’ being the active implementation itself. It is at stage two’ that
the perfect' policy can go awry, according to how it is used, and how it is managed. Up to
this point the policy has been crafted by experts and it has been created as the result of care
and caring; it is the fiuit of public participation and a sound deliberative process. Its eventual
emergence as a full-blown policy can be seen as akin to the birth of a perfect child. But like
a child, this policy will be influenced by its environment, by the people who handle it on a
daily basis. And ideally, these people should be morally and intellectually competent to do so.
Activation and implementation of ‘stage two’ of the policy begins at this point. It is the crux
of practicality.

Policy Effects
According to Brewer and de Leon, shortly into implementation an evaluation must be
done in which the consequences flowing from complex problems are sensed and addressed.
They state that at this point accurate feedback information is needed in order to decide
whether effects from the policy are negative or positive, to what extent, and for whom. Such
assessments can lead to other policies being instituted that bolster desired effects and
eliminate unwanted ones. Ideally, policy makers will watch to see that outworn policies and
programs are either terminated or adjusted. Attention must be maintained to spot unwanted
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externalities, for they represent potentially serious issues ’ But we know, too, that other
considerations often come into play here and impede active pursuit of the ideal; such things
as the question of the dedication and integrity of those who are entrusted with managing
policy implementation. There are the foibles of human nature which come into play; when
self-aggrandizement, greed, or plain incompetence derail a program or sabotage a policy
How can we guard against this happening?
Aristotle was one of the earliest to point out that;
In every field, it is those who are experienced that judge its products
correctly, and are privy to the means and the manner in which they were
accomplished and understand what combinations are harmonious. The
inexperienced, on the other hand, must be satisfied if they do not fail to
recognize whether the work has been produced well or badly.'*
A problem we face, therefore, is how to ensure that the people into whose hands these
policies are placed are capable both technically and morally, to faithfully guide, yet be astute
enough to recognize and correct for the appearance of unwanted externalities, even to the
point of admitting that their particular program or policy may have seen its last days. Are
there many who could do so and risk possible or even almost certain elimination of their
current positions in so doing? Or, is it better to have the policy makers themselves also be
the assessors of their policies? If so, would not these previously stated concerns apply also
to them? And would they be capable of admitting that a 'pet project' was not all that it could
be? Would they be capable of judging impartially?
In their schema for policy implementation Brewer and de Leon deliver their
understanding of the humane aims of a democratic society as being permanent even though
circumstances may change. Consequently these aims must be constantly respecified "in

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m i s s io n o f t h e c o p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u rth er r e p r o d u c tio n p ro h ib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

33

concrete circumstances via specific policy measures so that whatever potential for progress
exists can be realized".’ As they see it, policy is one of the concrete embodiments of a
collective perception of the future. Humans are always looking to the future and hold a more
or less collective perception of what it should be. This perception comes fi'om many sources
and is based on one's experience, identity, and expectations. This has to be taken into account
when a policy is being produced,* or during ‘stage one’. However, it should also be kept in
mind that these same collective perceptions will affect what happens to a policy during the
time it is guiding practice. People involved in the day-to-day operations emanating from the
policy will inevitably bring to their execution of policy-related tasks their own perceptions of
how they should be executed, these perceptions having been filtered through their own unique
experiences. This certainly affects how the policy is used, both in subtle ways and on
occasion, in ways that are more apparent. Consequently, it follows that assessment of a policy
will be somewhat influenced by these same types of prejudices, although perhaps in an
unconscious fashion.
Not only can the effects of a policy trickle down to intended beneficiaries, but they
can also "bubble up", thereby changing or reforming the policy from within. Brewer and de
Leon relate the following example which occurred during World War n. Local gasoline
rationing boards started, on their own initiative, to allocate additional gasoline to returning
veterans. This began from a sense of patriotic duty, and was not authorized by either national
guidelines or legislation. The national board later revised its standards to conform to local
procedures, "bowing in part to the bureaucratic rationality of local sub-units, and in part to
regional fear of losing control over local boards as an outgrowth of this set of ad hoc
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decisions". Policy implementors are able to modify a program by formulating their own
judgments within it and thereby changing it to such an extent that it is not recognizable to its
originator and even ignores the policy's intent.’ But, as in this example, that judgment can be
practically well-advised and so improve the policy.
Even though the result of the actions of the local boards was beneficial to a
"deserving" group of citizens, these actions, taken outside the policy guidelines, could have
had a negative effect not discussed by Brewer and de Leon. If there had been a dire shortage
of gasoline the general population could have been affected, and perhaps gasoline that might
have been earmarked for emergency vehicles or construction machinery, for instance, would
have been diverted, due to the local board decision. Returning servicemen were also marrying
in record numbers after the war, and housing was in short supply for these new families. A
further restriction on post-war construction could have exacerbated this problem. This is not
to say that policies should be blindly followed if it is perceived that changes can improve their
function. Innovation has often yielded positive results. But if it is not done in accord with a
concern for the overall benefit of society its purpose will be diminished, it will not be
effective. This requires a continual focus on the ideal ends of an action as well as on possible
externalities.

Rules and Limits
Participation in the implementation process is seen by Brewer and de Leon as a daily
interaction among various implementing agencies. Congress influences this process. It issues
formal statements, on what should be done, in the form of laws. Additionally, it fosters the
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activities of legislative committees and subcommittees to ensure compliance with legislative
intent. On this national level "the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget
Office, the Library of Congress and the Office of Technological Assessment" have the ability
to affect implementation in different ways. Interest groups as well as strategically placed
individuals also have a role in this process. And finally, bureaucratic rivalry has a part in this
complicated interplay of activities* which often appears to impede the process more than
benefit it.
Brewer and de Leon declare that there are many views of implementation, such as
"carrying out a program of actions", or "executing a selected option". Primarily, implementa
tion is seen as "an evolutionary thing in that we merely converted the requirements of the law
into administrative requirements". And because implementation has not been regarded as a
separate part of the total policy process but rather as just one step among many, this has made
it nearly impossible to faithfully convert the policy into its separate operational programs. This
requires a special effort. Another reason that implementation can be seen as problematic is
due to its complexity, which causes difficulty in description and analytical classification,
thereby impeding assessment. These multiple factors are seen as clouding clear understanding.
"Some simply equate implementation with politics and leave it at that. Usually, administrators
are left such broad discretion in carrying out legislation or an executive order that they can
easily modify the policy to fit bureaucracy's particular interests or personal requirements."®
But, where does this leave the individuals for whose benefit the policy originally was
intended?
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How We Define Our Ends, or Do We?
Abraham Edel points out that eventually we must realize that "every treatment of
evaluative method has to face the problem of how we can evaluate ends". He states that it is
apparent that means can be evaluated because they can be assessed in terms of the ends. But
those ends themselves are never evaluated. Instead, they are merely pursued or imagined.*®
But if we take time to consider it, the ends too should be evaluated specifically because we
are continually faced with the fact that newer generations are following us in time. We cannot
just simply hand them old attitudes, because conditions are constantly changing. Otherwise,
we leave these generations nothing of substance to work with. We give them jobs to perform,
the content of which holds no values, perchance to be filled by whatever passing fancy
happens to catch hold. Therefore it is an indispensable element of evaluation that we attend
to the nature of our ideals and to the criteria by which we evaluate them.** This is a good
point. Our policies age. Nothing remains static. Do we expect the next generation to use our
methods for solving their problems? In some instances they will be faced with problems
similar to ours, and in those cases perhaps "old" methods will be perfectly adequate. But we
should try to educate our young in such a way that they are able to think creatively and be
able to elicit their own solutions to fit the new situations that will occur in their lifetimes. This
does not imply that we should leave our problems for them to solve, but that we must set
policies in place with an eye to their perceived ends in light of future challenges and changes
in the nature of circumstances. Policies must be flexible while at the same time serving their
intended purpose.
To quote Edel:
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...whether one philosophical outlook will prefer to speak of ideals themselves
as changing, and another of ideals as eternal but men's relation to them
changing, there is in both cases a phenomenon of change which it is possible
to describe once we have the location of the particular ideal. In this sense, we
may think of the history of an ideal and speak of the succession of qualities
and relations it has during its history as its career. In this respect, change is
a normal feature o f ideals and the career of an ideal is to be found on the face
of history as events. Thus an ideal may have a coming-into-being and even a
passing-away. There is no inconsistency in the notion of the death of an ideal.
In fact, we may even speak of the natural death of an ideal. The natural death
of an ideal is to pass from feelings to human institutions and, when so
embedded, to be taken for granted to such an extent that intensity due to ten
sion disappears, so that only a madman would act contrary to it. This does not
mean that the values it embodies will have died, nor is it our aim to kill all
ideals. In the case of some ideals at least - peace on earth, for example natural death through achievement in the sense described is overdue.*’
If we replace the word "ideal" with the word "policy", what Edel has said would also apply
to a good poUcy. The only discernable difference might be that the ends for which certain
policies are designed might cease to exist, perhaps to be replaced by something worse, such
as the circumstances produced by corruption or war, thereby rendering the policy useless
through no fault of its own.
Nancy Sherman would not agree with Edel's assertion that ends are never evaluated.
Instead, she believes that we make our plans "in order to maximize the possibility of
coordinating our various ends". Consequently, we find that life holds moral ends, personal
concerns, and political ideals.*’ Thus, over time we may reach a series of ends, such as in
pursuing the goal of living one's life well. In this respect, various ends are not necessarily
achieved simultaneously; they may be achieved in stages that could be described as plateaus.
Yet at each plateau which is attained, one does not merely travel on toward the next end, but
reassesses one's situation, making certain attitude changes or adjustments while contemplating
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the necessity for retaining other plans. In this fashion a life is built toward excellence, toward
living as well as one can, given current conditions.
Thus, according to Sherman, the network of ends we seek must be sought based on
decisions which relate to how the ends we seek fit into a continually changing life-course, and
certain ends may give way to more preferable ends in our overall calculations of how to best
achieve our goals. Consequently, we must be flexible enough to revise our ends based on
experience and reflection upon our goals. Ends can be refined and changed by imagination
and belief and we do this revising relative to other ends we also desire. In view of this it can
be seen that ends are not fixed and static but become fluid when guided by reason. '* Overall,
Sherman's view would not disagree with the outcome of Edel's chain of thought, but only with
his statement that ends are never evaluated. For Edel does not say that ideals cannot be
evaluated, only that they are not evaluated. One difference in their approaches to this subject
seems to be that, in this instance, Edel speaks of policy in particular while Sherman focuses
on life and how it is or should be lived. Edel does concur that assessment and evaluation
should be an important part of determining our ends. What holds for achieving personal goals
also holds for implementing policies - in both cases the original design requires feedback from
actions taken in order to continue to work toward the planned outcome in a particular
situation.
This section has striven to emphasize the importance of continually evaluating ends
during the lifetime of a policy or program, noting that nothing can be forever set in stone.
Conditions change, people and their needs change, and sometimes they change their minds.
Government restrictions and input also play a role in developing goals. These factors all add
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to the interplay of what Sherman refers to as a network of ends. As Aristotle, Dewey, and
Sherman discuss this idea of evaluation for personal ends, this chapter has adapted their
thoughts for the evaluation of policy implementation.
The policy facilitator who guides the implementation process must be able to
recognize and prepare for shifts due to potential and actual variables, as mentioned above.
This is why it is greatly important that this person be able to judge the progress of the policy
with wisdom as well as experience, as Aristotle has counseled.
Later, we will see how Social Security policy regarding the aged has fared in view of
these elements. But for now we need to delve into the ways that our important decisions are
made and discuss the various points of view that ultimately factor into what ends up being the
official philosophy driving a policy and its programs.
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CHAPTER FOUR

HOW WE PERCEIVE MORALITY

In this chapter, as the title suggests, I will delve into certain aspects of our perceptions
of morality. In doing so, I will be attempting to define and analyze the concepts of the ‘good
person’, and the ‘good society’. Since this subject is so far-reaching and contains so many
inter- related aspects, it is necessary to divide this chapter into two parts so that the material
presented will be more easily followed.
What comprises the moral experience and determines what moral virtue is? How
important is the community in relation to the special needs of our elderly? Ethical values will
be discussed. Where do they come from? How are they perpetuated? How do we come to
judge things, and what forms that judgment?

I will briefly look at “universalists”,

“historicists”, “absolutists”, and “relativists”, and their points of view regarding morality.
Institutions, what they should be and what they actually are or have become will be
a major concern, for they help to form our perceptions about how society should behave, and
provide the setting and framework in which management choices must be made. The
individual and his or her role in social life will be discussed. Is this role strictly as an onlooker,
a witness to greater-than-life happenings, or does the individual play one or many roles; does
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he or she matter, and if so, how? Differences in moral perceptions and how or if they affect
individual lives or just the life of a society will be examined. Are all moral duties alike? How
important is freedom to all of this? Can it actually be defined, and if so, can we also discover
how it might be lost?
These questions will be addressed primarily from an Aristotelian perspective by
Dewey, Alasdair MacIntyre, Mark Johnson, and others who are concerned with the moral
direction in which our society is currently headed. In the course of this discussion it is hoped
that the argument for the importance of the role of the policy implementor will be clarified
and strengthened.
In the discussion which follows, input from several sources will be considered. First
William Galston voices concerns over changes which are occurring in our institutions and, by
extension, in our country. John Dewey then elaborates on this theme by enumerating how
means either create or work toward ends, and which among these are of actual importance.
As we seek moral direction for our policies during the periods of implementation, clear
sightedness and the ability to make realistic and fair-minded judgments about the means we
use become more crystallized when attention is given to projecting moral consequences.
Mark Johnson will join this orchestra to comment that the

we think influences

how we see and react to moral situations. Thus, different ethical orientations can result in
solutions that are poles apart unless there is a willingness to abandon cookie-cutter concepts
in problem-solving.
Robert Bellah and his co-authors provide a motif of coherence as they explain how
many of our large institutions are failing to meet our needs as a society, and the necessity for
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these institutions to be updated as situations change within the social substrate. The theme
is expanded when Emile Durkheim joins in to elaborate on the importance of rules, codes, and
laws in a society and how these must adapt in order to conform to social progress.
Differentiation between the good individual and the good citizen is discussed by
Judith Shklar, and again, as with the other contributors, she provides a positive addition to
the central theme, offering it from yet another perspective.
The ancient wisdom of Cicero is offered to show that while technology may advance
over time, humans remain very much the same in many ways.
Julia Annas and Herbert Schneider look at judgment, the ways it is formed, how it
should be formed, and its importance to the solution of moral dilemmas.
All these contributors, while giving social commentary from their own unique
perspectives, lead into and are in agreement with the basic tenets of Aristotle regarding the
importance of femily, institutions, and the individual in creating and maintaining a successfully
working community. These multi-level views of community are necessary if we are to even
begin to understand the nature of the influences at work on any policy throughout its ‘life’.
We need now to look at the idea systems that influence the thinking of individuals and
which, in turn, ultimately affect the ways in which public policy is engendered, enacted, and
received.

PART ONE
Absolutes, Relativism, and Moral Imagination
Galston notes that in our country we can perceive rising doubts in reaction to the
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ascendancy of self-interest in private as well as public life. This, he believes, is causing a
proliferation of fears regarding "the fragmentation and privatization of American society,
mounting concerns about the effects of institutions - ranging from families to schools to the
media - and a renewed disposition to believe that without certain traditional virtues neither
public leaders nor public policies are likely to succeed".* He reflects current feelings of
cynicism toward our policy procedures and our institutions. Examples of this self-interest can
be seen in the recent explosive proliferation of ethnic and/or nationalistic groups, in the last
decade, which now insist upon recognition or consideration apart from the general population
of the nation. In part, this has given rise to the use, and occasional abuse, of terms of ‘political
correctness’ regarding certain types of conduct which may be interpreted as ‘insensitive’ or
prejudicial.
Dewey, in reflecting on the moral life, says that we are all concerned with ends one
way or another, and with choosing, arranging, and using the emotional, intellectual, and
practical means that comprise these ends. These acts, taken together, form conduct. But not
all conduct contains moral importance. Take for instance stirring a fire, or eating.
Consequently, an act is morally indifferent "whenever one end is taken for granted by itself
without any consideration of its relationship to other ends".^ Ends which are aesthetic,
hygienic, and intellectual can stand alone without any particular thought as to consequences.
"But let the value of one proposed end be felt to be opposed as to appeal to a different kind
of interest and choice, in other words, to different kinds of disposition and agency, and we
have a moral situation."^ Dewey's careful definition is important here so that we are clear
about exactly what a moral act is.
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Galston follows this line of reasoning also, stating that when certain practical and
theoretical imperatives are accepted it is because we take virtue seriously. So the right thing
to do within a particular situation, is defined relative to "what a person with a virtuous
disposition would do if he or she were in possession of the pertinent facts", and getting them
is an act of judgment, discernment. When emphasizing particulars the need for "cognitive
virtues" is implied. These virtues are focus, attention, judgment and imagination. They allow
the moral agent to evaluate ethically exacting situations correctly so that appropriate action
can be taken.^ Mark Johnson, too, expresses the necessity for us to be aware of the role that
our thought processes play in evaluating ethical situations.
According to Johnson, many of our actions are rooted in a system of metaphorical
understanding or interpretation. He sees our ends as being directed by our purposes along a
pathway. The choices we make along the way determine not only what kind of a journey we
will have, but whether or not we reach our determined end. This end, hopefully for the
individual, is a purposeful life.® Again, by analogy, it is easy to transfer this view of attaining
ends fi’om a personal format to the policy format. If wrong choices are made by implementors
during its life a program will miss its mark or not reach its desired, projected end.
Johnson looks at the ways we approach our current problems. He believes that, in
general, we are not even aware of why it is we make the choices we do or how we come to
believe certain things in the particular ways we do. He sees two major viewpoints as
representing the bases for our formulations of what we believe defines morality: the absolutist,
and the relativist. In presenting their views he uses "moral objectivity" as a means to discuss
or illuminate them.
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The absolutist, according to Johnson, sees moral objectivity as resulting from
"universally binding moral laws" which emanate from a higher power and are shared across
political and cultural boundaries. As such, moral objectivity is seen as a state of being wherein
the moral agent rises above his or her humanity and assumes a godlike universal outlook.
Universal reason, on this view, is static; it never varies. Relativists agree with the absolutists
regarding universal moral laws, but do not believe in shared cultural values that are temporally
lasting, believing rather that each culture defines morality in relation to its own particular
customs. In this context, imagination does not play any part in the formation of moral
precepts. Some relativists may acknowledge the role for imagination, but take it to be an
amorphous, ungovernable capacity.®
Yet, rather than totally discarding these imaginative ideas, which do hold some
possible and practical attributes, Johnson believes we should alter them to reflect the
advances that have been made in the cognitive sciences so that they can adequately address
our current problems. He recognizes that it is natural for us to want and need stability in our
lives, as is reflected by moral absolutism. But he finds moral relativism to be quite dangerous
because it encourages the ignoring of problems which are common to all countries, such as
environmental concerns, by insisting that there are no moral principles that are universally
held across cultures. And the "god's-eye point of view" of objectivity espoused by the
absolutists presents a humanly unattainable ideal. In feet, there is no all-encompassing concept
that we can rely upon. Instead, solutions can be attained by utilizing various concepts in
varying proportions depending on the problem at hand. Thus, we may draw on elements
derived from metaphorical definitions and prototypical designs, as well as from imagination.
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Points of view have to be found that can be shared by those who do not share identical beliefs
and prejudices. Therefore, when we try to define our moral concepts we must ask "What
metaphorical frame (or frames) is it defined relative to?", for our ideas of rationality are
"defined relative to particular values, interests, and purposes".’
In this regard, we can make positive use of our prejudices by transforming them rather
than discarding them. For it is by these that we are able to initially make sense of our
surroundings. We must see our position as being the means by which to enhance our moral
growth and understanding.* Prejudice then, in this sense, is used to interpret what it is that
confi-onts us in our life experiences; it is not used as an unjustified distortion of truth. We
need to be sure that our policies embody continual self-reflection, dialogue, and criticism
among opposed viewpoints.

The ‘Good’ Person VS. The ‘Good’ Society?
A different yet complementary picture of how moral concepts, or the lack thereof,
affect the use and outcome of policies is expressed by Bellah, et al, who see institutions as
patterned ways of living together:
Walking in any American city today, one participates in a ritual that
perfectly expresses the difficulty of being a good person in the absence of a
good society. In the midst of affluence...we pass homeless men or, often,
women with children asking for money for food and shelter. Whether we give
or withhold our spare change, we know that neither personal choice is the
right one. We may experience the difficulty of helping the plight of homeless
people as a painful individual moral dilemma, but the difficulty actually comes
from failures of the larger institutions on which our common life depends.
...with this issue, as with many others, we tend to feel helpless to shape the
institutional order that made these choices meaningful - or meaningless. In a
world undergoing enormous technological, economic, and political change,
many of the established ways we have of living together are not working well.
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Some of them are not working as they were intended to. Others are having
alarming and unintended consequences that affect not only people but the
national environment. [Consequently],institutions established at different times
and under different conditions might need to be reformed from time to time.®
This insight by Bellah, et a i provides reason enough in itself to look for ways to restructure
a program such as Social Security so that it better serves those for whom it was intended.
Many of our social policies are no longer working as they were meant to. Some, such as
Medicare, created problems and opportunities for abuse right from their onset, or implemen
tation.
Cicero succinctly pointed to the way in which society and the individual are
inextricably linked:
Society's interest and that of the individual are the same, else all human
relations - justice, liberality, ... melt away. To reserve moral action for
relations with kinfolk only is to deny all social obligations or common
interests. If foreigners were fair game, it would destroy the brotherhood of
man. It is totally unnatural to wrong a fellow man for gain. The starving sage
may not steal the food even of the most useless member of society.
There are two kinds of rules of moral universal application, which, according to
Durkheim, are divided into two groups: individual moral codes which we apply to ourselves;
and rules that relate to our dealings with other people. Individual moral codes function to seat
the foundation of morals in the consciousness. This is where "all else rests". He tells us that
one of the next highest points in ethics is formed by the rules which mark out the duties
people owe to each other.*' The difference between the two kinds of rules - rules o f duty and
individual moral codes - is that the morals of an individual are distinct from the morals of a
society.
Firstly, there can be more than one moral code in operation in our society. From the
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religious perspective there can be the obvious differences between Jewish, Catholic, Muslim,
and Protestant moral codes. And from a cultural perspective, differences can be seen between
the moral codes of varying ethnic backgrounds. An Irish-American draws on a different moral
code than that of a Chinese-American, whose moral code has been shaped by a different
history, geography, economy, or social custom. The individual, consciously or sub
consciously, draws from both these influences to shape her or his individual moral code.
Secondly, the rules of duty seen in the communities in our country have occurred as
the result of an agreed-upon consensus by a majority of citizens that these are the rules they
wish to observe for the sake of community cohesion and cooperation. Thus in a society one
generally finds only one set of the “rules of duty”. We only have one proper interpretation,
for instance, for the red, yellow, and green lights on a traffic signal; a double yellow line on
the highway means no passing in all situations to all drivers; all youngsters must be vaccinated
prior to entering the public school system; and dogs must be kept on leashes when off their
owners’ property in urban areas. These few examples are among the duties or obligations
people in a community owe to each other and are expected to conform to for the sake of all
persons in their society.
But we must keep in mind here that both types of rules can and have been wrong, or
interpreted wrongly, in many instances. What is of greater importance is for one to have and
exhibit good judgment in any given case, rule or no rule. Good judgment will be discussed
later in this chapter.
Whether or not a person is an admirable human being depends on what emotions he
or she feels in various circumstances,*’ according to Bernard Williams. Aristotle elaborates
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on this when he writes about the necessary ways to pursue the good life, a life well-lived. He
states that "The proper function of man...consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with
a rational principle or...not without it."*’ Moral virtue comes about as the result of good
habits; it is a settled disposition of character that results when, through deliberate thought,
one follows the mean, avoiding extremes in action.
According to Galston our ethics, as Aristotle suggests (NE 1178a8-21), are reflected
in our socialness, our rational capacities, and our bodily constitutions. "[T]he human virtues
are the virtues of our composite nature", which is suspended "between the beasts and the
gods".*^ There are different ways to understand human virtues, depending on "whether one's
point of departure is theological or secular".*®
We tend to see the virtues as instrumental goods when we look to human
circumstances, or else as dispositions that allow us "to perform well the specific tasks
presented by our situations" when we look to the kind of life we are choosing to live. The
instrumental conception, within differentiated societies, guides toward an understanding o f
virtues related to particular social roles. The instrumental conception, within political
communities, guides toward a perception of the good citizen as having "the virtues
appropriate to specific regimes". Galston tells us that according to Aristotle, these
instrumental understandings make sense in the "distinction between the good citizen, the
content of whose virtue may differ with and between political communities, and the good
human being, whose virtue everywhere is the same". Instrumental virtues are, in this regard,
"inherently relative to tasks or roles that are themselves situated with social contexts".*®
Consequently, understanding the virtues as self-development is a crucial component of the
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guidance we require as individual and social agents, but only a component. However, this is
no reason to disregard the virtues.*’
Aristotle tells us that "one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the
community is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue
o f the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member".**
Therefore, too, "it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue
which makes a good man".*® And this is the problem today: If the good citizen has the virtues
which are also found in the good man his efforts will produce one result. However, if he does
not possess them his efforts will produce an entirely different result. We can also argue that
in a polity with a bad constitution, a good man will be a bad citizen. Since Aristotle believed,
as do many of us today, that the human community was a partnership of citizens in a
constitution, one could assume the partnership to be dissolved when the government of a state
drastically changes. If these changes result from tyraimy or conquest in war, and if the
political philosophy became such that the state turns into an oppressor rather than a partner
and protector of its members, then the good person would be perceived as a bad citizen when
he or she chose not to support the changed administration. The community of mankind, he
tells us, requires justice to bind people together, "for the administration of justice, which is
the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society".’®He also
remarked that "there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other".’* The
most basic form o f community being the family, we find a basis here for the care of the
disabled elderly to naturally begin with the family. And as the community assumes the status
of a wider, extended family, this points to the probability that it, too, has a certain amount of

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m i s s io n o f t h e c o p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p ro h ib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

52

responsibility for the well-being of its older citizens.
Dewey supports Aristotle and expands the subject further by stating that the
relationships and function of a family are abundantly important to [human] life - more than
we can sufficiently emphasize. This function and its importance to humankind cannot be
overstated. But in our consciousness we contain the results of the influences the family has
had upon us. "We get the outcome though we could not state the process by which we get
it."” This idea is in accord with Johnson’s belief that often we are not sure about what it is
that forms or molds the choices that we make in life.
Some of the ethical values that result fi’om the femily, according to Dewey, are ethical
"in the wider sense". Others, however, come to us "as conditioned, dependent, doubtful". If
particular conditions occur these values will be fulfilled. What controls this, the decisive
condition, is the attitude and effort put out by an individual. While we can say a particular
value usually "belongs" to the family function, it is a different case to determine that in a
particular instance the value does not, in and of itself, exist within the individual. Its
transformation from a conditional, problematic condition into a social categorical condition
is dependent upon what the individual desires and what effort is put forth by the individual.
And “in the narrow sense”, the value becomes ethical when it has been taken from its realm
in the general sense as problematic and then conditioned by our personal attitude and efforts.
This is what Dewey sees as the basis o f all problems of morality. In the larger general sense
moral ends or values are a part of society as a whole, part of an existing system into which
an individual is bom, and therefore this system endures apart from the individual. In a way,
this ethical world has a reality as substantial as that of the physical world.”
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Dewey believed that society [in this century] is in a dualistic stage, [of organic and
inorganic relationships] yet always working toward “a more perfect form”. We have to
assume that society as a whole is essentially and inherently progressive, and that instead of
progressing toward a particular, defined end, its only end is progress; and this "end" is
dynamic, by definition.” But ‘perfection’ is never actually attainable.

If it were, society

would no longer be dynamic, but would instead become static and eventually stagnant. This
is because there always exist, within society, those individuals who do not feel obliged to
observe the laws and rules. He would call this a "nonorganic" relation. A "socialized " person
is one of the "static goals" of society, and the process leading to this goal is dynamic. During
the process of becoming socialized, a person realizes that his or her best interests are also, in
a sense, the best interests of society. The unsocialized individual has a static point of view,
for he or she is concerned only with personal interest.
Additionally, counter-culture groups similar to those seen in the 1960's occasionally
arise in our country. While the group itself is in rebellion against what has been the norm in
society, the individuals who comprise the group may and often are socialized to the extent
that they have become aware of certain social aspects that no longer work for them as well
as they may have for their parents or grandparents. In this case we can see where a strong and
large-enough movement can effect visible changes in certain social patterns and institutions
and become slowly absorbed into the fabric of daily life. In these instances such movements
can become quite dynamic. The counter-group rebellions of the Sixties gave rise to the
acceptance of Rock and Roll music and long hair on males in mainstream society along with
an examination of our moral attitudes toward unnecessary warfare, spurred by the Vietnam
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conflict. And after a few years these and other changes of that era were accepted and, some
of them too, eventually became static. For after a while, people began rejecting those nowaccepted but previously unacceptable ideas and practices: Popular music again changed its
beat along with hair styles, but the introspective look at our reasons for going to war
remained with us. Thus, the fabric of our moral perceptions was somewhat altered by a group
that, at first glance, was denounced as unsocialized by those who looked only at its fiinges
rather than at its heart.
Consequently, we find that morality is not located as an inscription on our consciences
like a system of abstract rules; nor is it found solely in the office o f the moral philosopher. It
is not so surprising to discover that morality is a system of functions found within the social
function, and which has been created and compressed by the pressure of societal
requirements.” The setise of the ideal contributes to the growth of ethical notions, but is not
responsible for their creation. Durkheim sees the laws of morality as natural laws since they
have been "derived from human nature and the nature of society". This derivation is unique
to humanity. A lawmaker only discerns laws and clearly formulates them rather than inventing
them. The laws are a result of a day-to-day progression in human relations insofar as we
determine them to be necessary. "They express the condition o f our mutual adaptation.
Rather than being ïoveseea. a priori, they result from the integrated efforts of a society,” and
social phenomena arise from practical causes. All human behavior is aimed at adapting the
individual and society to its environment.” We should look at society as a being with its own
personality and life, and its progress and welfare must be looked after by ethics.
Consequently, any progress that society makes must give rise to new requirements.’* Seen in
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this light, we find that changes are not only desirable in public policy - they are absolutely
necessary. And the policies should be designed and implemented with a flexibility and ease
of adaptation that results fi'om built-in contingencies.
Now, according to Dewey, a person who is already good has no problem spotting the
good in either the general or the specific sense. However "the one who does not yet know the
good, does not know haw to know it". Moreover, this individual is hampered by the obstacles
that his own ignorance presents because he or she sees solutions in ends which are shallow
and impermanent. Since these ends satisfy immediate concerns an habitual absorption with
them prevents the individual from possibly envisioning the final end. "Only if the individual
is habituated, exercised, practiced in good ends so as to take delight in them, while he is still
so immature as to be incapable of really knowing how and why they are good, will he be
capable of really knowing how and why they are good, will be capable of knowing the good
when he is mature." This assumes that the adults around the child know the difference
between the good and the lack of the good. But a social order has to be in place which can
foster this knowledge[!]’®This insight, of course, is purely Aristotelian.
Judith Shklar speaks of the fact that the good man and the good citizen are not the
same.” She points out instances where philosophers have not been able to agree about who
makes a good judge. According to Shklar, Plato believed that it is the judges who basically
perpetuate and legitimize ongoing systems. Plato was speaking of courts of law, but
nevertheless it is easy to take his thought one step further and apply it analogously to all
policy analyses. Shklar states that where philosophy is concerned, a person steeped in
Aristotle's syllogistic reasoning and the laws of the land - still using the courtroom analogy -
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would be able to see beyond the spirit of the law in adjudging the letter of the law. For, being
a part of the process, the judge already has a vital interest in its success. Nevertheless, the
judge can be only as good as are the laws themselves.’*Here, in the Aristotelian sense, we
see that this can be a clue as to how we need to approach and instruct the people who train
those who implement and manage policies. They must be sensitized to the fact that, aside
from their skills, they are not outside the process they oversee, but are an integral component.
In summation, Bellah, et a i, began this section by expressing concern that a society
which allows people to suffer in the midst of affluence presents a moral dilemma for the good
person. They do not believe that a society such as ours, then, is a good society. An
unbalanced infrastructure has resulted, in great part, from inattention to the shifting conditions
that normally result within a thriving dynamic society, plus a lack of attention to the way we
manage and assess our policies.
Yet the community, as we have seen, is primarily composed of “good”, or at least,
well-meaning people. These individuals often end up following the dictates or influences of
educational, religious, or governmental institutions and/or established practices. However,
when they participate in the preparation and implementation of policy these people can, and
often do, perpetuate and even magnify erroneous or obsolete concepts. Thus such concepts
end up obviating the intended good in the long run, for they do not “work”.
Cicero saw people as inextricably linked with and to their society. By contrast,
Durkheim looks at the problem differently and finds two sets of moral codes: personal and
public. He sees this as a definite division between the morality expressed by a society and that
of the individual.
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A third view is that of Aristotle, for whom the good man and the good citizen can, but
need not, be mutually exclusive. He sees the family as the first “community” to which people
belong. Dewey’s view reflects Aristotle’s but is more detailed as to the interaction between
the person and the society. He sees the family as being where our first social perceptions and
values are formed, happening within the personal matrix of a person’s efforts and desires
which work, to a greater or lesser degree, upon the social system which exists apart from the
individual. It is not an integral part of the person, so its effects are dependent upon the
individual becoming “socialized” or attuned to the needs and interests of society in the larger,
general sense.
But even though, as with these thinkers and Shklar, the good citizen and the good
person are not the same, it must be argued that they both are, nevertheless, parts of the
process. For even the most socially detached individual is affected by and also affects society
by how he or she chooses to act/not act, or interact/not interact with and within the
community. However, a community, and especially a ‘healthy’ community, requires citizens,
leaders, planners, and implementors who are aware of its needs, aware of its goals, and aware
of its shortcomings. This sort of awareness is fostered by an atmosphere of clear-sightedness
and clear-sighted goals which can only be stated when the participants are well-schooled in
all the options at their disposal. When dogma is replaced by an education that focuses on what
is currently happening in addition to what has occurred in the past this will begin to happen.
Herbert Schneider, in accordance with Dewey, believed that moral experience, unlike
information, was something that could not be taught, in the classical sense; it had to be
acquired anew by each generation.” But there are many parts to this process. The young
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person must be prepared so that he or she can intelligently assess the moral experience. An
important educational facet is to make the individual aware that he or she is a part of the
system rather than only an observer, an actor rather than someone to be acted upon. This is
not to say that one should not observe the system in action, but that observations must be
made in such a way that the observer also sees him- or herself within the structure of the
system, as an integral segment. In discussing how he sees a successful society operating,
Dewey has taken great pains to point out the importance of this fact.
In order to promote this self-awareness it is important that a sense of civic duty be
imparted to young students in the public school system, and indeed, in all elementary schools.
While the subject of re-vamping this massive social and socializing institution is too vast to
be more than summarily mentioned here it is, nevertheless, one of the major cornerstones to
initiating individual awareness of one’s place in the scheme of our current social matrix.
According to Schneider:
[W]e cannot assume that [conscience] is a built-in regulator of human nature,
infallibly indicating to the owner when and how he goes wrong, for
conscience itself must be trained to become responsible.”
As Schneider points out, our consciences do not automatically go into action at birth. In order
to become responsible, a conscience must be trained. And this is an area to which not enough
attention has been paid during the last few decades when educating our young.

Defining A “Good” Society - An Impossible Task?
Before we actually attempt to define a good society, perhaps we should take a brief
look at the term ‘good’ itself.
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Dewey points out that it is logically difficult to pinpoint the actual reason that a
quality, such as wealth or health, is good or not. But we cannot separate the question of the
nature of the good from the question of the form of the good. "If the good represents a
concept it must be because there is a certain unity of form or principle running through all this
variety of actual concrete experience." Consequently, in order for an experience to be called
"good" we must assume that certain conditions exist. Furthermore, those conditions must be
fulfilled.” It is from exper- ience itself that we must find these conditions. So when we
examine the concept of good we are examining a particular function and position in our
experience. Quite simply put, in order to determine if life is worth living we must first
determine whether our happiness overrides our misery. When we deem the perfection of
human nature to be a desirable end we have to know realistically that this is not an ultimate
but only an approximate statement.
Bellah, et al. ask if a great society is necessarily a good society. Today, industrialized
society, in the form of the exchange economy and the division of labor, has been pushing
humanity in the direction of a planetary interconnected whole. But this process has not been
smooth. It has caused "crises of moral meaning and solidarity, as well as breakdowns into
extraordinary violence and anger, as the units and conditions of life develop unevenly".
Consequently the concept of a good society comes to be seen "not only as an idealistic project
but as the long-term practical necessity of the new era". But there is no readily available
pattern to be found for a good society to which we can compel people to conform. The fact
is that this is "an open quest" which, being central to the concept of a good society, requires
the active involvement of all of its members.’®
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Michael Perry asks the primary question; "How can we know what way or ways of
life are good for a person - that is, how can we know what a person's well-being consists
in?"’® We find that there are certain manners of living that are conducive to the well-being
of all human beings.
But is there reason to think that there are ways of living which are good not
just for this person or that, or for this group or that but fo r human beings
generally! That is. .. are there ways of life that are good in a nonrelative,
universal sense?
The position of the universalist [or Aristotelian] according to Perry, is that whatever the
meaningful differences are, humans require many of the same basic things [such as food,
shelter, companionship, etc.], and accordingly there are things of value that every human can
agree upon. There are basic requirements for fulfilling human lives, "or at least lives as
fulfilling as any of which they are capable", that all humans must have. So, when we think of
human good it must be a pluralistic concept, keeping in mind that people differ across time”
as well as across political boundaries; they differ from each other interculturally as well as
intra- culturally. Perry has given a concise rendering of the notion of pluralism in the moral
sense.
Yet, "historicist thinkers" deny the concept of a shared human nature. They tell us
there is nothing beyond socialization or history which simply defines the human. This outlook
is found to be very common among current thinkers, according to Perry, and it subverts the
dialogue about basic human rights.’* He quotes Chomsky, who argues against historicist
views;
A vision of social order is...based on a concept of human nature. If in fact man
is an indefinitely malleable, completely plastic being, with no innate structures
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of mind and no intrinsic needs of a cultural or social character, then he is a fit
subject for the shaping behavior* by the state authority, the corporate
manager, the technocrats, or the central committee. Those with some confi
dence in the human species...will try to determine the intrinsic human
characteristics that provide the fi'amework for intellectual development, the
growth of moral consciousness, cultural achievement and participation in a
free community.”
As is quite evident from recent literature, as well as from any person with an observant nature,
the social character of the individual begins to be shaped by experience and genetic expression
early in life, and continues to be shaped thereafter by personal habits as well as institutional
requirements and inputs - such as schooling. However, to state that we are solely shaped by
our society is not entirely correct. Humans are not "indefinitely malleable" as the historicist
thinkers would have us believe.
MacIntyre, another Aristotelian, states that the idea of moral pluralism in our culture
is too indefinite, that it is spoken o f complacently in "surface rhetoric". "For it may equally
well apply to an ordered dialogue of intersecting viewpoints and to an unharmonious melange
of ill-asserted fiagments." He suspects that the term 'moral pluralism' is usually meant in the
latter sense and that we do not realize that all of these fragments each once belonged to total
value systems of their own. In such, they had a function and a role which is no longer
contained in them. Over a period o f three hundred years a concept can change its meaning.
MacIntyre elaborates:
In the transition from the variety of contexts in which they were originally at
home to our own ...culture ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’ and ‘pity’ and ‘duty’ and
even ‘ought’ have become other than they once were. [W]e simultaneously
and inconsistently treat moral argument as an exercise of our rational powers
and as mere assertion. We all too often... treat the moral philosophers of the
past as contributors to a single debate with a relatively unvarying subject
matter, treating Plato and Hume and Mill as contemporaries both of ourselves
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and of each other. This leads to an abstraction of those writers from the
cultural and social milieus in which they lived and thought and so the history
of this thought acquires a false independence from the rest of [its] culture.^
Julia Annas looks at this point more fully. She believes, for instance, that ancient
ethics can be quite pertinent to current moral philosophy. "But if we rush to establish
similarities too soon, they will peter out." First, we have to be aware of the deep contrasts
between ancient and modem ethics. In this way it will be easier to locate their similarities. She
finds three distinct sources from which our current ethical thinking stems:
Modem ethical thinking is the product of several ethical traditions:
1) Judeo-Chrisdan religious framework; the idea that morality is in some way
guaranteed by God;
2) Deontology, embodies the idea that the basic questions in ethics are those
concerning what one ought to do and what one's duties are;
3) Consequentialism, embodies the idea that the fundamental ethical questions
are rather those as to how one should produce the best consequences.
[W]e have an ethical framework which is concerned not only with
bravery and cowardice but also with duty and obligation, and with producing
the best outcomes. Studying ancient ethics... will not lead us to reject, in favor
of virtue, notions like rule-following and appeal to benefit; but it may make
us rethink the role they play in modem theories, and the ways we relate them
to virtue and goodness.
Annas finds that a modem assumption is that moral theories should aid us in deciding what
is the right thing to do, and particularly in believing that it should help us to find answers to
difficult moral cases and dilemmas. But no theory can help us, on its own, to settle hard cases.
For "all theories, whether deontological, consequentialist, or virtue based direct us towards
the principles we need to apply in order to produce [or to judge] right answers, but this does
not mean that they give us the answers; we apply them to give the answers."^*
When we look at the problem of social ethics we find that society has an "organic"
nature, according to Dewey This nature is dynamic and must be sustained by action. A
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person's awareness of this organic character of society stimulates his or her moral conscious
ness. And through one's conscious effort moral consciousness is maintained. This activity
creates a constant awareness of situations within society "which are not yet organ- ized". This
forms a criterion for one ethical perspective in society. It arises from the recognition o f certain
relationships and factors which have not yet been organized and consequently are not totally
socialized.” But others arg, and they too are parts of public ethos.
Durkheim’s outlook does not dispute Dewey’s, but provides another ethical
perspective where he sees definite divisions among organized social activities. He finds that
there is a degree of variance in morals which arises due to the differences among the people
who practice them. Those differences comprise, in part, the distinctions that arise from a
greater or lesser degree of kinship, of the sexes, and of the ages. Moral relations are affected
by all these differences. We find the same with civic duties, or those of a person toward the
community. Civic obligations will vary depending on the type of government involved, and
all governments have different foundations, with some being democracies, others monarchies,
and so on. Family duties and civic duties do, however, share much in common. Yet, where
civic morals are concerned, we see that the ethical duties of a merchant differ from those of
a professor, and those of a scientist from the soldier or the priest.” Not only is one type of
moral duty distinct from the other, because of the ‘office’, or the role and its duties, but
between some we find actual contrariety. For instance, where the scientist must train herself
to have an open mind, the priest or soldier must, in many respects, be obliged to passive
obedience. In every society, then, we can find a plurality of morals that function in parallel
lines. Durkheim refers to this as "moral particularism", and states that it does not work where
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individual morals are concerned, but appears "in the domestic morals of the family, goes on
to reach its climax in professional ethics, to decline with civic morals and to pass away once
more with the morals that govern the relations of men as human beings".”
Moral particularism then, can be said to be a morality of groups rather than of
individuals. It finds a consensus among people who are concerned with group goals, which
often differ fi'om individual goals. Moral particularism is highly focused to represent the
particular end or ends of a particular group. It is best exemplified in professional organizations
which strive to promote the appropriate interests of their specific businesses or skills. Thus,
the members have agreed to a particular level of conduct and service that best highlights the
distinctive service or product offered to society. Consequently, Dewey perceives this
“plurality of morals” as independently arising and being formed by separate groups, yet all
having, as a goal, ideals of form and practice that will hold their members to tightly specified
standards that have been agreed upon in advance. Each, in its own way, contributes positive
input to society as a whole, based upon its self-imposed ideals of the good.

Judgment
We find, then, that theories in themselves do not answer nor offer patented solutions
to difficult problems. However, a “theory” of good judgment in any and all cases should be
our goal. And good judgment will never go out of style, is adaptable as well as practical (by
definition). Yet it is an attribute that one rarely possesses without being taught how to think
critically. Policy implementors do not spontaneously emerge full-grown, in this sense (aside
from their particular academic specialties), yet must be critically able to assess each new
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situation as it arises. This involves knowing how to think, and being able to “separate the
wheat from the chaff” as it were, where ambiguous and superfluous verbiage is involved in
presentations, protestations, and professional and political documents. In other words, the
implementor must be a clear-thinker who has become knowledgeable, over time and by
training, in the process of critical thinking. Old ethical standards can however point the way.
They can make us think about how to derive new solutions to our own unique problems and
thus effect positive changes.
Herbert Schneider believed that an education that was broad enough would generate
“an interest in the art of life”. He defined this as “the accumulation and interrelation of many
types of good judgment gathered from the various fields of experience”/® Unlike the
conscience itself which he felt must be trained, the principles of conscience “are not given us
ready-made when we get our consciences. They must be learned with social intelligence, not
with the tongue”.” Additionally, the discovery of values comes about “experimentally” by
testing and tasting.” And so, judgment becomes a form of knowledge. One becomes aware
of “how to interpret social reactions” and comes to be aware that conduct often has social
consequences.” The ability to use the right judgment comes through a combination of such
factors as cleverness, originality, imagination, skill, experience, and insight.” And knowing
how to think critically is what makes these components all ‘work’ together productively.
Much current thought seems to suggest that there is no connection between judgments
about what people should be like and what they should do. But when we separate judgments
of character from judgments of acts our moral discourse becomes ambiguous. If we cannot
see them as related we will never be able to derive a system of moral theory.®® But when we
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think of our lives as a whole we need to ask ourselves how we have become the persons we
are now; how past plans, successes and failures have created us as the individuals who are
now involved in the projects and attitudes we have. We also have to think of the future and
how we visualize our plans as continuing. If we do this many of us find dissatisfaction with
not only our achievements but also with our prospects. However;
...it is only the dissatisfied who have the urge to live differently, and hence the
need to find out what ways of living differently would be improvements.
Ancient ethics has nothing to say directly to those who have never reached
this point of reflection about their lives or are unimpressed by it: the dull and
the complacent, for example. These people can benefit fi’om ethical philosophy
only indirectly, through doing what books, or other people, tell them to do.
Nor can ancient ethics say much to or do much for those who are not
prepared to carry the lessons of ethics into their plans for living. Even those
of us who are not dull and complacent will not usually detach ourselves from
emotional engagement with present concerns and think about our life as a
whole when we are young; those who never do, the immature, form another
group of people on whom ethical thinking has no direct hold.®*
What Annas is saying, in part, is that curative, ‘pre-formatted’ answers cannot be realistically
dredged up from humanity's past and be refitted for application to certain current social
problems; and for some individuals, advances in ethical theory will only help them indirectly
through the work of others.
But, as Schneider has pointed out, there are no shortcuts to moral knowledge. The
responsible individual can attain good judgment only by having first learned the various
factors required.
As far as dissatisfaction is concerned, however, one could argue that the term
"dissatisfaction" can be discerned in more than a general sense. We can use it to describe how
an individual feels about his or her poverty. In that sense, certainly, the individual would want
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to improve life as far as possible within the limits of his or her ability. And perhaps another
individual is merely dissatisfied with his surroundings and 'improves' his life by moving to a
new area. But I think it is important to emphasize that there is a type of dissatisfaction that
does not grow out of desire for an end which is purely personal. Rather, this type would be
the dissatisfaction felt by individuals who are concerned by the lack of harmony and fairness
in the socio-political national or corporate structure, or in (as Bellah, et al. refer to them) our
"institutions". These dissatisfied individuals would be concerned with learning the reasons for
the poverty experienced by the person described above, and would search for ways that might
prevent this from recurring. Thus policies would, hopefully, be implemented by individuals
of good judgment to change the situation and allay the underlying causes.
In Part One we have been looking at the possibility that a good society can exist. We
have looked at some of the various components it could include if it were to exist. We have
seen that there are different concepts of what should be required of a good society. Societies
are comprised of individuals, families, corporations, professional groups, and institutions of
government, education, and religion, as well as commercial organizations for production,
distribution, and sales. Each contributes its individual or collective perceptions of what it
considers to be of paramount importance to making our society good. While some
perceptions are or can be self-serving and shallow, others can be too highly idealistic.
Aristotle, Dewey, Durkheim, and others in addressing this problem have, each in their own
way, cautioned against extremes in either direction. Johnson, in particular, shows how
individuals, while presumably autonomous, are nevertheless a reflection o f their society in
how their thinking patterns develop, thereby echoing the tenets of various institutions and
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traditions. Yet we see that a society is also a reflection of its individual members. It reflects
their depth of conscience, their moral values, their community involvement, or their lack of
such qualities. Through all of this we have come to see the importance of having policy
makers and implementors who are imbued with a strong sense of duty to civic responsibility
as well as having highly developed gooc/judgment. These individuals do not spring full-grown
from some mythic deity’s forehead, for they come to us from the general population. It is
necessary that the foundations for this ‘knowledge’ be imparted to them beginning with their
early schooling. This is not to suggest a form o f ‘brainwashing’, but instead to propose that
it starts with elements that used to be taught in schools as a matter of fact - citizenship and
civics, for instance. These should be re-introduced to the curricula. These and subjects like
these can only provide the students with more ‘tools’ to use in going about their daily lives.
And, as they mature, the students would further benefit from the introduction of and heavy
emphasis on such subjects as government, ethics, and various social sciences. The ability to
form and utilize good judgment, as Schneider stated, needs to be molded and nurtured from
an early age. As Annas pointed out, good judgment never goes out of style. But knowing how
to use it, how to think critically, must be taught. This is a challenge to our future, for without
it, it seems likely that certain of our policies will go on, thoughtlessly rushing toward obscure,
outdated goals or relying for implementation on persons with little moral sense as to how and
why a policy is needed.
But there are elements indigenous to a morally successful society that we have yet to
explore. Some of these require an in-depth look before we can reach a more totally fair
assessment of the perception of morality in our society.
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Part n will look at the concept of freedom and what it means to different people. Who
is responsible for our freedom? When we attain free- dom, does that mean we no longer have
any responsibilities to worry about?
Next, we will take a closer look at institutions and organizations, how they foster and
augment our perceptions and policies, and what impels them toward inner change or causing
changes in the way we think about particular things. We will find that their influence on us
can be a powerful determinant as to how we face our challenges and set our goals, and if we
do it insightfully or haphazardly.
This consideration then leads into a discussion about morally respon- sible behavior.
Is moral outrage enough to support a change in people’s behavior and attitudes? Can it
overcome institutional influences? How do we judge our moral experiences? Is it done
through scientific inquiry, set against the framework of a legal system, or resonated in the
background of our cultural attitudes? What is the difference between the form and the
substance of a moral action? There are undoubtedly other areas that could be explored, but
these should round out the discussion of how we perceive morality.

PART TWO
Defining Freedom
For most Americans, freedom is an essential ingredient in defining a good society. But
it is necessary to look more deeply to determine what freedom really denotes. “For many of
us, ‘freedom’ still has the old meaning of the right to be left alone.” That idea had a particular
plausibility in an earlier America, where individuals could spend most of their life on their own
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homesteads. But today, “freedom must exist within, be guaranteed by institutions, and must
include the right to participate in the economic and political decisions that affect our lives.”*^
Freedom has meaning on several levels and this meaning depends on one’s social situation and
placement in time.
Paul Boiler presents a somewhat stoic perspective on the concept of freedom, stating
that, in the case of the self-perfectionist, humans can be said to be truly free only if they have
emancipated themselves from their passions and prejudices and brought their wills into
harmony with r e a s o n . T h i s differs from Johnson’s view that we need to re-mold our
prejudices into useful instruments for social survival. But, to examine his point charitably,
perhaps Boiler is speaking of prejudice in its most negative aspect. Or, he may not
differentiate between forms of prejudice at ail. Boiler is not altogether clear in his concept of
“reason”.
He states that an exercise of power is implicit in liberty, such as the power to speak;
it connotes freedom from fear, or an absence of constraint and restraint . Yet to Frederick
Douglass (1817-1895), freedom “meant dignity, self-reliance, and moral responsibility”:
It meant the possibility of choosing a vocation and working at it with pride
and zest. It also meant continual knowledge, virtue, and social concern. There
was nothing lawless about freedom; it was closely linked with character. Nor
was there anything easy about it; it required hard work to achieve and
determined efforts to retain. For Douglass, ‘Freedom, Industry, Virtue, and
Intelligence’ were all of a piece, ...and it was slavery’s denial of a person’s
right to moral and intellectual development that chiefly made it an
abomination.”*’
Dewey, however, sees freedom as being granted by the individual to him- or herself,
if certain social morals are present:
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Freedom for an individual means growth, ready change when
modification is required. It signifies active process, that of release of capacity
fi’om whatever hems it in. But since society can develop only as new resources
are put at its disposal, it is absurd to suppose that freedom has possible
significance for individuality but negative meaning for social interests. Society
is strong, forceful, stable against accident only when all its members can
function to the limits of their capacity. Such functioning cannot be achieved
without allowing a leeway of experimentation beyond the limits of established
and sanctioned custom. But socially as well as scientifically the great thing is
not to avoid mistakes but to have them take place under conditions such that
they can be utilized to increase intelligence in the future.’®
When Dewey speaks of increasing intelligence, he means it in the sense of increasing our
collective intelligence regarding what works and what does not work well within our social
institutions. Policy implementors should learn from mistakes, and use them as lessons by
which to guide their future decisions and actions. With regard to freedom, we can be hemmed
in by our own self-limitations. When we do this to ourselves, we also impose it on others
through our limited expectations.
Dewey explains that not only is an individual’s freedom greater in a more diversified
and comprehensive social order, but so is his or her responsibility. With increased and varied
stimuli to social action we have greater freedom as well as greater means by which it is
possible to fulfill our potential. But this only increases our responsibilities, for we also are
freed with more reasons to consider the consequences of our actions. This greater freedom
also provides more means to society for showing us the errors of our ways should we be
negligent in our use of it. Many of the actions we take in our society will not only touch more
individuals, but will affect the less visible ties between social institutions as well.”
Dewey states that while we have the freedom to act, we must be prepared to handle
all the consequences that result from those actions - the good, the bad, the physical, and the
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social. For we do not execute these acts in a vacuum! Freedom is a means for us to be free
from subjection to the will of others; from slavery; from direct obstruction, and interference.
But, these are only its “conditions”. In order to have freedom we must possess the resources
necessary to actually “carry purposes into effect” as well as the “mental equipment” plus the
trained powers of reflection and initiative [critical thinking] required to be both farseeing and
cautious.’*
Thus, freedom cannot be exercised without careful attention to the responsibility that
comes inherently linked to it. This strongly addresses and supports my overall theme
regarding the importance of the role of policy implementors within the policy process. The
freedom to act in putting a new policy into effect must be tempered by constant vigilance for
unwanted externalities - effects that were not foreseen by policy makers. And this vigilance
should be one of the most necessary responsibilities of implementors.
It is interesting to note that in his tour of the United States early in the last century
Alexis de Tocqueville warned against a possible (then) unforseen direction that a free society
could take. He believed that a democratic society is capable of providing the groundwork for
severe oppression characterized by;
An innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly
endeavoring to secure the petty and paltry pleas- ures with which they glut
their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest
...Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes
upon itself alone to secure their gratification and to watch over their fate. That
power is absolute, minute, regular, provident and mild. It would be like the
authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare man for
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood:
it is well content that the people rejoice provided that they think of nothing
but rejoicing. For their happiness such government labors...it everyday renders
the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it
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circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all
the uses of himself... Such a power does not destroy but it prevents existence,
it does not tyrannize but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes and stupefies
a people.”
How many individuals in our country today do more than take their freedom for granted,
without seeing it as a privilege which requires constant work to maintain? How many even
understand what their freedoms are or are not? We read that people elsewhere yearn for
release fi-om tyranny, aspire to democracy, and see our society as a model! But in our society
citizens often see themselves as voiceless, because many institutions in the substrate of our
culture simply are no longer working well for them.

Institutions
An institution, in its formal sociological definition, is a pattern of hoped-for action of
groups or individuals supported by social sanctions, both positive and negative. These can be
simple customs such "as the confirming handshake in a social [or business] situation", or
"highly formal institutions such as taxation upon which social services depend, where refusal
to pay may be punished". There is always a moral element in institutions.®” Bellah and his co
authors elaborate:
Individualistic Americans fear that institutions impinge on their freedom.
Institutions are normative patterns embedded in and enforced by laws and
mores. In common usage the term is also used to apply to concrete
organizations. Organizations certainly loom large in our lives, but if we think
only of organizations and not of institutions we may greatly oversimplify our
problems. If we do not distinguish between institutions and organizations, we
may think that our only problem with corporations is to make them more
efficient or more responsible. But there are problems with how corporations
are institutionalized in American society, with the underlying pattern of power
and responsibility, and we cannot solve the problems of corporate life simply
by improving individual organizations: we have to reform the institution itself.
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[C]hanges in how organizations are conceived, changes in the norms by which
they operate - institutional changes - are the only way to get at the source of
our difficulties.®'
Thus, we need to look at new and different methods in an effort to make these changes. When
a policy outlives its usefulness, yet the traditions that support it are so entwined with the daily
life o f each of us, it is often an uncomfortable prospect to consider suddenly eliminating a
familiar portion of our daily routine. For decades, we took for granted the ability and the
freedom to be able to drive wherever and whenever we wished without restriction. Yet in
many o f our largest cities we were suddenly faced with the prospect of having to severely
curtail this activity. Ozone inversions and smoggy air polluted with sometime dangerous levels
of carbon monoxide and lead caused us to have to stop and take a ‘reality check’. Certain
cities promoted car-pooling, reserving a freeway lane just for participants. Radio and TV
were urging people to not drive and to even stay indoors on high-pollution days. Car
manufacturers then began to design more efficient engines; oxygenated gasoline was
developed, and its sale became mandatory in many states during the smoggy season; and
emission testing of motor vehicles to detect faulty operation became a requirement in one
state after another. All these changes were necessary so that the quality of the air we breathe
could improve, and it has improved. But a real change had to occur in the automotive industry
and its associated institutions and industries - state regulators, the gasoline producers, the oil
industry, and most of all in the consumer, the person who, a few years earlier, was so blythly
driving gas-guzzling, inefficient, lead-spewing vehicles with such abandon. None of these
institutional changes could have occurred without the re-education of the public in general,
and the re-organization of priorities by several major industries, agencies, and organizations
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which were tied to the institution of personal transportation in this country.
Some of our institutions originated in the eighteenth century. Others were initiated in
the post-World War II era, established to save the "free world", and are serving us less well
than some of those which date from two hundred years ago. "[W]e need to understand how
much of our lives is lived in and through institutions, and how better institutions are essential
if we are to lead better lives.®^ It is fundamental to understand that institutions and
organizations mediate the relations between self and the world."®* Bellah and his co-authors
are proposing that no number of palliative programs is going to ease the numerous problems
our society is faced with today because the problems themselves are generated by the very
flaws which have been woven into the fabric of our social intercourse and thus repeatedly
imparted to and inculcated in each rising generation. So this systemic dysfunction dooms us
to continually experience and unsuccessfully seek respite from the same basic social ills over
and over again.
As Bellah et al see the situation, the only way to surmount these deepening problems
is through greater participation in the larger structures of the economy [as consumers], and
the state, [as citizens].®* In speaking of moral theories, Dewey points to Socrates as having
made a great effort to determine just what the "real good" is. He sought "the true end of all
the various institutions, customs, and procedures among men". Socrates looked at the lack
of consistency in people's behavior; looked for an explanation for the conflict seen in human
interests. He saw that different "would-be moral teachers" gave diverse reasons for these
problems and did so because "they were ignorant of their own ends". Thus, we have to know
our "good and proper function".®’ If we apply this to the way our institutions or policies
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function we find that we must not lose sight of the ends we want to achieve. Sometimes
‘course corrections’ need to be effected so that the means do not come into conflict with the
ends themselves. When institutions no longer fully serve those for whom they were originally
intended, the theoretical “good” is obscured, and social demoralization follows!
Bellah, et a i, believe that there is a sort of reductionism in the traditional way we
think of society; if we do not find the problem with the individual, we then try to find it with
the organization. Our pattern of thinking can hide the power of institutions from us as well
as their tremendous potential for good and evil. For instance, if we have not been taught how
to think critically, we can go through life without constructively questioning why it is that we
do what we do, and whether or not what we do makes sense. Through our daily actions and
words we continuously engage "in creating and recreating the institutions” and organizations
that make life possible. This viewpoint is lacking in our ideas about society, and this process
is always ethical and political because institutions, including our families, exist through ideas
of right and wrong and notions of the good (whereas, by contrast, organizations exist through
pre-designed structures which are often based on arbitrary rules designed by the owner or
board of directors, and created through personal wealth and power). But we find, while we
are creating institutions together with other individuals, that institutions are also creating us.
They form and educate us, particularly by way of the socially performed "metaphors they give
us, metaphors that provide normative interpretation of situations and actions. The metaphors
may be appropriate or inappropriate, but they are inescapable." Thus a church congregation
may define itself as a "family"; the CEO o f a corporation could speak of employees as being
"team players". "Democracy itself is not so much a specific institution as a metaphoric way
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of thinking about an aspect of many institutions."®® Our way of life, then, can be seen as
tapestry of interwoven themes, each representing a particular institution or organization; one
thread, or theme, representing the public educational system; another depicting religious
beliefs; a third symbolizing manufacturing production standards; a fourth standing for the
current status of frmily-owned (non-corporate) farms; and so on. No one theme in itself can
represent the entire American experience, just as no particular person can be totally
representative of all Americans.
We can see that the notion that institutions are "objective mechanisms", separate from
our lives, "is an ideology that exacts a high moral and political price". Even the concept of
autonomy relies on a type of institutional structure and cannot be altogether seen as an escape
from institutions. Autonomy is only one concept of virtue among other worthy concepts such
as care and responsibility. For without institutions through which such virtues as care and
responsibility can be exercised, “autonomy itself becomes[...]an empty form without
substance”.®’ Given these insights, it is hardly surprising that ordinary citizens are confused
by what they see, when political leaders, and well-educated experts and managers appear to
be without an adequate public philosophy to guide them in assessment of facts and
determination o f goals.®* And this appears to be a missing element in the guidance o f public
policy once implementation has occurred. There seems to be a lack o f mature insight as well
as the awareness that we do not exist outside of these institutions, or these policies, but are
very much an essential part of their success or failure.
Bellah, et al, state that when we think of applying our knowledge to our problems
[through the policy process or organizational design] we defeat ourselves by separating ethics
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from technical expertise, thus rendering knowledge from a whole into a bifurcated and
therefore limited process:
...just at the point when our citizens depend more and more on knowledge, we
face a crisis about the purposes and meaning of that knowledge. [W]e have
concentrated more on the technical effectiveness of knowledge than on its
moral purpose.
There is a profound gap in our culture between technical reason, the
knowledge with which we design computers or analyze the structure of DNA,
and practical or moral reason, the ways we understand how we should live.
As the power of our ability to manipulate the world grows, the poverty of our
understanding of what to do with that knowledge becomes more apparent.
Even when we see that the solution must have something to do with
institutions, we once again look for a technical solution in some kind of
‘management science’ rather than in trying to understand the inherently moral
nature of institutions themselves.®’
Thus, we find that an essential ‘something or other’ is missing from our social calculations,
and in searching for solutions we blindly miss what is right in front of us.

Moral Experience, Argument, and Beliefs
"By the fate it allots to its members who can no longer work, [a] society gives itself
away - it has always looked upon them as so much material. Society turns away from the aged
worker as though he belonged to another species."’” De Beauvoir believes that the way
society treats its elderly "exposes the failure of our entire civilization". As long as a person
is profitable, in some way, society will care about him or her. The young are aware of this and
it causes them a certain amount of anxiety as they enter the social life course that, in its own
way, corresponds to the anguish the old feel by being excluded from society. But between
these two age groups the problem is hidden by daily routines’*of earning a living and raising
families. We take no time to contemplate these problems.
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In an ideal society there would be no need to discuss the problems of the elderly, for
there would be no problems. But our society suffers from troubled institutions, as we have
seen. Society is composed of different individuals, all with different social and economic
backgrounds, different intelligence levels, and different degrees of sensitivity to the plights of
the old, the ill, and the unfortunate among us. Aristotle points out to us that the family is what
nature established for taking care of the every-day needs of people.’^ But the community
arose out of a need for cooperation among families for the benefit of their mutual protection.
"Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship.
Morality, according to Dewey, is found in consequences that are "definite, observable
facts which the individual can be made responsible for noting and for employing in the
direction of his further behavior".’* But why is it that we do not often discern facts in this
light, and more so, when we do, why is it that others are not convinced?
According to Sayre-McCord, the person who wants to change the world rather than
just describe it is a moral instrumentalist. He sees moral language as the vehicle best suited
to this end "because people have been conditioned to use and respond to moral utterances as
commands and exhortation". The relevance of making moral claims is to create an influence
rather than merely indicate facts. Moral language changes or intensifies the interests of
individuals rather than just describing them. Rather than simply having moral reactions, people
can use moral argument to discuss beliefs, because it is these moral beliefs and not moral
reactions that can change people's attitudes and behavior.” This is an important point. But
some will argue that a statement of moral outrage will suffice. They believe that this is an
adequate way to address such a topic, that since their opinion has been rendered, the problem
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has been fully addressed. And they would leave it there without looking further into the
derivation of the problem. They decline to discuss it, or their idea of discussion is a oneperson diatribe about what is wrong with the world. If engaged in discussion by a rational
person who wishes to air potential causes and solutions, this type of individual will react as
if he or she has been attacked, or will refuse to take the time to listen to facts that would
enhance the discussion. Many persons are simply unable to carry on a discussion about policy
at this level without becoming defensive and argumentative. They are unable to reserve their
opinions until the facts have been investigated, and seem interested only in expressing their
opinions. Unfortunately, we all know or have met people like this. Thus, we see, even in socalled intelligent and educated individuals, a resis- tance to bilateral cooperation as the
method by which to rationally conduct a problem-solving dialogue. Changing one's precepts
or imaginatively looking at another's point of view is, for some reason, not easy for some to
accept. They do not readily embrace change, even if it would benefit them. Their mind-set
seems to be: "If it was good enough for my father..." This attitude creates an acknowledged
roadblock in the path to reason.
Dewey describes yet another view - what he refers to as "the spectator view of
knowledge" which "is a purely compensatory doctrine which men of an intellectual turn have
built up to console themselves for the actual and social impotency of the calling to thought
to which they are devoted." These people allow themselves the luxury of believing that their
knowledge is "something too sublime to be contaminated by contact with things of change
and practice". This is really due to a lack of courage and the conditions they have imposed
on themselves. Dewey sees this as a transformation of "knowing into a morally irresponsible
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estheticism".” And he reinforces Annas' position when he declares that: "it still remains true
that the troubles which men undergo are the forces that lead them to project pictures o f a
better state of things."” But in order to have positive changes we need to have certain
freedoms, as explained earlier in this chapter.
Kaplan tells us that what we judge is separate from "the fact of our judging it", in our
moral experience. The process of judging itself is the result of a culmination of what we have
become - via our experiences, but “whether we have judged well or ill is not determined by”
the conditions that have contributed to what we are. An empirical scientific inquiry is, like all
other social practices, conditioned by society. Consequently, the questions we ask are framed
in and by the language of our culture. We find that "what is good for one man may not be
good for another", but this fact "is indifferent to what either man may think to be good,
whether for himself or for the other"” [or how wise he is in so-judging]. Dewey addresses this
in his own way: "It has been noted that human experience is made human through the
existence of associations and recollections, which are strained through the mesh of
imagination so as to suit the demands of the emotions."” Both Kaplan and Dewey essentially
agree on the issue of how the individual forms actions and judgments. Additionally, Johnson’s
assessment of how we use our imaginations to extend concepts through the use of
metaphorical language is also in accord with these ideas.
Kaplan comments specifically on how morality is seen in our country: "Few people
are more scrupulously righteous than we [Americans] when we recognize an issue as moral."
Unfortunately, according to Kaplan, we rarely do! We use a basically utilitarian approach in
daily governmental decisions in a way that becomes an isolation of value. "Ethics is thought
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to bear on politics, not from within, but only at the edges." Political morality is seen as a
legalistic concept. If we see a law being violated it is then that we assume morality to be
threatened. He goes on to explain;
For the mass of the citizenry, policy raises moral issues only when its adoption
or administration involves bribery, corruption, or venality. If from the wholly
legal workings of policy patent injustices result, we suppose morality to be
served by acts of philanthropy or executive clemency. Morality demands
mitigation of effects; correction of causes is not the domain of morals, but of
hardheaded practicality. Alas, morality of this kind is a luxury product and will
give way whenever we can no longer afford the philanthropies. It is easy for
the rich to be generous and the powerful forgiving.*”
What Kaplan highlights here is the fact that what is often perceived as being a moral action
is, in actuality, nothing more than a method of assuaging guilt and pacifying outrage in many
cases. Philanthropic actions and federal pardons do not automatically right a wrong nor
accomplish more than temporarily alleviate the conditions that arise from deeper causes.
These causes therefore need to be addressed from within rather than from without,
recognizing these ‘Band-Aid cures’ for what they are; surface attempts to correct a problem
that, in reality, requires major surgery, in metaphorical terms. Consequently, ongoing
practices in our organizations and institutions which may be, and probably are, morally
questionable, slide by, to be repeated again and again so that the same old malady continues
to exist. Undoubtedly, under such conditions it is difficult to decide where to begin in
attempting to make a crucial correction, but the basic framework of the institution must be
re-built. And a major part of this process can be facilitated by well-trained policy
implementors who are sensitive to the ways in which morality works as an ongoing part of
the entire process, rather than being the occasion of putative and highly publicized events.
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We find again, a concurring voice in MacIntyre, who states that "...we have - very
largely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality".*' But we find
that we are still utilizing the language and the appearance of morality even though its defining
substance has been dissipated. Today we find that the language of morality is used primarily
as a way to express disagreements.*’ Consequently, we are using its form but not its
substance.
According to Kaplan, many people mistakenly assume that when they have stated the
problem they have also stated the solution. This perspective also has an underlying
supposition that the answers to all of our moral problems are already known. Political
morality is seen to be, in this view, merely "a matter of police action", calling for strenuous
law enforcement rather than legislating it [in the first place] with wisdom. "Such wisdom has
already been provided - by Moses and Solon, by the fathers of the church and of our country."
Unfortunately, when we find problems with enforcement, we rarely ask if there might be
something wrong with the law itself.** Kaplan recognizes the importance of not being rigid
in application when he states; "Policy itself becomes in a real sense unprincipled when it fails
to recognize the contextualization of moral laws. For these, like scientific generalizations,
have their conditions and limits ...requiring anchorage in the particular cases." Consequently,
a particular decision is not correct simply because it agrees with law.** Drawing an analogy,
one can see that just because an implementor’s decision is within the letter of the law does not
make the decision morally right or good!
Williams expands this further, stating that moral law is more explanatory "than the law
of an actual liberal republic, because it allows no emigration, but it is unequivocally just in its
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ideas of responsibility.”*’ This is precisely what makes it just - the recognition, in the hands
of a wise person, that there are no exemptions.
In this chapter we have looked at perceptions of morality and how these perceptions
arise through the institutions of a society. The greatest emphasis has been from the
Aristotelian point of view, supported mainly by observations from Dewey, who advises us to
learn from our mistakes, but to learn also not to be afraid to continue developing new
approaches, rather than relying on old concepts out of fear of failure.
Other voices are inserted as a background chorus - most voices in harmony with this
prevailing viewpoint. Mark Johnson, one member of this ‘chorus’, has presented the case for
realizing how our imaginations can play a vital role in restructuring the basic tenets of both
the absolutist and the relativist so that they can be used to attain new solutions to be applied
to current social problems.
Durkheim highlighted the importance of rules in a society, and their importance in
relation to ethical conduct by the individual as well as the society at large. The contributions
of Bellah, et a i, are important for their outlook on how institutions and organizations work
in our country, and how necessary it is to realize how pervasive these are in our everyday
affairs. They point out that our institutions are failing us. Kaplan tells us that morality is
seldom a process of applying an unquestioned principle to a problem that unquestionably falls
under its scope. Johnson agrees, but believes that we must also alter our relativist points of
view. Annas believes that we must always think in terms of consequences when we act.
What these voices and others have to impart are all variations on a common theme:
moral problems are not solved by reapplication of the same old ‘comfortable’ solutions.
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Actually, ‘stopgaps’ is a better word for such moves, since no solutions are forthcoming. A
major reason for using old solutions might be because use of them sidesteps positive
confrontation of the problem. Therefore, the ‘comfort’ is only in the individual’s
misperception that the problem has been handled. The mental and spiritual laziness of that
individual, rather than freeing a society burdened by an ethical dilemma, has just added to it.
Another major reason, of course, is simply ignorance which stems from the inability to use
wisdom in judgment to identify problems accurately and formulate just solutions.
Where policy implementation is concerned we find that when good policies have been
carefully designed and developed, in what I refer to as stage I of the policy process, their
intent is often defeated by static moral and social concepts which render them inoperable,
ineffective, or plainly dangerous after stage II, (implementation). They are often “managed”
as if the implementors themselves stood above the process somehow rather than being
integral parts of it.
A system of ethics cannot be wholly composed at one time, and then later impressed
upon reality. We must first observe the reality and then deduce morality from it. Durkheim
tells us that we "must grasp ethics in its many relations with the innumerable facts on which
it is patterned and which it regulates in turn". If we separate ethics from these facts it becomes
isolated from reality. It has no context. At this point it will become merely an abstract theory,
a collection of empty concepts, dryly formulated. But when ethics remains a part of reality
it becomes a complex and viable operation within "the social organism". Everything of
importance which occurs in society elicits a response from, and is marked by, morality. By
necessity then, morality, while affecting the life of a society, must also change when the
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society changes. This makes ethics what Durkheim refers to as a "science of life", for it
enables people to exist together.*® Schneider calls this “the art of life” and believes our
existence will continue to be troubled unless and until we are morally educated and our
consciences trained to be socially responsive and responsible. In light of this it is quite
important that we apply ethics to the problems of the elderly within the context of the type
of society we are currently experiencing. It is equally important that we not detach the elderly
from the sphere of society when policies are made regarding them. Successful policies, it
seems, will arise only through critical thinking so that they can function smoothly rather than
to the detriment of the elderly or society.
Morality is not a set of conclusive and settled ethical ideas, but holds an entire range
of ethical views. "Morality is so much with us that moral philosophy spends much of its time
discussing the differences between those outlooks, rather than the difference between all of
them and everything else."*’ These differences lead us to step back and look at differences
between people and cultures as well as at their central similarities, as we shall do in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CULTURAL COMPARISONS

According to Abraham Edel, morality needs to be understood in the context of its
relation to the complexities of society and culture.' Many anthropologists see morality more
as a facet of life than as “a separate department with institutions of its own”.’ So morality,
whether it stems from religious or biological roots, or even both, can be found in any aspect
o f humankind.* Consequently, we find a wide range of moral differences between various
peoples. For “[t]o have enough to eat, to have sons, and to die in respected old age on one’s
own ancestral land, is the conscious goal of some people’s striving, while others are
concerned with wealth or glory or power, and will see such pursuits as the proper aim of a
good life”.* So we see a great variety in the types of lives people have created for themselves.
Yet “certain minimal standards must be met if these ‘experiments’ are to be successful at all”,
according to Edel and Edel. Each culture supplies templates of social relations, beliefs, motor
habits, and knowledge in a way that allows people to exist within it. Therefore, each culture
has put techniques in place for mating, earning a living, dealing with everyday problems,
treating illness, coping with old age - and methods for learning these techniques.’
Not surprisingly, then, we find cultural variation when defining who is, and who is not.

91

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m i s s io n o f t h e c o p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p ro h ib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

92
old.® Although everybody grows older, the individual ways people age and the meanings they
attach to their life course are not the same. Also, there are highly variable divisions within the
life course itself. It may be a revelation to some Americans to find that, because we assume
that particular characteristics make a person "old", other cultures do not share these same
views. Even within our own culture we have seen that perceptions of what defines old age
can shift from one historical period to the next, over time.^ One hundred years ago,
individuals who had lived long enough to reach their eighties were a rarity. People who had
reached their fifties back then were perceived as being elderly!
The more traditional societies, such as Japan, lean toward more positive attitudes
about aging than does mainstream American culture. In Japan it is polite to inquire about an
elder's age, for it is a source of pride and congratulations. By contrast with etiquette in the
U. S., we consider it rude to ask an older person's age because we assume that they think it
is a fact to be ashamed of or to deny. This is seen when, upon finding out the age of an older
person in our country, the standard reply is inevitably: "You don't look that old". Translated,
this really means: "You don't look as senile and decrepit as most people your age"!*
Age and sex are used by all societies to classify their members, and each category
holds a difierent expectation. Americans, however, have developed a set o f discriminations
and prejudices against the elderly that is probably unequaled by any other culture. These
range from stereotypes that the majority are senile to the assumption that their need for sexual
gratification is non-existent, and from forced retirement to elder abuse.®
Since humans live in a world of symbols, age becomes more complicated. It is used
by all of us as a means of diSerentiation. We name the divisions in the life cycle to reflect the
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progression from infancy to old age. The term "age-grade" was coined by RadcIifFe-Brown
in 1929 as a means to refer to these age categories.
Age, although a cultural domain, is not a neatly classified realm. But in spite of a lack
of well-bounded age distinctions there is a sort of order. Discontinuities occur which divide
age into age grades or culturally significant segments. In itself, age is a significant aspect of
group formation." Thus, we have age-defining boundaries in our country for membership
in such diverse groups as Scouting and the AARP (American Association of Retired Persons).
The number of age strata, or grades, and their age-related boundaries, vary cross
culturally as well as historically. Childhood, for instance, was not viewed as a discernable life
period with special characteristics and requirements in Western Europe until around the
seventeenth century. There was no awareness, in medieval times, that children were distinct
from adults. They were a part of adult society as soon as they no longer required their
mothers' continual care. The word "child" did not hold the same meanings it does today.
There were three meaningful and clear distinctions in age strata: infancy, adulthood, and old
age." Another, contemporary, view sees old age as a stage within a life continuum with
chronological boundaries that define it as a special time in life. "
De Beauvoir, however, sees yet a different side of the contemporary view toward
aging:
A striking fact...is that the standing of old age has been discredited.
Modem technocratic society thinks that knowledge does not accumulate with
the years, but grows out of date. Age brings disqualification with it: age is not
an advantage. It is the values associated with youth that are esteemed."
Often in our country, however, we are seeing that there are no hard and fast rules or scales
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for physically measuring age stages or where they begin or end, aside from the arbitrary
assignment of a particular year to the attainment o f ‘old age’. Physical aging, for instance,
varies from individual to individual and depends on many factors for its rate of speed.
Environmental factors such as amount or lack of exercise, physical labor or ‘desk’ jobs, play
into the aging rate. Then there are social fectors that contribute, such as amount of education,
financial status, and to a degree, social class. Additionally, the rate at which individuals age
can be further divided into internal and external categories. These categories need not
necessarily occur at the same speed and with the same individual. So one person at fifty may
have gray hair and wrinkles and be healthy, while the next person might appear to be ten years
younger yet not outwardly exhibit the fact that he or she is suffering from an ailment that
usually is not seen until the sixties or seventies. Genetic predisposition plays an important
role, as does mental alacrity and general psychological health, all influenced by lifestyle. Thus
aside from the assignment of an arbitrary number, the onset of ‘old age’ cannot be accurately
defined. (In the next chapter we will look at how arbitrarily lumping all people of a particular
age into the same category has caused chaos within the Social Security program.)

The Japanese View of Aging
An absolute chronological age usually marks the onset of old age in literate societies.
In the U. S. today this is frequently the sixty-fifth birthday. In traditional Japan the transition
to old age is a formal ceremony held on the sixty-first birthday. There, one puts on a bright
kimono which symbolizes a new freedom from mid-adulthood responsibilities."
Japan has an unprecedented number o f elderly citizens. Since it is, like the U. S., an
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industrialized society it seems reasonable that we would look at the policies it has put into
place regarding the treatment and care of its elderly. Perhaps, by looking at these policies, we
will be able to learn from Japan's successes as well as from its mistakes in initiating policies
to deal with its burgeoning elderly population. We must, however, keep in mind that Japan
is not, like the U. S., a culturally diverse society. Its social traditions as well as its religious
background have resulted in a highly homogenous society that has rigorously adhered to a
traditional outlook that permeates every aspect of its culture. Nevertheless, certain crosscultural comparisons may emerge which we might perhaps utilize to deal more realistically
with our own soon-aging society.
Japan is well-known for its group-centeredness and the hierarchical organization of
its society. These particular features o f its social organization are mainly unconscious, rooted
deeply in its history, and pervade nearly all social behavior. Superficially, they are similar to
features found in pre-industrial European countries. Often, these similarities have been taken
as functional equivalents and thus described as "pre-industrial" or "traditional". But the
corporate emphasis and the Confiician base of Japanese ethics determine these patterns of
hierarchical social organization and group-centeredness to be more or less unique to Japan. "
This uniqueness is strengthened by the Japanese cultural homogeneity. The small island nation
was ruled centrally by a rigid and powerful bureaucracy without contact with the outside
world from 1603 to 1868. As a result, the language and customs as well as their view of the
world is exceptionally uniform. Japanese behavior, according to Christine Kiefer, is based on
perceptions of unstated uniform expectations far more than are Western cultures. Welldefined social roles and proper actions are the result of Confiician values at all levels of
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society. The most important of all relationships is that of parent and child. Regardless of the
ages of the generations in question the standards insist on respect, kindness, obedience, and
support toward parents. Historically, this theory of ethics was inculcated, and then supported,
in agrarian villages where all âmilies were unified into large land units. Age-grading regulated
authority as did a patrilineal kinship system or ie. The ie was a strong hierarchy of interrelated
families in which seniority, the rights of the eldest, and male dominance typified formal
authority." As Mears has stated: “The Japanese belongs to his personal family, which in turn,
belongs to the natural family of which the Divine Emperor is the kind father”."
In pre-modem Europe inheritance patterns gave the elders of landowning families
some authority, but most peasants did not control land and this limited the influence of elders
overall. By contrast, in Japan the lower peasantry were integrated into the landholding
scheme, which reinforced the Confiician stress of universal esteem for their elders. These
traditions resulted in modem Japanese customs and a deep stmcture of ethics, based in
Confucianism, whereby it is necessary for social roles to be properly performed in order for
social success to ensue. This is true for aU classes regarding the roles of parent and child. This
has superseded the tendency of economic values to override family values, as in most other
industrial societies. Where the law is concemed, feudal origins, together with Confiician
traditions, have resulted in the elderly receiving extensive rights in modem Japan." Edel and
Edel, however, find similarities between the European medieval morality and that of the
Japanese, where hierarchical social roles were designated and the relationship between God
and man were structured.^"
American society, on the other hand, emphasizes rugged individualism associated with
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the values of independence and freedom. One's morality is questioned and one's humanity
reduced if one is not self-reliant. Independence means that the individual is able to give as well
as keep a balance in a relationship while he or she also takes. Nonreciprocal taking, in
contrast, is dependence^*; and that is looked down on by Americans.
In Japan, heavy requirements of respect and care for the elderly are levied on the
young by Confucianism and traditional society. However, (and interestingly) the old do not
escape obligation under this structure. The individual must subordinate himself to the well
being of the group, regardless of his authority or formal office. Theoretically, households
were ruled by the oldest active male, but often, decisions for the household were made by the
most competent member. Punishment at the hands of the community awaited those who
neglected the well-being of subordinates or used authority in an unfeeling fashion. This value
regulates many social functions within organizations and communities in Japan today. The
ideal form of decision-making is done by consensus, and this is referred to as the "corporate
emphasis". To some extent, this separates power and prestige. In contrast, personal feelings
are often assumed to supersede social conscience in the U. S., and there is a wider range of
acceptable options to draw from in dealing with interpersonal behaviors.^ These options
stem, in part, from the ethnic and racial heterogeneity exhibited by U. S. Citizens who, in
contrast to the Japanese population, have been drawn here from all over the planet. And while
we are not a “melting pot” per se, our differences are, with few exceptions, tolerated if not
embraced.
In Japan, conscious personal choice is subjugated by group-centeredness and the
homogeneity of values by a preponderance of widely shared cultural expectations. This lends
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a stability to Japanese society. Rules do change, but they do so very slowly. “
Social changes which occurred in Japan due to contact with other cultures and
Western societies were somewhat disruptive, but were modulated by the values of Confiician
filial piety and the values of family solidarity. The civil code was revised in 1899 to require
femilies to take care of their elderly. These policies had the effect of lending "a sense of jural
entitlement" to the entrenched notion of respect for the aged. Relatives were charged with an
added measure of responsibility. This situated the family into position as a "safety net" under
the destitute, or at least that majority of destitute who were fortunate to have families. Today
the modernization and industrialization of Japan have given rise to a population explosion.
In just 130 years the population has quadrupled; the over-sixty-five segment has increased
more quickly than the other segments of society, reaching 13 million in 1990 and representing
10.3% of the total population."
Health and welfare programs tend to be the major focus of Japanese gerontologists,
who seek to solve the problems created by the aging population." According to Kiefer,
Japan’s citizens are notable not only for their longevity, but also for the fact that the majority
of its people over age sixty-five is healthy. They rarely express worries about dying, but tend
to be troubled by thoughts that life may become meaningless long before death. This stems
more from a desire to not become a burden to their children rather than from being tired of
living."
The norms giving responsibility for the care of the aged to their children substantially
contribute to a feeling of material security for the elderly. Needless to say, this is not the case
for those who are estranged from their children, or who have no children, or whose children
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are poor. These cases contribute to the one-third of the over-sixty-five population who work.
Most Japanese pensions are considerably below American levels. The typical retirement age
has been fifty-five, leaving a five-year gap before government pensions begin. Half o f those
who retire at fifty-five take another job, and the majority of these "recycled workers" work
at lower paying, less prestigious jobs than before. It is estimated that 42% of elderly Japanese
receive welfare supplements. This indicates that their personal income is below $2,900 per
month. 42.1% of Americans and 44.1% of Japanese over sixty say they must work for money.
In Japan, 61.8% of those over sixty lived with their children in 1985, while in the U. S. the
rate for this age level was 14%." Ideally, in Japan as in the U. S., the best arrangements are
for the two generations to live "close but separate"."
Senility is regarded in Japan as being an inevitable and natural part of life. Therefore,
no "treatments" are sought. In an efiFort to interpret and communicate feelings, family
members may even join the elder in his or her hallucinatory world. While not necessarily
drawing the elder closer to the rest of the family, this seems to draw the family itself together,
the good o f the family being the ultimate goal." While this practice can be seen as a
condescending or humoring move on the part of family members, I imagine that its basis
might also be found in the family wanting to join the elder where he or she ‘is’. Rather than
bemoaning the fact of senility, or even Alzheimers then, the family would have adopted an
attitude of “oh well, why not”, and accepted the reality of the situation.
In contrast to most Western countries, the Japanese family remains the usual source
of care giving for the severely impaired elderly. This accounts for three-fourths of the nursing
care given to the disabled. And one-fourth of all primary care giving relatives are themselves

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m i s s io n o f t h e c o p y r ig h t o w n e r . F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p ro h ib ited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

100

over sixty. This contributes to high stress levels within families. Yet without the free labor of
these family members Japanese society would be even harder pressed to meet the basic
necessities of its aging population." But, according to Welty it is becoming difficult to find
adequate space in Japan for the nuclear family. Increasingly, it is primarily only the affluent
who can afford to maintain homes spacious enough to include the extended, traditional
family.^*
The progress of geriatric service development in Japan needs to be closely watched
by the U. S., given the unusual willingness of the Japanese families to care for their aged
members. But their ability to care for them at home is being eroded by increasing female
employment, a falling birth rate, inflation, and continued urbanization. Meanwhile, the aged
population continues to grow. And most developed societies are following the same route,
although at a measurably slower rate.^^

Aging and Ethics in Other Societies
Turning away fi"om Japan and industrial society, we find that for many young people
in non-industrial societies, to attain old age is the ultimate lifetime achievement. For in many
of these societies, certain advantages systematically inhere. Often, the young are envious and
resentful of the elderly who are in control. This is the downside of attaining power and
privilege in these societies, for the elderly often discover that a state of uneasy peace and
occasionally open conflict mars their relations with the young.” Nevertheless, this culturallybound dichotomy appears always to be embraced by the aging young as they move into the
advantageous positions once held by their elders, thus continuing and reinforcing the cycle.
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So perhaps the system has, in a sense, a built-in goal - an impetus for the young - giving them
something to strive for that is feasibly within their reach if they are patient and willing to work
toward it.
Over the years, the elderly have accumulated religious lore and ritual experience which
qualifies them to fill particular ritual roles. And the old are repositories of wisdom about
everyday affairs as well in societies without writing. The elderly are perceived as important
sources of information about the past and about how things should be done, because they
have lived a long time.”
Our country is one where good intentions and “door-to-door-charity” no longer seem
able to address the everyday problems that beset us. Other, more organized agencies for
social insurance, family welfare, and other such programs are, while more reliable and
efficient, strictly a compromise at best between the traditional values of society and the very
real needs it feels. Our institutions reflect not only sympathy for the needs of others, but “the
right of the individual to do what he likes with his own wealth”/® However, other societies
maintain other approaches.
Small-scale societies, according to George Silberbauer, tend to be more cohesive and
inwardly focused than industrial societies, such as ours, which tend to maintain close external
ties with each other. A smaller society often finds people connected to each other in more
than one way. Family members are often also individuals with whom daily business
transactions are conducted, resulting in more closely-knit and integrated social relationships
than are found in our society. Consequently, we find that behavior limits in these societies are
more narrowly defined than in our country, and must be continually fine-tuned," so that the
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scales of order do not become unbalanced. For instance, it could be very easy to bruise or
damage a family relationship if, under these conditions, a business relationship involving a
relative were to become adversarial. Not only would this affect the family and the business,
but it would also have an impact on the community at large.
By necessity, institutions in these communities have to remain un- specialized and
flexible because they too will be called upon to serve many functions. But written laws are
seen as unrealistic and restrictive to such a society, for each social situation brings with it a
special and unique perspective." Instead, relationships are guided by values, and these cus
toms, having evolved through generations of practical use, are internally generated rather than
being externally applied®*, as the application of written law would be.
The Australian hunter abides by strict mandatory rules when he divides his kill among
his family. The portions are not gifts, but rather what is matter-of-factly due to them. Thus,
by absolute right the hunter’s father, father-in-law, paternal uncle, and grandfather receive a
particular share of the kill. This would not happen, however, among the Eskimos for in
stance, if game were scarce. But the Australian elders are supported by religion as well as law.
The hunters respect these sanctions because it is the elders who maintain the sacred myths as
well as the many features o f ceremonies which are seen as necessary to the successful
proliferation of game. This symbiotic reliance on the sharing o f sacred myths and the kill on
the part of both is the foundation for satisfying particular kinship responsibilities.®® According
to Silberbauer;
Whether a society has an ethical system can be recognized by its having a
mental construct of values which are expressed as principles to be invoked
and interpreted in guiding social behavior(i.e. that which has significance and
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meaning for others) and in judging it in gradations of good or bad. All known
societies, judged by this criterion, have ethical systems."

We have to understand here that just because a society is without written laws this does not
mean that it is an immoral or lawless society.
Many attitudes exist among various cultures regarding the degree of harmony required
for a society to run smoothly. And universally, there does not seem to be any one particular
type o f killing which could be regarded as evil. Occasionally parricide and fratricide are
sanctioned. But then the frame of reference must be carefully interpreted:
So, for example, when the Eskimo abandon their aged parents to die of
starvation this is by no means callous murder. It is a bitterly regrettable
necessity, which the old people accept and indeed, one is told, initiate and
insist upon. It is not a wrong act, but a filial duty.^*
The reason for such behavior could be additionally supported because these people believe
that it is better to die of exposure to the elements while one is still relatively healthy because
one continues after death in the same condition in which one dies. So being decrepit is not
seen as a viable or desirable alternative.^® But, in today’s world, it is doubtful that this practice
is now observed or tolerated. However, it is important to under- stand that such practices
evolved initially from a very real necessity to conserve scarce resources. This solution appears
to have been one which the entire culture agreed upon for the greater good of the majority:
those who remained in good health and were able to withstand the rigors of a harsh
environment.
The inequalities between young and old, and the tensions that typify their associations
with each other, are not fixed or unchanging in non-industrial societies, and can undergo
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important modifications. They have seen drastic changes in the last one-hundred years or so
with the introduction of new governmental institutions, new technologies, new economic
arrangements, and new religious and secular ideologies; all of which have emerged, first, as
a result of colonialism, then because of improved world communications. The status of the
old and the quality of their relations with the young have been profoundly affected. In this
changing non-industrial sphere, the elderly are steadily losing their influence and privileges
while the young continue to gain. During this time of change the young are challenging the
authority as well as the values o f their elderly.” This is not to say that such changes are
necessarily good for the small-scale society itself but some changes have to be expected when
external interaction with other, more technologically advanced, societies occurs. Cultural
changes of this sort can be shattering to a society, and as with most social upheavals of this
nature, it takes time for equilibrium to be re-established.
Among Native Americans the Zuni teach their ethical code as something “to be taught
and learned like any other facts o f the world”.” Thus, morality is expressed beautifully as a
part of the greater whole, interwoven with and indistinguishable from any other facet of daily
life. (One can only speculate as to what such a method of teaching contemporary American
young would accomplish. I find it impossible to see negative results to such an approach given, of course, that the approach itself would ever be accepted by mainstream society.)
Illness is a subjective classification in itself. One group may classify symptoms as
pathological, while another might see them as a normal part of life. For example, the Omaha
Indians saw their elders as having status based on their experience and knowledge, deferring
to them long after physical weakness became apparent. These elders were not deterred in any
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way from having active roles in their society. Yet in other societies, once the elderly became
a burden and could not provide for their basic needs they lost their value. In Africa, the
Hottentots left their infirm elderly in deserted huts; Laplanders bludgeoned the decrepit to
death. These elderly were seen as having no part to play in their societies.^® Based on
necessity, in the face of famine or even potential extinction, it can be seen that such
‘solutions’ seem harsh only to those who have been raised in a more benevolent climate or
conditioned to a wealthier economy with surpluses.
Navajo moral discussions contain advice and encouragement as its essence. We have
to look at these models realistically of course, in the context of their own cultural history. And
we need to know who or what is the source of these exhortations or commands - parents, or
the entire social framework. From there we need to be cognizant of how the training is
supported or guided by the social structure of the community. Does it receive partial
validation through religious authority? And if so, how does religion interface with other social
institutions?" Consequently, we find that each society has to fit its moral rules to its needs
and goals. Our culture, for instance “has a fondness for the abstract and highly general”, as
Edel and Edel point out," and as Johnson has shown us in describing our system of
metaphorical understanding.
According to Ruth Benedict, the study of peoples who had not yet been touched “by
the spread of a standardized worldwide civilization” was important because their “simpler”
life styles provided the opportunity for isolated localized social forms to develop.
In the higher cultures the standardization of custom and belief over a couple
of continents has given a false sense of the inevitability of the particular
[social] forms that have gained currency, and we need to turn to a wider
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survey in order to check the conclusions we hastily base upon this near
universality of familiar customs.”
Benedict believed that “modem” civilization, seen in this light, becomes an “entry in a long
series of possible adjustments” to our social situations. She wondered how we can, with
assurance, relegate certain behaviors into absolute categories of normal or abnormal." She
states that certain traits that our culture has discarded, such as the ability to go into a trance,
or homosexuality, function quite well in other cultures.®” Her conclusion in this regard is that
“normality is culturally defined” because we are “shaped to the drives and standards”®* of our
particular society.
Benedict makes an interesting point when she states that “[n]o one civilization can
possibly utilize in its mores the whole potential range of human behavior”. We select, as a
culture, from among all possible behavior traits, in a process that is “non-rational and
subconscious”, occurs over great periods of time, and is conditioned by history. “Normality,
in short, within a very wide range, is culturally defined.” She sees abnormality as being “a
term for the segment that [any] particular civilization does not use”.®®So when we say a thing
“is morally good” we are actually saying (whether we realize it or not) that it is habitual. Her
belief is that the concept of “normal” is a variant of and derived fi"om the concept of “good”.®®
I believe that we have to take a ‘world view’ and realize that being judgmental can and often
does arise fi’om a lack of familiarity with the facts and conditions indigenous to each culture,
and even to each situation within a culture. Benedict’s viewpoint can serve to remind us to
keep an open and critical mind when regarding problems that require effective solutions. We
have to maintain an awareness, especially during policy implementation, that acting solely
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from habit because a particular solution seems ‘comfortable’ may lead to stagnation and con
sequently, ineffectiveness. Therefore implementors must continually reassess the ends of a
policy as well as the means by which it operates to attain them.

Moral Implications
According to Fry, the symbolic medium through which we comprehend and navigate
our world is culture. It is a cognitive or ideational code by which we guide our social behavior
and evaluate, not only our own personal behavior, but that of others. With proper use of this
guide we can come to know the "good life" and to express the qualities we wish to see in the
world. Anthropologists refer to this as "ideal culture", and when contrasted with actual
behavior that is what it remains.” However, Johnson has shown us that the cultural medium
is, in turn, reliant on other symbolic structures, such as how we use metaphors to express and
relate or link one thought to another. Fry’s observation, however supports the contention
made in the previous chapter that the ideal life is always just beyond our grasp. While we may
“come to know” it, that knowledge will only be an ideal. For an ideal is rarely ever captured
or attained, but stands instead as the standard we would hope to reach, as a society, if we
collectively could. It must be understood that “the ideal” usually represents the views of the
majority within a society. And, as we have just seen, different societies present us with
different conceptions of what would be ideal based on their history as well as on their current
conditions. These conditions must then be seen as containing demographics based on such
diverse things as the area encompassed by the society; whether their technology is based on
industry, tourism, or subsistence; age distribution, and climate, just to name a few. When
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ideals represent the views of a majority we necessarily have a minority who perceive some or
all of them as foolish, empty, or even dangerous. In a diverse society such as ours this is often
the case.
The diversity of our own subcultures may offer relevant suggestions to policy-makers
through their varied ways of approaching the needs of their dependent elders. Their traditions
generally end up being subsumed under our official government dogma, but they may contain
possibilities for helping %ing policy become more realistic in its application.
Each society, according to Benedict, contains individuals whose temperament types
run counter to their culture’s expectations. However, “there is an ascertainable range of
human behavior that is found wherever a sufficiently large series of individuals is observed”.
But the vast majority of the individuals are “plastic to the moulding force o f the society into
which they are bom”. So traits, such as the ability to go into a trance, might be valued in India
while discounted here. And homosexuality is institutionalized in certain cultures while here
it is considered by many to be unacceptable.®®
In this fashion, Benedict defends moral relativism. One cannot argue against the
examples she used to show how much we are all influenced by our own particular culture and
subcultures. Perhaps cultural relativism, as presented here, was much more relevant in
Benedict’s time, over a half century ago. Today, with virtually the entire planet linked
electronically, there appears to be an overlaying culture that is slowly absorbing all peoples
on what I would call a “public” level. This is especially seen in the U. S., in many ways, and
in a microcosmic way with all the various cultures represented here. While habits derived
from our parents’ or grandparents’ place of origin may hold sway in private, at home, most
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of us understand in general and can navigate this outer, public culture that has been impressed
on us from outside not only through but by the media, Madison Avenue, government policies,
other national institutions, and our corporations.
While looking at other societies’ ways of treating their elderly will not give us
answers, it does prompt us to look within to seek the answers that most fit our individual
problems. And the solution may be that there is more than one way to approach and deal with
them. It seems that this may be the only way we will be able to progress along the
(metaphoric) path or paths that will lead us toward our own “ideal” solutions.
And so our policies must be guided with wisdom and as much foresight as is possible
to ensure that no segment of our society is needlessly hurt by inattention to potential policy
fallout’, or externalities. This is especially so when policies deal with our elderly citizens. Of
the societies we have briefly looked at in this chapter, none have as much economic and
industrial similarity to our way of life, overall, as does Japan. We might look to Confiician or
traditional Japanese society, for instance, for re-introducing (or introducing) standards of
respect and support toward aging relatives in our culture. The media play a big part in how
the elderly are perceived, and I am not certain that they would want to trade the laughs they
get for depicting them in a more positive light. However, our culture’s emphasis on selfreliance is not wrong either. There are actually very few people, including most elderly, who
would not prefer to be so. But when a person’s physical and financial resources dwindle, selfreliance is not easy to maintain. Nor should we, as a society, scorn those who are no longer
able to continue on as they once were. Since our corporate and political institutions reflect
the values that are held in our society, might they not try to make an effort to convey a
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different attitude toward aging? A good culture should want to project good attitudes. It
seems to me that a good culture would promote policies that do not ‘type-cast’ a whole
segment of the population just because it attained the arbitrarily determined age of sixty-five.
The aging policy would look at need, not age, as a criterion for assistance. The practice of
arbitrarily forcing funds to be withheld fi"om one’s wages in the form of Social Security is
unfair as well as unreliable as to its stated purpose. In practice, it does not work well. Many
individuals could better invest the funds that the government currently withholds from their
paychecks in private accounts for greater personal gain than Social Security ever yields for
them. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
We have found, as in the case of the Zuni, that certain aspects in their moral codes
are equal to or even superior to some ‘official’ standards adhered to in modem American
society. Contrasts and comparisons with other countries and cultures, therefore, are a good
way in which to help us to assess our progress in any particular policy area. Here, aging
policy can benefit by the policy makers and implementers being aware of the differences be
tween cultures and subcultures in how they assess the limits and value of their aged in relation
to their societies. Makers of aging policy need to realize that aging policy has somehow
missed its mark in our country and is not serving well those whom it should, and in some in
stances is serving those whom it should not, i.e. those who are not needy. What looking at
other cultures can do is to not only allow us to explore alternative approaches in relation to
helping the sick and/or needy U. S. elders, but it gives us a less parochial view by which to
judge whether or not what we are doing is what we should be doing. For instance, compari
sons between industrial and non-industrial societies let us see how impersonal our “services”
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to the aged have become. A formula is applied to a person upon attainment of age 65. It is
an arbitrary system that takes no account o f state of health, personal need or lack of need, or
financial status. Assumptions are made solely based on age without consideration that some
elderly may be well enough off financially that assistance is unnecessary, while other persons
may be in acute need of more assistance than is offered, while even other persons might
require assistance while yet in their forties or fifties. Not weeding out those individuals
capable of caring for themselves does a disservice to those whose needs are truly great.
Our look here at other cultures has shown that not only do we tend to depersonalize
the aging individual in our country, but we often, in effect, take away the responsibility of the
family for their aged members. We saw that the Japanese rely heavily on families. In
comparison, we see that our government is being paternalistic. An attitude among many
American citizens can be seen to have developed; Why bother, if someone else will do it?
Government has insidiously, although perhaps well-meaningly, taken over and displaced a
portion of the families’ duties.
A second fact that falls out from all this is that the individual herself is lulled into a
false sense of security regarding her future. If the government will do her saving for her, by
payroll deductions for Social Security, it seems that she is relieved of worrying about her
future and old age. This too is an insidious event. It was never openly advocated, but was im
plied that one’s old age, through Social Security, was secure. But is it? Many seniors today
can give testimony to the feet that indeed it is not. People need to be educated on how to take
care of their own finances, and the importance of saving for their futures. Social Security
going bankrupt due to inefficiency could mean a chaotic and miserable old age for our poor-
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est seniors as well as those with modest savings to supplement their Social Security benefits.
One can never be secure when placing one’s life and future in the care of another, especially
an impersonal other, whether that other is a person or an institution or agency. Too many of
our elderly really believed that Social Security would take care of them in their old age.
The next chapter will analyze and question how or if certain policies in our country
discriminate for or against our aged citizens. We will look at current aging policies, their
strengths and failures.
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CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS OF AGING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

This chapter will pull together three main areas that have been considered in prior
chapters: 1) perceptions of aging in our society; 2) how more closely monitoring a policy
during its ongoing implementation, or “stage two”, can better ensure its success and more
readily determine its success or failure in the community at large; and 3) the components of
ethical behavior and attitudes reflected by a community and its individual, corporate, and
institutional aspects. Against this backdrop we will be examining the background and policies
of the Social Security program - its goals, successes, and its failings - where the elderly are
concemed. These three areas will be tightly interwoven with each other as well as with the
recommendations for the Social Security program which will follow in Part Two.
All three of these, in and of themselves, encompass areas of serious concern. But here,
each is being utilized to enhance the other. We have needed to take a serious look at all the
facets of aging - how our society views it, how it is seen in other cultures - in order to provide
a clear base for the next ingredient of this mosaic: the policy which has engendered the Social
Security program. We shall explore how informed, judicious attention to details by insightful
implementors can strengthen a policy, such as Social Security, or more quickly determine if
116
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it should be severely altered or even terminated. The character of the implementer him- or
herself, as we saw in chapter four, plays a major role in this.
Quite often we hear the human lifespan being metaphorically referred to as a
“journey”. As such, it is perceived as having a beginning, a middle, and an end, relating to
childhood, the ‘productive’ years, and then a decline into old age. This perception is not
necessarily accurate, nor is it flattering. One’s ‘usefulness’ to society should not be tied solely
to the work one does to earn a living, or in other terms, to the language of market forces.
People also raise families, participate in community activities such as voting, church
membership, observing laws, and so forth. But many people - often upon attaining a particular
age - are forced to retire. And after almost a century of this kind of stereotyping, many accept
this as the way things should be done.
Until recently many people have also accepted, without question, the fact that an ever
increasing portion of their salary is “withheld” in the form of Social Security. (In 1996 a
person will have to earn over $62,700 before he/she no longer has to “contribute” to Social
Security.) These monies are then, as a rule, returned to the contributors in the form of a
monthly check after they retire. By itself, this is hardly enough for one to barely survive
without supplement, and those who have no means to supplement Social Security can barely
subsist. Consequently, we see that this program is not a perfect solution to easing the
‘declining’ years of the working poor. For the majority, it is a supplement to life savings and
private retirement programs or those offered now by many corporate employers. For some
people. Social Security is not a necessity. The Social Security guidelines no longer seem to
be fulfilling their original intent, partly due to inflation. Edward Boorstein quotes John Svahn,
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Social Security Commissioner in 1982, who states that two billion dollars a year are lost in
payroll tax revenues for every percentage point the unemployment rate rises.* Consequently,
if the payroll tax revenues fall, the system is unable to easily meet its commitments. Under
private plans and/or personal investments a person receives back what she or he has put in
and does not need to rely on collecting monies from future generations. According to
Malcolm Morrison the retirement policy of our government “was to provide a period of
leisure (or rest) after the conclusion of working life”.^ But should the government even be
attempting to do individuals’ saving for them? What would be a good alternative? Could it
be possible to educate people to save for themselves? What institutional changes would have
to be initiated in order for this to be so? And how could the corporate world assist in initiating
or incorporating proposed changes? In the spirit of rugged individualism, do we really need
to have the state shepherd our savings and retirement through a general payroll deduction,
or can we Americans, who are known for our ability to pioneer new frontiers, take more
charge of our own lives and forego the paternalistic protection and “nannyism” that appears
to be daily gaining more of a foothold in our lives?

PART ONE
Ageism
George Maddox states that ageism is the most important aspect of aging in our
society, having emerged in third place after racism and sexism. It is important for 3 reasons:
1. It affects everyone, young and old.
2. It involves basic questions of social policy.
3. It influences federal expenditures that rival our military budget.^
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It seems that the government would be the first place to be free of such discrimination
because of the laws Congress has passed against it. But the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(1977) discovered that ageism was contained in ten different federal programs. In various
ways, community health centers, social services to low-income individuals and families, legal
services, vocational rehabilitation, vocational education, the Food Stamp Program, Medicaid,
and employment and training services all were inclined to discriminate against older persons.
Several states, for example, exclude the elderly from programs for vocational rehabilitation
because they are not of "employable age". Unfortunately, there is also evidence that the
elderly are discriminated against by their own families.^
Thirty-seven states, as of 1986, required that neglect and abuse of elders be reported
to government agencies. Four percent o f all older people are abused every year, according
to an official estimate. However, actual physical abuse is the least common form. Passive
neglect, such as financial exploitation, verbal, and emotional abuse are far more common. But
all forms of elder abuse are encouraged when the elderly are stereotyped as worthless,
helpless, and repulsive.*
Gerontological researchers have noted that considerable arbitrariness persists
regarding a solely chronological approach to ageing. However, in large-scale bureaucracies
the number of years that have passed since birth is a simple and exact indicator for decision
making in regard to clients or members. These encompass decisions such as when an
individual may obtain certain benefits, be entitled to particular rights, begin working, and
retire. But age alone is often not a reliable indicator of ability or lack thereof. Chronological
absolutes can hide an unbelievable amount of variation.®
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In our country there is no clear-cut boundary which delineates old age. Although
social researchers use sixty-five as the benchmark, administrative eligibility for pensions,
retirement, and Social Security has been variously set from ages in the forties up to ages in
the seventies.’ But in all cases where age boundaries are set the limits are set arbitrarily, and
are then regarded as immutable.
We also find that in our country there is an intricate network of association between
minority group status, poverty, ethnicity, and the various patterns of aging found within
groups depicted by those three elements. Since age in urban locales is often compounded by
and identified with poverty, this becomes particularly critical. Many poverty-stricken elderly
are members of groups whose historical background differ greatly from the average AngloAmerican population. They have most likely also experienced stereotyping, discrimination,
and prejudice throughout their lives. In spite of this, they have managed to compensate by
utilizing strengths drawn from their respective cultures to withstand these inequities.* As
mentioned in the previous chapter, these subcultures may provide valuable insights for
reforming our institutionalized ways of perceiving and acting toward the elderly.
Supporting the dependent elderly appears to irritate many of the young. They see it
only as a one-way street where they are giving without receiving anything in return. Yet,
according to Fry, nonreciprocity is tolerated in many other roles in society. These roles,
however, are [often] strictly defined and include infancy, childhood, and illness. Chronic
dependency, especially in our culture, is seen as bordering on freeloading, whether it is
voluntary or involuntary. This in itself reduces "the prestige-generating components" of the
elderly’s status. They often see themselves, and are seen, as having little to give that is
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regarded as worthwhile when they require the help of others. Their self-esteem and integrity
is jeopardized because reciprocity is perceived as being out of balance.’ But does it need to
be this way? Chapter Five showed us that the elderly are seen differently in certain other
societies where they are valued for their experience and wisdom.
This insight into our almost subconscious social concept of reciprocity helps toward
understanding how a pervasive resentment toward the aged can have arisen. But nevertheless
it cannot be condoned, for it is not a valid basis for non-support, particularly of the
disadvantaged elderly who are often at risk of "falling through the cracks" of our social
networks. They should not be scorned by society because they are regarded as having no
means by which to reciprocate. Often, they were bom into disadvantaged circumstances and
never found their way out, or perhaps were not allowed a way out, although one may have
been perceived. Our social conscience must not become indifferent or numb to the suffering
of those who are truly less fortunate.
As people's abilities and skills are utilized while interacting in the "real" world,
compromises are made. But when these compromises are extreme, or different evaluative
standards point in two different directions, value conflicts arise. The elderly often experience
difficulty in carrying out the ideals of daily life, with this resulting in ambivalence on their part.
As the positive and negative contrast, the expressed values become dualities. We attempt to
incorporate the positive because it is good. And we find, rooted in the basis for reciprocity
and exchange, that independency-dependency is a major value orientation*® in our society.
The practice of early retirement or retirement at a specific age is one that can be seen
as a form of ageism. Advancing years is no actual disqualification in many occupations, for
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the worker is not prevented from doing a job merely by his or her age. With some professions,
such as physicians for instance, de Beauvoir tells us that age adds to their value for a certain
length of time. Their years of experience are preferred to the relatively short term served by
the neophyte. But even here, the picture changes further on when the physician becomes old.
He is then perceived as being in biological decline, worn out, out of date, and unable to keep
up with modem discoveries. People imagine that he has "lost" most of his ability. This type
of prejudice "condemns" the elderly person, in almost every field of endeavor, to idleness.*'
Violent political movements and revolutions, according to de Beauvoir, are never the
undertakings of the elderly. But a certain few do continue serving in government into their
later years. Adenauer was eighty-seven and Churchill eighty-one when they "retired".*’
Palmore sees elders as actually having made gains overall in terms of education,
health, occupation, and income. Since 1961, according to a Health Interview Survey, relative
to the young, older cohorts above age sixty-five showed decreasing measures of disability and
illness. Palmore believes that this is due to cohort changes rather than to decreases in ageism.
Cohorts bom after 1920 are regarded as being better educated, healthier, and more affluent
than are those cohorts bom prior to 1920. He sees this as being due to "more fortunate life
experiences". Being better educated, they did not suffer from financial loss and unemployment
during the Depression, and received better health care as well as better nutrition.
Consequently, as the older cohorts are replaced among those over sixty-five, the averages in
the areas of health, education, and income improve. These remarkable improvements,
combined with the many programs and services developed solely for elders, has resulted in
criticism of the programs in favor of the aged, or what he sees as positive ageism.** Positive
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ageism, then, is the polar opposite of discriminatory action. In this case, it is favorable
treatment only for the aged minority.
Being old has advantages that are not usually thought about. Education, advertising,
and a conscious public urging could counteract negative aging stereotypes. Society benefits
from elders, according to Palmore, because:
1. they are more law-abiding;
2. they are better citizens, for they participate in the voting process more
frequently, are interested and informed about public issues, contact public
officials more often, and serve more often in public office;
3. they are involved in more voluntary activities;
4. they are better workers; and
5. due to the maturity arising from experience, they tend to be wiser.
Palmore also points out that there are several advantages that primarily benefit the older
person in our society:
1. In addition to being more law-abiding, elders are less often victims of
crime. Contrary to popular opinion, persons over sixty-five have substantially
lower victimization rates in nearly all categories o f crimes.
2. The aged also suffer fewer accidents than any other age group.
3. The most important economic advantage of elders is Social Security and
other government pensions. Their benefits automatically increase with the cost
of living index.
4. Supplemental Security Income (established in 1974) guarantees a minimum
monthly income of $340 for an individual and $510 for a couple over age
sixty-five.
5. Extra personal exemptions and tax benefits in the form of reduced property
taxes, and [one time] exemption of capital gains fi’om sale of personal
residence.
6. Medicare, a form of national health insurance. And,
7. Free services and reduce rates for housing, medication, meals,
transportation, entertainment, education, etc.**
Consequently, being old does not have to be seen in a negative light. Old age can be depicted
in a positive fashion, not only to the young, but to the aging themselves, according to
Palmore.
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Additionally, Peter Uhlenberg suggests that there are reasons not to accept, as certain
and final, the projections of statistics for our future elderly population. It has been presumed
that "baby boomers", whose numbers are currently at 22 percent of the general population
and twice that of the elderly population, will swell the ranks of the aged far beyond anything
previously experienced. But, the ratio of expected increase could be higher or lower,
depending on dramatic increases or decreases in mortality. So, uncertainty exists when
projecting absolute future age distribution ratios.*® Epidemics and war, or scarcity of basic
resources due to overpopulation, are just a couple of possible scenarios that could alter these
projections. Nevertheless, we still need to be prepared for the probability that the predicted
increases will develop, and adjust our policies accordingly.

Social Security
Since its inception Social Security has been regarded as the most successful anti
poverty program in our country. Millions of elderly have been kept by it from slipping into
poverty. Every month more than one out of seven people in the U.S. receive a Social Security
check. This translates into over 36 million people. Only three percent of citizens over sixtyfive live in poverty, according to some experts.*’ However, it has recently become more and
more apparent that something is wrong with this assessment of its success, which seems to
be a self-perpetuating myth. The poorest elderly poor have difficulty surviving just on Social
Security alone, while a great percentage of the elderly have no desperate need for it, although
they certainly have it coming insofar as they paid into the system during their employment
period. But the system itself needs to be re-evaluated, updated, or perhaps even scrapped and
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replaced.
According to David Brodsky;
During the 1920s and 1930s, such factors as declining wages, rising
unemployment, the loss of savings, and inadequate aggregate [product]
demand contributed to the Depression. The political system’s response to
these economic problems involved an expanded government role in the
economy. The Social Security Act of 1935 served as a major element of this
response, and although its component programs enhanced the economic
security of retired persons and other individuals, the act focused on the twin
problems of unemployment and inadequate demand [for consumer products].
Accordingly, its retirement and old-age assistance provisions sought to reduce
unemployment by removing older workers from the labor force, thereby
opening up jobs for younger workers... In sum, policy makers tailored Social
Security to the economic circumstances of the 1930s.**
There were eleven people working for each retiree when Social Security was begun.
That ratio has fallen to approximately 3.3 to one today. By 2035, the ration will have lowered
to only 1.9 to 1. The median life expectancy for men was fifty-eight years when Social
Security was introduced. Today it is about seventy-two years.*’ However, competing needs
are causing politicians to struggle for a reconciliation, and to perhaps restructure this
entitlement. Many citizens doubt that the government has the ability to find a solution.
Today's young are not sure that they will ever see a return on the taxes they are now paying
into the Social Security fund at rates much higher than ever paid in the past. Spending on
Social Security has doubled since 1960. Some state that seniors are robbing their children's
future, but others disagree, saying it is the rising deficit, due to poor policy choices from the
seventies and eighties, which is the real culprit.’®
The image of the elderly as an economically disadvantaged group became increasingly
obsolete during the years between 1959 and 1987. The proportion of elderly with incomes
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below the poverty line dropped from 35% to 12% during that period.” The "issue of how to
meet the growing economic commitment of supporting the dependent older" generation must
be faced as the population continues to age. The elderly are politically entitled to
comparatively high levels of economic support from our government programs. But a
problem is developing because taxes that are now paid by the working population to support
the elderly have increased so sharply in the past three decades. Uhlenberg says that "it is
clearly too simplistic to argue that increasing poverty among children is caused by the
improved economic position of the elderly". However, it is noted that many older persons
who are recipients of benefits from these programs are also politically powerful as well as
affluent.” Possibilities for dealing with this inequity will be addressed further on.
Lamm, et a i, quotes Daniel Callahan who states that, "it is by no means evident why
mere survival, the living of life through adulthood, in and of itself merits the bountiful social
blessings of fully subsidized health care." In 1965, Medicare was set up as part of the Social
Security system to aid elderly Americans in paying for health care. It was estimated, at that
time, that by 1990 the program would cost $8.8 billion. By 1988 those costs had already risen
to $89 billion, and the plan is currently flirting with bankruptcy. It is ironic that today the
elderly are themselves paying proportionately more than they did in 1965 for health care.”
Dewey suggests that the valuations which society has given to particular activities are
those which actually originated under social conditions from past eras. The situations were
different then, and do not now represent current conditions. We must look to "individual
variation" as the means by which our current values are to be focused.” Individual variation
arises from environmental change. When one individual clings to the ideals of his forefathers.
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and the next individual develops new habits based on changes seen around her, a clash results.
Either one individual accepts the habit of the other, or a new habit is formed, or total
reconstruction occurs. Co-existence and toleration also come into play where mutual interests
are concerned. What usually arises is "the greatest good for the greatest number". Institutions
are formed based on new statutes, as a result.” This echoes Cicero, who declared: "In the
calculus of duties, those involving society's interests come first, and within these there are
gradations: duty to gods, country, parents, etc."” The inclination of our society to dismiss the
elderly segment, to render them invisible, goes against the grain of common sense and
decency - for “we” too will be older some day.
In recent decades, incentives and opportunities for older persons to participate in
productive society have declined. It is apparent that norms have not been developed which
would encourage their continued contributions in the social realm. The growing emphasis on
"leisure activities" for the aging gives the perception to some that the elderly are to be
excused fi'om societal responsibilities.” But this may not necessarily follow. Because one has
more time for leisure activities does not automatically preclude or assume that one's sense of
community responsibility withers. If, through habit, one has been socially active, one will
probably continue to be so, and perhaps even increase one's community involvement in lieu
o f leisure time. This follows fi’om Cicero, quoted earlier. Many elderly are active today in
their communities as members of Neighborhood Watch groups, or seen working at voting
precincts during elections, for instance.
Aging policy in Japan was spurred by the speed with which their population has aged.
This has resulted in a crisis for the health and welfare services to the elderly. In 1984, Japan
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spent $75 billion on health care, of which $18 billion was spent on those over seventy. Almost
one-fourth of the country's health cost was going to care for ten percent of its population.
Since 1973, when free medical care was established, cost for care of the aged had increased
eight-fold.”
We can determine a parallel increase in expenses in the U.S., even before our
percentage of elderly citizens reaches the Japanese proportions. Before this occurs we must
look for alternate solutions to the heavy burden that will inevitably come.
In the U.S. young and middle-aged workers now pay most of the benefits of our
growing retiree population, some of whom have larger incomes from pensions and Social
Security than the contributing workers. According to Boorstein, “in 1980 the Social Security
Administration published a report showing that only 12% o f those sixty-five and over
received” income from assets and other savings,” with three fifths of those sixty-five and over
receiving more than half their income from Social Security.*® According to Senator Bob
Kerry, in 1995 there were only five workers paying taxes to support each retiree. And, the
number of workers per retiree shrinks with each decade.**
It is impossible to differentiate between household income and disposable income
when presenting relative income levels of various age cohorts. Child-rearing and educational
expenses, and mortgage payments are often in the past for the elderly, so they can derive
more from their gross income than can the young. In 1986 a Congressional Research Service
study determined that a sixty-five year old retiree who had paid the maximum Social Security
taxes during his or her working career would receive the total contribution in only twenty-one
months! This means, according to Lamm, el a i, that for most o f a person's retirement the
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benefits received were paid for by neither the employee nor the employer but by the
diminishing base of contemporary workers. In 1990 the maximum contribution to Social
Security was 2000% higher than it was in 1970.*’ However, these statistics do not account
for increases in the cost of living during that period, nor the interest that would have been
earned on one’s total contributions during their working years had they been privately
invested.
We cannot question that Social Security is an indispensable program for the aging
poor, yet it has turned into a generous entitlement for the elderly wealthy and middle class
segments. The elderly, over age sixty-five make up only 10% of the impoverished in this
country. The decade between 1973 and 1983 saw the real wealth of people aged 65 to 69
climb from $169,366 to $321,562, while the group aged 25 to 34 saw a decrease from
$59,624 to $49,046. Eighteen percent, or 4.4 million households, receiving Social Security
benefits received an outside income of over $25,000 per year in 1986, according to the Con
gressional Research Service. The system is paying benefits not only to the aged poor, but to
a great number of wealthy retired persons while taxing the working poor and middle class.**
In order to keep the system intact and solvent, the Social Security Administration
estimates that a 42 percent increase on taxable income would have to be put into place by
2029. Since this is an unrealistic solution it appears inevitable that changes in the system must
occur.*'*
If we look at the reasons these programs were enacted into law we find that the
conditions which served their inception have changed enough that to just continue on as we
are in this regard would be foolhardy.
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Durkheim points out that law rests on both objective aid subjective causes at the same
time. We must look at demographics, the physical environment, and the climate as well as
national culture, ideas, and preferences. Law is supposed to be changeable, and this is why
it is required in one place and time and not in another. In other words, it should not be blindly
imposed on everyone in all places and at all times and under all circumstances. This is not a
matter of truth, for the law is neither true nor false. The law is not compromised by variations.
He sees it as being "appropriate or inappropriate to the aim that is its raison d'être"
As Social Security is currently structured, it compels middle-and low-income
employees to pay Social Security tax on all or most of their earnings. The wealthy paid Social
Security tax on approximately the first $62,000 earned in 1993. Those most likely to depend
on Social Security benefits when they retire receive the smallest payments when it is time for
them to collect. However, those whose earnings were higher, and who are not likely to
require the benefit, receive the highest payments.” It is, however, the very people who earned
so little during their working lifetime who in fact need the most assistance. Under current
guidelines. Social Security has not, nor never will, adequately help those it was supposed to
help. Certainly, an unpublished, if not unforeseen, externality of this policy is that the well-todo middle class have been able to use this as a sort of extra ‘savings account’. But not even
this portion of the retired population is benefiting as well as they could if they had been able
to invest the withheld portion of their salaries themselves, or if the money had been put
instead into a personal retirement fund. The middle-class recipient has had no say about
whether or not a portion of their earnings could or should be withheld in such a fashion. And
later I shall argue that this is wrong. The middle class could earmark a small percentage of
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their wages to be given to a Social Security fund for the poorest retirees, and few would
begrudge them that if they had the option to decide for themselves how to invest their own
retirement monies.
As Durkheim has pointed out, it is almost always impossible to create social change
with "methodical reflection", for most social actualities are too complex to be totally
encompassed by even the widest human intellect. Most social and moral institutions come
about, then, because of obscure causes, subconscious feeling, and "motives which have no
relationship to the effects they produce and which, consequently, they cannot explain".*’ The
complexity of society forces us to realize that humans are not isolated from each other, for
what affects one is eventually felt by the others.** For this reason, we cannot say that what
happens to the aged has no effect upon us, for we too will grow old soon enough. Ageism,
and early retirement policies are our concern. Nor can we allow current inequities in the
distribution of entitlements to continue without expecting to feel reactions in the form of
protests, at the least, and bankruptcy of the programs themselves, at the most, due to
imprudent implementation and distribution practices. The implementors themselves know it
does not work well but are given no authority to alter anything within the policy.
While the individual aims to preserve him- or herself, society has the same goal - to
ensure its continuity and its coordination. In each case a life process is involved, although
each has different ends. "The individual's action will always be to maintain his life process, and
any change in the economic conditions which threaten the life process would lead him to do
things which are non-social." It is impossible, however, for society to be independent of the
individual.*’
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Since the positive morality of a society grows out of its established activities and the
values that are attached to them,*® we must realize that society exists for the individual. The
power that society derives comes from the individuals within it. It is the individual unit of the
social structure that must initiate action in order for progress to be attained. Yet one does not
exist entirely for society, but also for oneself. An individual can also exist without a society,
albeit a lonely and difficult existence, but that is not an avenue to be explored here.
According to Dewey, from a dynamic-organic point of view we see the individual from two
standpoints. From one, society works through the individual; in the other, the individual is
merely a part of society.** A third standpoint could be that within a society the individual has
the opportunity also to give to and receive from a few or many others. Rarely does the stream
of benefits or contributions flow solely in one direction.
As Elizabeth Wolgast tells us, “the community is nothing without its members, they
help constitute it. Therefore its actions cannot be dissociated from them even if it also cannot
be reduced to actions of theirs”.*’ This observation highlights an important point: that
although we might, as individuals, have varying viewpoints regarding how we approach and
meet our social problems, the solutions collectively agreed upon by the majority are reflective
of the populace as a whole. So while, as individuals, we may not all agree upon the course
of action, the action that is collectively taken in representative government is the responsibility
of us all. If the action works, that is good, but i^ conversely, it is ineffective or even damaging
we must all assume a portion o f the responsibility for its failure.
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Duties of State
We find, then, that when we have any association of individuals we also have authority
to coordinate and control in order to maintain a plan o f order. This is necessary.** In a society
this authority is the State, which "is the very organ of social thought”, according to
Durkheim. The State does not speculate or think for the sake of thought, as an individual
might, but thinks toward practical ends, or to guide collective behavior. And since the State
is just a collection of individuals, its aim should be the development of individuals.**
Dewey calls this association o f individuals “a consensus of consciousness”. It guides
the social mind. It is not totally uniform, but enough so that it can actually limit or control the
individual along certain lines. It is a working organization of ideas and ideals. He sees the
social mind as being as real as the individual mind**, yet separate. He points out that social
philosophers have been almost hypnotically influenced by this "political factor" which is
perceived as direct control of the individual. This is an exaggeration, for the political aspect
of society must be thought of as only one aspect of social operation. Other aspects, such as
farming, and raising femilies are just as important to a society.*® This puts the concept of law
in a clearer perspective, and allows one to remember that law is only an artifact of society.
Government, therefore, exists for a particular social aim. It is no more important to
the social scheme than is any other social aspect.*’ Its end is only one among many in the
continually changing entity known as society. This being so, we should not be hesitant to
effect changes, while at the same time remembering to be prudent in regard to the
externalities, or fer-reaching consequences, of those changes. The power of the State should
not be feared or regarded as overpowering in our country, for, ultimately, its power resides
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with us.
Morality, as we have seen, is a function of society, and is pertinent to all the social
fects from which it is derived as well as to economic facts.** This being evident, the ways that
the Social Security law is serving and not serving our society must be seriously scrutinized.
It is the moral duty of society to do so.
“But”, Wolgast cautions, “separating the justified demands of public service from
unjustified ones requires a keen faculty of moral criticism, and that faculty is just what
continued participation in an institution brings into jeopardy.”*’ By clinging to outmoded
social policy we can actually do more harm than by squarely facing the challenge at hand,
fashioning morally intelligent solutions, and making changes.
The law is a means to an end, not something which, in itself, is sacred. According to
Durkheim; "It is only of value if it fills its function well, that is, if it assures the life of society".
Morality too, functions to assure moral order. And like the law, it holds tenets that compel
action if it is necessary. But this constraint has a more psychological and subtle characteristic,
for it is not exercised by the State but by the entire community. There are no precise
formulations, so morality is freer and more flexible than the law. Intrinsic differences exist in
addition to the extrinsic, for morality reaches far beyond the law, which stands as "the minimal
morality absolutely necessary for society to endure".*®
Wolgast pictures our government as an “artificial person”, with all o f its actions being
done at a personal distance, and being somewhat indifferent to individual situations. This
embodiment of government as an artificial person represents the citizens who are ultimately
responsible for the actions of their representative. But a problem arises because the action
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taken on the citizen’s behalf is impersonal, the citizen being involved only at a distance.
Where policy is concerned, there is no single natural person who can be deemed
accountable.** This creates a moral problem, for no one person really assumes the
responsibility, or is given a mandate to do so. This lack corrupts the moral integrity of the
persons involved as well as the policy with which they are entrusted. Wolgast concludes that
there is an underlying moral problem in all this because “the electorate is not fully responsible
for the misdeeds of their representatives; they did not make [the representative’s] choices”.
The moral dilemma occurs because “acting in someone else’s name, the representative, as a
natural person, cannot take full responsibility as she would for private decisions”,*’ but can
take full responsibility as a public agent. As Wolgast sees it, lack of responsibility and lack
of information “go hand in hand, and both are built into the organizational structure”.**
Wolgast believes that “treating corporations [or governments] like persons is morally
hazardous. For the fiction of a person without any moral dimension is...an invitation to act
without accountability”.**From this we can see how easy it is for policies to become bogged
down in bureaucracy. Nobody takes responsibility, and since those involved are acting in an
impersonal way, as artificial persons, they do not feel that the responsibility is theirs.
According to Wolgast “[a] difficult decision requires moral wisdom, not an institutional
excuse”.** But if it is a decision for all of us, then it requires an institutional channel.
Bellah, et a i, point out that it seems as if many of our institutions stress individual
advantage rather than the importance of combining resources for the common welfare. This
is seen where governmental, educational, and economic agencies compete for resources. This
takes away fi’om the meaning in our lives, and fi’agments our resolve toward achievement; we
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become sidetracked as we structure our lives in an endless competition for the consumer
symbols that [supposedly] represent power, prestige, and money” as promoted by those
institutions. It is an undoubted certainty that these powerful institutions are unable to see the
chaos that they engender, and are even blind to the fact that this is indeed the result of their
manipulations. This lack of awareness lies in the fact that they have lost sight of their original
purposes, if they ever had clearly-defined ones to begin with. They continue their existence
in a spirit of self-fulfillment rather than a spirit of usefulness and service. They fail to question
whether or not they have continued to fulfill their operational premises. Self-appraisal in terms
o f ends is lacking. Consequently, these institutions which were established in hopes of solving
problems have become instead a part of the problem itself. Due to lack of insightful guidance
they have slid into the morass and become out of focus in regard to their original goals. Un
doubtedly, this slide is caused, in part, by a general lack of attention to the certainty that
unforeseen problems, in regard to the relation of the policy to its target problem, wjll arise.
It is as if the administrators often wear the metaphorical ‘rose-colored glasses’ while attend
ing to their duties. There is not a comfortable familiarity with the absolute fact that an admin
istrator will be faced with unforeseen challenges. When the inevitable does occur it is often
met in surprising ways:
- by paralysis
- by panic
- by ignoring the obvious
- by anger
- by placing blame
These reactions by administrators are all non-productive as well as ultimately harmful and
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demoralizing. Additionally, some corporations react in an altogether different direction by not
allowing a new policy time enough to prove if it is worthy or not, to correctly collect
supporting data, collate information, and etc. There is no wisdom evident, so the managers
are beset with a constant bombardment of one policy replacing another, or worse - redundant
plans that pile duplicate and unnecessary duties on already over-burdened managers. We thus
find the policy unable to continue effectively on its course, due to the latest challenge or
upset. Instead, progress is stymied - not by the problem, but by the chaos of a lack of
preparedness - which should have been part of the integral make-up of the policy system as
well as the policy implementors. Inevitably, this lack ends up contributing to the vicious circle
of such common problems as increasing crime, unabated poverty, and an abysmal lack of
education. This set of symptoms and reactions can be seen to happen in many institutional
settings. The wealthy, the educated, and the ‘comfortable’ have no idea why these problems
continue, even if they are concerned about them. And for some, as long as they are not
“hassled”, ignorance is indeed bliss. The problems continue because those who could help are
in the grip of institutions that reassure them that this is the way it has to be, that there is no
other way.
Chapter Four looked at ethical considerations. In a parallel to Johnson’s discussion
of the polarity between Relativism and Absolutism, Bellah, et a i, propose a similar schism
regarding Utilitarian Individual- ism and Moral Individualism. They found that neither view
adequately provides an understanding of “the common good”. Often, the government seems
to make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses rather than on moral leadership when
deciding social priorities such as human health, welfare, and environmental issues. According
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to the cost-benefit analysts, before government intervenes to save lives it must be decided
“how much a life is worth” in order to come to a rational decision.*’ Cost-benefit analysts feel
that this is a democratic as well as moral method to assess government policies. In this fashion
of assessment the analysts are dealing with statistical lives. Thus the value of a life is measured
in market terms.** This utilitarian approach to human life, although seemingly ‘practical’,
comes across as cold and unfeeling, as indeed it is. An ‘individual’ comes to be represented
as a composite unit made up of the sum of all individuals, but in reality represents no one
individual in particular. We find quite often that this type of approach is taken by ‘traditional’
physicians who treat all patients based on an abstracted ‘average’ person, with no patience
for those who do not fit into the center of the chart on a bell-curve. Thus, the minority of
patients who appear at either end of the curve are often over- or under-medicated and left off
in worse condition than when they sought treatment. This is a truly harmful result of not
treating persons as individuals, but rather treating them by attempting to force them to fit a
generalized and fictitious profile.
Applying this Utilitarian approach to government - that those who govern should be
guided by the sum of the desires of the general population - one looks only at the desires and
needs of current citizens. No consideration is given to a sense of responsibility to those yet
to be bom, nor the needs of the truly disadvantaged. Instead, what is decided as being good
for society as a whole, by judging a sum of individual autonomous preferences, ends up by
sharply straining the idea of what the whole itself is. The idea of “the whole” ends up being,
in reality, another fiction. Consequently this outlook cuts the current generation off from its
sense of responsibility to those of the future by maximizing their obligations to their own
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welfare.*’ Often, then, these policy applications are seen instead as reflecting people’s
preferences rather than their needs. This brings to mind the argument between Socrates and
Callicles (in Gorgias) regarding the difference between pastry-makers and physicians and
which profession was the more beneficial for humankind. The confectioners, according to
Socrates, catered to peoples’ desires while the physicians of the time tended to their needs.
As Schneider has pointed out, we must “attempt to discover general norms of
responsibility valid for any type of association”.®*We must be able to base our decisions on
how to respond to multiple circumstances by being “responsive to the actual demands of the
real situation. And then, from the co-presence of these various responsibilities in thenconcrete meanings for the interests at stake, there emerges a conviction that "^this one is the
right action here and now’”.®* Schneider elaborates:
[RJeason can never answer such problems independently of art, nor
conscience independently of experience. Responsibility is achieved as it is in
all the arts by learning the various skills required. The road to acting
responsibly is by learning the hard way. Short cuts to moral knowledge are
perilous.®’
Schneider’s advice should be used in training all people who are in charge of managing or
implementing policy. They must be aware that, realistically, a policy that cannot adapt to
natural changes in the population it serves is no longer functional. Trying to fit people to the
hard, inflexible rules o f a policy, rather than giving the policy flexibility to begin with and
allowing it to expand or contract with the actual needs of the population, simply prepares it
for an inevitable failure. Legislators and implementors who are trained to look at their policies
in this light should actually be able to anticipate problems and natural changes, and be able
to alter the course of the policy to accommodate real needs. For it is the job of legislators.
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implementors, and managers to imagine things before they happen! Recommendations for
changing the current practices o f the Social Security program will be offered and argued in
the final section of this chapter.

Realities and Possibilities
"...when we are young or in our prime we do not think of ourselves as already being
the dwelling place of our own future old age."®*
De Beauvoir sagely counsels that our waiting future holds the meaning of our lives,
and this will be in question unless we stop "cheating". "If we do not know what we are going
to be, we cannot know what we are..."®* And if we cannot realize that the policies we put in
place for the elderly now are, most likely, the policies that we inherit in our aging years, we
shall in fact cheat ourselves.
In view of this, the individual needs to fashion his or her activities in a manner that
will, in fulfilling personal aspirations, also serve community requirements.®* For some, it
seems that there is a continual opposition between individual interests and social interests in
the actions and the consciousness of the individual. A solution, therefore should be sought in
existing moral principles. This schism is apparent in opposing relations between the
progressive and the established sectors of society or, as Dewey puts it, "the relative dynamic
factor and the relative static factor.”®®We see this again in the relation of the moral to the
legal sphere. One notion holds that only the outward manifestation of nonsocial, egoistic
tendencies can be restrained by society. Another notion sees the social structure as needing
to go beyond this and encourage action that expresses socializing motives and tendencies.®’
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Callahan seems to be a proponent of this latter viewpoint when he expresses his belief
that during "hard times" we must call upon or awaken our "moral resources". He is concerned
that if we cling to the so called "values" of affluent times during the difficult periods, that we
will find ourselves imbedded in moral chaos. "Hard times need a broad sense of duty toward
others, especially those [others] out of sight..."®* Callahan asks if we can, in fact, determine
the difference between public and private morality if we examine their relationship to each
other; and he answers that we have to realize that this distinction is a cultural artifact. This
emphasizes a point made earlier in this paper: that there are no private acts which do not
eventually have public consequences. Attempting to separate the two will only harm our
moral life. He believes that if we go on in this direction we will become an intolerable society
and this will destroy private as well as public life. We have to be aware that the good of the
individual (or the ethic of individualism) is not necessarily the good of society.®’
Adapting this concept to the question of how we treat our elders, we can see that
what may work for a corporation (by insisting upon mandatory retirement at a certain age),
does not work, overall, for the benefit of the many capable older workers who would like to
continue working. When individuals are discriminated against due to forced retirement,
regardless of health and/or ability, this eventually harms society. While this brings up the
question of how we provide jobs for the young, that is not necessarily the problem it is said
to be. For not everyone is enamored by the concept o f working beyond their sixties; many
would even prefer to retire fi’om full-time work in their fifties if they could. Those who have
been fortunate and are wise enough to have planned for such an early withdrawal from the
work-force will do just that. And for those people of all ages who do work, their paychecks
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would be more meaningful to them if there were not an arbitrary substantial amount deducted
for Social Security and Medicare.
Abilities are not suddenly lost at age sixty-five, nor is a general decline suffered. Some
people do not experience even gradual loss until after ninety years of age. However, agespecific treatment does apply in certain groups. For example, age is fairly used for the
calculation of benefits and costs of annuities and life insurance policies. Similarly, grouping
athletes into age cohorts is sometimes an equitable policy when competition is involved.™
De Beauvoir points out that to a great extent the age at which one begins to physically
decline depends on the social class to which one belongs. Manual laborers are often worn out
by age fifty, while a person of privilege can easily reach eighty because the onset of decline
has begun later in life without continual physical trauma.’'
While there are economic costs for ignoring the creative and productive capacities of
older persons, there are also cultural and social costs for ignoring the resources, wisdom, and
social support they have to offer. But there is rising concern about the billions of dollars
annually spent on the health and welfare of elders. Some proposals call for the reduction of
such services, but these have been bitterly resisted by organized efforts of [many] elderly, for
they believe that they are entitled to these programs.’’ Especially where the wealthy aged are
concerned, according to Lamm, et al., it would not seem unreasonable to change Social
Security laws to subject all earned income to taxes. This would ensure that the person who
earns $250,000 per year pays [at least] the same percentage of taxes on income as does the
person who earns $25,000 per year.” Some officials have suggested means-testing of the
aging to determine if Social Security benefits should be paid to those who generate income
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above a certain amount.” However, if someone has paid into Social Security for forty years
or so that is their money; it is something that has been counted on to be there upon
retirement, an entitlement literally! The only way someone should not be given Social Security
payments is if they had elected not to participate in that particular program - a governmentrun retirement plan - and had not paid into in at all.
Policy dd)ates centered on population aging generally fit three major categories. The
first encompasses a set of policies that would alter the aging of the population. Uhlenberg
believes that this approach ameliorates any challenge related to an increasingly older
population by lessening the future aging o f the population. But he does not say how this will
be achieved. Perhaps by having even more babies? This would be like trying to put out a fire
by throwing gunpowder in it! The second category o f policies emphasizes the potentiality for
changing the ways people function during their later years. The final category of proposals
addresses issues connected to the seating of responsibility for supporting the aged. The
prevalent combination of responsibilities among the individual, the state, and the family could
be varied or changed in several ways.’*
In the first category, policies to “alter the aging of the population”, social policy could
be used to change demographic behavior. It might be possible to affect demographic variables
that directly impinge upon the structure of age by changing patterns of fertility, migration, and
mortality. A concerted effort to increase the birth rate would slow or stop future population
aging. This plan is referred by Uhlenberg as pro-natalism. It is obvious that Uhlenberg either
did not really think this out too clearly, or he has a very wry sense of humor. However, he
lists two objections against implementation of this policy. Firstly, if increased fertility occurs
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among the lesser educated and lesser skilled segment of society more children will grow up
in circumstances of poverty, thus placing these young at an immediate disadvantage for
joining mainstream society and becoming productive. This cost to society would not be worth
it. The second argument against this policy would be the obvious consequences of population
growth in general; environmental quality would suffer because of a sustained population
growth. This "cure" would surely kill the patient!”
Encouraging higher immigration as a strategy to reduce the aged population is not
seen as a plan that merits much attention. It might be that increasing the number of young
adults would increase the birth rate and add to the labor force, but then these people and their
children would, soon enough, enter old age themselves.” And in today’s political climate, this
suggestion would not be well-received by the public.
The growth of the oldest-old population, above eighty years of age, could be slowed
if a policy were adopted to restrict life-extending resources to this segment. Rationing health
care to the old is being debated, since the latest medical technology is so expensive.’*
Somehow, this "solution" seems to be quite cold-blooded, although it is being looked at by
some states as a method to control medical costs related to treatment for indigents in general.
A final policy proposal to change the aging of our society would be to change the
chronological age at which one is deemed to be old. Reaching age sixty-five signals arbitrary
retirement in most cases. This is a negative. But, on the positive side, it also entitles one to
Medicare, full Social Security coverage, senior citizen discounts, and tax advantages.
Changing this mandatory age-specific marker would reflect our increasing longevity and the
evolving characteristics of the cohorts who are now approaching it. Sixty-five, in most cases.
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is not really "old". This would not, of course, afiect biological aging, but changing the age for
access to entitlements could lighten the economic load of supporting an increasing dependent
aging population. A change made to the Social Security Act in 1983 called for "gradually
increasing the age for full Social Security benefits to sixty-seven by 2027". If this were
extended to all of the old age entitlement programs, and if the age criterion would be
advanced to seventy-two years, the economic effects of future population aging could be
ameliorated even more. So, concurrent changes would have to be made. For instance, how
would the near-old population be affected? Would they become more vulnerable?” At least
some o f them might find that declining health would make waiting for later retirement a
hardship. But, this does not address other aspects of the social structure, and it ignores my
earlier argument regarding the importance of flexibility in a policy so that implementors have
the ability to make discretionary judgments. Again, setting a rigid, arbitrary age for retirement
makes no allowances for the many differences between persons in the rate they age and their
state of health.
Brodsky argues against resetting retirement age by citing the opinion of Robert M.
Ball, a former Social Security commissioner:
Ball...believe[s] that increasing the retirement age, as a practical matter,
reduces the benefits for someone who planned to retire at age sixty-five with
full benefits, but who would, if the retirement age were changed, retire at the
same age with the reduced benefits paid to early retirees. Moreover, Ball
believes that proposals to delay retirement fail to take into account the
employment problems likely to face older workers, especially those trying to
find rather than maintain employment after age sixty.*®
Since societies have become larger and more complex, diversity has also increased
within them, according to Durkheim. Therefore, the State, also, must branch out and evolve
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if it is to fulfill its function.*' Furthermore, it is not possible to set limits on the course of
progress - to sit back and state that something will be forever so. There is no way to measure
the eflfects of moral activity on progress, and no reason to consider the work of progress to
be at an end.*’
In wanting to know how the Japanese coped with the "problems" of the aged it was
hoped that the answers they found would contribute to answering similar questions regarding
our own aging society. However, two issues emerge which could lead to precarious
assumptions. Firstly, there is the hazard of "false parallels". Although American and Japanese
gerontologists can learn much from each other through asking many of the same questions,
this is not necessarily comparable. For instance, there are the Japanese attitudes toward the
unstable ambulatory elderly, and to wheelchairs. General attitudes in this respect are that
those older people should stay out of the way; that they do not belong on crowded avenues
and on rush-hour subways, for they slow down those with a ‘purpose’ in life, and get in their
way. Secondly, we need to discern if differences found in Japan are related to their culture,
or to other reasons. A difference may arise from cultural tradition, but again, it could come
about because of technological or economic considerations. Do 60 percent of the aged
Japanese live with their children mainly because "age-appropriate environments are so scarce
there", and housing so expensive? Or is this because of tradition?*’ The relative absence of
services so the fi-ail elderly can live independently, and the high cost of land are probably
important factors that go into the age integration of the household.*'* It is likely a matter of
economics and tradition.
Displays of public respect toward the elderly in Japan are rewarded in the Confucian
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tradition. National customs, such as Honor-the-Aged-Day, indicate this. But less formal rules
apply to close kin and acquaintances in personal situations. There is no paucity of epithets
among the Japanese. "Dried plum crone" and "old codger" are often used. When Palmore's
“Facts on Aging Quiz” was given to comparable groups o f Japanese and Americans, it was
found that the Japanese hold more negative stereotypes about aging, and are less
knowledgeable about the elderly, overall, than are their American counterparts. The
explanation for this finding was that the influences of modernization on family economics is
spurring a growing conflict between the generations. However, Kiefer is doubtful that this
explains the finding. She believes it has to do with the Japanese not having a well-developed
sense of responsibility to strangers. It "is a society dominated by face-to-face relationships".
But in spite of this, the Japanese blame their elderly for the unacceptably high medical costs
that arose after free health care for the aged began.**
On the surface it would appear that the policies developed by Japan to care for their
elderly could serve as a model for our future programs for the aged. But when we delve
beneath that surface it becomes apparent that in some respects there are some deep divisions
between the two cultures that probably will preclude our taking such an easy path to find
solutions. Most likely, we will find stronger solutions that are better adapted to our flexible
and multi-cultural way of life. We are not a traditional society. This determination does not
disparage the Japanese Confucian tradition, but rather, states the facts as they currently stand.
The U. S. is a diverse society, religiously, racially, and ethnically. We are independent, and
will undoubtedly be happiest, as a people, if our society finds its own solutions. It appears that
much of Japan's problem in dealing with its elderly stems from tradition being challenged by
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the progress Japan has made in the world of modem technology. It has a lot of work to do
in order for the two systems to be integrated. Apparently, the Japanese elders are currently
caught between these two systems. Our national background allows us far more flexibility,
which we still need to recognize and put to use.

PART TWO
Recommendations
Our life course is generally divided into three categories - education, work, and
leisure. This division emerged when education and retirement became institutionalized.
Uhlenberg believes that this stratification may actually be harmful to all stages of human
development. For the youth are not exposed adequately to the realities of work while they are
being prepared for it in school. The young and the middle-aged are loaded down with too
many responsibilities and too much work; they could use more leisure. The elderly suddenly
find that they are considered by society to be marginal, obsolete, and non-productive. He
argues that we should adopt social policies that encourage a greater mixture of education,
leisure, and work during the entire life span. As a benefit, this restructuring o f the life course
would potentially elevate "the productive contributions of the elderly to the society".*® These
three facets of life are too rigidly defined in our society.
School is the time when the young should be preparing to meet the challenges of
adulthood. Too much effort and expense, however, seems to be devoted to entertaining them,
satisfying their wants instead of their needs. Youngsters often want many things, but do not
yet have the wisdom to know what they need. This is why they have parents and teachers.
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Both parents and teachers should be able to guide the young, to explain the workings of the
world, and to instill values and an ethical sense. Sadly, in some or all of these areas many
teachers believe that this all lies solely in the province of the parents. Or, if they try, some
teachers are told that it is not within the realm of school policy. Often, fear of legal reprisals,
particularly during the last quarter century, govern this reticence of teachers to become
involved. Yet there are also some parents who want and even demand that the schools handle
non-practical (in academic and business terms) subjects such as sex education, which should
be in the domain of the femily, a duty and responsibility of one or, ideally, both parents at the
least, and at the most a responsibility only shared with the parents by educators.
This attitude of “passing the buck” for responsibility is transferred to children by
example from the adults in their lives. More and more we see people actually giving up their
power to an institutional entity.
Education should not stop with the end of childhood or early adulthood. If a positive
attitude toward learning is engendered by teachers and augmented by parents one is more apt
to develop a respect and reverence for the process and the deep personal fulfillment it brings
to life. This type of learning, later in life, is an enhancement to “the daily grind”. It is not
necessarily formal and constant, but comes from experience, on-the-job-training, and
observation.
However, early education is, by necessity, structured, should have a purpose, and
point toward a goal or perhaps many goals. One of these goals should be to help the student
become a self-sufficient person because of confidence that what has been taught will be
useful. Yet many students today have their doubts about this. This is where one should begin
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to glimpse the world of adulthood, and to learn how to grasp the practical and mental tools
that will lead to self-fiilfillment, production, and self-satisfaction with whatever course one
has chosen to take in life. This is where awareness of future responsibility - responsibility for
oneself and perhaps others - should begin. And a part of that future is, at the least, awareness
of old age as a fact of life along with the inevitability of one’s own old age and the very real
needs that will accompany it.
Here is where the old (but ‘tried and true’) values are important. It seems that many
school systems in our country tried to “fix” something that was not “broke” when the virtues
of kindness, truth-telling, diligence, patience, honesty, and saving “for a rainy day” were no
longer an active part of the curricula. That society as a whole has ultimately suffered as a
result of this omission is a given. If beginning at an early age, people are taught to take
responsibility for themselves, they will be less apt to sign away their rights to guide their own
destiny. This, I believe, is where we must begin in order to effect a positive change in the way
we see the individual in society and in old age. If we do not make this change we may soon
see de Tocqueville’s dire prediction (as quoted in Chapter Four) for our society come true;
we will become so self-centered as to exist only for ourselves and our pleasures, allowing the
government to benevolently keep us “in perpetual childhood”. This is where we have to
question the moral limits of policy.
The schools are where the changes to our Social Security system have to begin, with
the children. The idea first has to be present, a way of life has to arise, driven by a philosophy
of positive self-reliance, and then a more natural and realistic policy can be developed and
implemented that will address the needs of the truly needy, while allowing those who have no
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particular handicap or need to plan for and maintain control of their own futures. Grade
school is where the habit of saving and the ideas of investment and earning interest should
begin. Alexander Pope put it most succinctly, saying:
‘Tis education forms the common mind:
Just as the twig is bent, the tree’s inclined.
Perceptions of aging. Corporations as well as government must realize that the way
older citizens and employees are regarded and referred to by them eventually permeates all
of society. As was highlighted in Chapter Two, certain age norms, such as the expectation of
retirement at a particular age, can be construed as ageism. And as de Beauvoir has pointed
out, these attitudes are short-sighted.
We have found that not all cultures respond to their aging members in such negative
terms. In fact, often, the aged members of many societies are revered for their wisdom and
abilities. It might be a positive factor toward further eliminating negative ageism for our
business and government leaders to develop a more acute sensitivity to how their treatment
and portrayal of aging individuals in our society can be either positive or detrimental to not
only the elderly but society as a whole. One place to begin might be with television
advertisements and programs that represent older people as doddering fools fit only to be the
butt of jokes. Here, a basic lack of respect for this one segment of the population ultimately
serves only to demean us all. Additionally, other options which concern the overall well-being
of seniors relates to how they are treated and perceived in the workplace. The following
recommendations might offer methods to consider which could lead to a more positive
position for the aging in our society; the most important one being an entirely fresh and
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innovative look at the current Social Security system.
In order to increase the economic productivity of the aged it would be necessary to
not only invest in their education, but to allow them to have employment opportunities. It will
be necessary to better enforce existing age discrimination policy which was put in place by
the Employment Act of 1967 and designed for the protection of older worker's rights.
Alternative work options could be opened and would benefit those close to "retirement age".
One policy solution could be "phased retirement", where the work schedule is gradually
reduced along with salary and pension payment. Another possible adaptation, which would
not require much corporate restructuring, in terms of policy, would be to create a pool of
company retirees who would be available for temporary, full, or part-time assignments.*’ This
is done currently, by a few companies, on a restricted basis. These retirement options, if
adopted, would have many socially beneficial side-effects. The older worker would not feel
suddenly alienated upon retirement. If in good health, he or she would be able to make their
own decision as to when to retire. There would also be continued ties with co-workers, and
a feeling of continuity as a retiree who belonged to a company pool periodically recalled old
skills. The positive results could be boundless. It could be argued that younger workers might
be unable to find well-paying jobs if this policy became popular with companies, but since the
cohorts o f the future are estimated to be much smaller, the young worker should not be
displaced. And if the future holds yet another population change, adaptations to these plans
will have to be made.
Some might argue that taking away administration of Social Security from the Federal
government and allowing it to be administered on the state level would make things simpler.
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But actually, this would cause a nightmare for businesses which are based in several or all
states. They would go crazy trying to keep up with a possible fifty sets of laws. And the state
bureaucracies themselves would all swell with each state developing and administrating its
own set of rules and paperwork. Or perhaps some states would find the process too costly
and time-consuming and decide that they could not regulate such a program. This would leave
employees without any means of old-age provision.
Dewey cautions against generalizing our rules for dealing with moral problems within
society. He reminds us that it is important, if humans are to flourish, that we not lose touch
with our environment. We must pay attention to it, for "the fimction, or the life process, may
be said to be maintained as the cooperation of the organism and the environment".** By
extending his illustration to the problem of Social Security, it could be said that the way our
government-managed ‘pension’ is operating is totally out of touch with its environment. If
the system is not to collapse under its own weight it is important that we deal with the
problems that its continuation poses for current and future generations.
It is paramount that the first thing to be done is to look at need, and not age, to
determine Social Security aging policy. Keep the system in place, but have it be utilized on
a voluntary basis by those who wish to participate, while allowing others to opt for personal
plans. The ultimate goal of the plan should be to gradually phase out the program as it is now
run. This could be done in a series of changes beginning with making participation in the
government-run Social Security program voluntary. One could elect to save for retirement
through a private plan if one wished, gr through the Social Security system. The important
object here, however, is that participation in the government-run Social Security program
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would no longer be mandatory. In this first stage the employers could make other pension
and/or savings and retirement plans available to the employees, still matching their deductions
for whichever plan they chose. But the amount withheld from the employee and matched by
the employer could fall within a range of choices running from 3% to 15%, for instance. This
would make it easier for those people starting at the bottom of a pay scale to have more takehome pay until tenure and/or merit increases brought their salary level up to a point where
saving/investing would be easier. Every employee would have to elect a plan, but it would not
necessarily have to be the government managed Social Security program.
Working under private retirement fund systems would allow many people to feel more
in charge of their own destinies. As a result, they might be more inclined to designate a small
portion of their gross pay to be given to Social Security or a similar fund - perhaps 2%, for
instance - to aid the unemployed, underemployed, or indigent retiree. However, there are
programs already in place to aid most of the unemployed while they seek work.
Unemployment benefits or most aid programs can be supplemented with food stamps when
a family is in need. While this is a real and necessary concern, the primary problem being
addressed in this section is that of the regularly-employed “average” person who is the most
affected, now and in old age, by the arbitrary Social Security tax policy now in force.
However, William Browne and Laura Katz Olson find that,
the combined financial and administrative resources of national, state, and
local governments provide nearly all the assistance that older people receive.
Non-profit associations and the private economic sector rely on rather than
supplant [the] government. In reality, none of these other entities have the
capacity or inclination to furnish the programmatic and financial support that
the elderly need and have come to expect. While a small percentage of the
aged live comfortably in retirement communities, others require more
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substantial government funding than currently is available simply to escape
poverty. Government’s task...becomes complicated by the diversity of the
clientele within the group.*®
Browne and Olson further point out that by the late 1970's and 1980's programs serving the
elderly had such good support that approximately 25% of the national government’s total
annual expenditures went toward them.™ Federal, state, and local programs that serve the
poverty-level population and a substantial portion of the elderly “include Medicaid, the Food
Stamp Act, Title XX of the Social Security Act; various housing acts, especially section 8,
and section 202 federally subsidized housing programs, and low-income energy assistance”.®'
Consequently, my proposals do not in any way propose to delete or diminish the support to
which this population segment has access.
Monitoring aging policy implementation. The government, as well as corporations,
often becomes mired down in the workings of a policy itself to the point where no one can
actually determine if the policy is working at maximum effectiveness for its intended target
group. To this end it requires continual vigilance during implementation to see that aging
policies - or any other type of social or corporate program - remain on track in order to
benefit those for whom it was designed. While certain corporations have developed new
strategies for allowing long-term employees to retire with good benefits, others have not. And
the government has not appeared to give much serious consideration at all to working flexible
alternatives into the Social Security Program. Government policy-makers should take a closer
look at what some of these progressive businesses are doing. Perhaps it could be learned,
while doing this, that government ‘intervention’ in dictating the way retirement monies should
be saved and invested is not only obsolete but also no longer practical for many workers.
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Some companies already utilize a matching funds type of withholding program for
their employees that, at this point in time, allows employees to authorize deductions over and
above those required by law for Social Security (such as 40IK, and stock option plans), so
a system is already in place that could easily be modified and expanded as needed to
accommodate this idea. These additional investment/retirement plan deductions are already
automatically recorded on the employees’ W-2 forms and reported to the government as
“pre-taxable income”, so no additional types of paperwork or reporting system would have
to be designed. And as the retirement/savings plans would be administered by private
investment firms that are already regulated by existing laws it could only be a boon to the
economy since investments would be made in the broad arena of the marketplace or in mutual
funds, etc. Since the government would no longer collect the current monies from the payroll
deductions of employees plus the matching employers’ contribution, it would not need to
spend so much money on staffing and paperwork to administer and police compliance. In our
capitalistic and competitive business world it is not without reason to imagine that companies
would compete for employees by trying to outdo each other in offering a variety of plans from
which the employee could choose. Meanwhile, managers of the Social Security program
would find themselves with a smaller bureaucracy to manage, and one that might eventually
be phased out over the years as current Social Security recipients die, and as the business
sector of society worked with its employees to provide alternative ways to save for
retirement.
According to David Brodsky, “any attempts to improve old-age policy will have to
balance considerations of cost with a concern about need”. He believes that it is very
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important for policy makers to consider alternative approaches in order to determine eligibility
for income support as well as other social service programs. Basing eligibility on age rather
than need has limited the ability of these programs “to serve effectively elderly individuals
most in need”.®’ Basing access to entitlements on need rather than age, however, gives several
advantages:
1. It would more successfully direct scarce resources to those persons most
in need.
2. Older persons would no longer be segregated by age as recipients of
preferred treatment. And,
3. It would very likely stem the backlash against the elderly by other social
segments who see themselves as unfairly bearing the costs of programs
serving a relatively well-off elderly population.®’
Morrison argues that, “the traditional meaning of‘retirement’ as a complete cessation
from work “is being supplanted by an increased interest by some older people in employment
alternatives. He believes that the future will require “a different social definition o f aging” or
a change in the meaning of “retirement” itself.®^ He finds that retirement decisions come about
due to personal priorities, economic status, health concerns “and public and private sector
policies that have, over time, conditioned [individuals’] understanding of the choices actually
available to them”. A change in any of these factors will affect the timing and content of both
employment and retirement decisions.®* He points out that currently, “few government or
private sector policies provide incentives for older persons to either remain at work after
pension benefits become available or return to work after receiving benefits”.®®However, it
is unlikely that businesses will focus on developing policies to attract older employees unless
a serious labor shortage should occur.®’
Morrison finds the term “pension recipient” to be a more accurately descriptive title
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for seniors than “retiree” because today more people continue some form of employment after
pension benefits begin. This trend is breaking the link between pension and age, for when
someone now begins to receive a pension it no longer indicates a cessation of work.®* But this
and other trends will not be enough to cause “major changes in retirement behavior unless
public and private policies, as well as the expectations and behavior or older persons
themselves are modified”.®®If and when the link between age and receiving a pension is
broken, it will be a positive step away from negative ageism.
In this chapter we have examined the background and policies related to Social
Security. One’s “productive years” are found to be standardized or made static by
preconceived perceptions of when old age begins. These perceptions have been reinforced by
systematized rules governing when a person may or must retire. This has, in turn, created an
atmosphere conducive to the stereotyping of elderly persons in negative terms, and has also
restricted the options available to them for working or retiring at an age that is personally
comfortable and appropriate to their individual circumstances. It has been suggested that a
more fluid or dynamic attitude be adopted which would more adequately serve the needs as
well as the desires or older Americans.
The Social Security system itself is seen here as limiting and curtailing options for
many individuals as they work toward their retirement years. It is time that Social Security,
as it is now known, be phased out as a mandatory system and be replaced or augmented with
a more versatile system that allows the individual more personal control and autonomy over
payroll deductions that are withheld for retirement purposes.
People should be encouraged and educated to be more responsible and involved in
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where and how their payroll deductions for retirement benefits are held and invested. For the
majority of employed individuals more freedom and personal control over how this is
accomplished would result in more flexibility over when in their lives retirement could occur.
Some could opt to retire in their forties or fifties while others might prefer to work until their
eighties or beyond.
Medical advances have caused average life spans to increase beyond what they were
when Social Security was initially introduced. When life spans dramatically increase, if follows
that perceptions about lifestyles should also change. For instance, in Medieval times the
typical lifespan was thirty years! In thinking back to when I was thirty, and the perceptions
I held then, I realize that in a society where the average life-span is now approximately 74
years, a much different perspective must currently flavor the social matrix. Imagine being in
your late twenties and facing the very probable fact that some dreaded disease could and
probably would end your life at any time. Something as seemingly benign to us now as an
abscessed tooth could, in those days, have a painful and tragic ending as the infection coursed
through one’s body. We have a difficult time now relating to such a close association with
immanent death, and this is because our circumstances are such that so dreary a life is
unthinkable. Thus, being old at the age of thirty would, by necessity, create an individual who
had a far more fatalistic outlook on life than the thirty-year-old individual that I remember
being. Today, being thirty is being on the threshold of life; seventy is a very realistic and
attainable goal. Our outlooks have changed, our lifestyles have changed, all because our
probability for acquiring many deadly diseases has greatly diminished or vanished. So we can
see that given the increase in lifespan since the comparatively few years since the inception
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of Social Security, that we have more options now to explore and we should not be limited
by rules that were set down in another era.
Responsible individuals, of whom I believe there are many, do not require the federal
government to babysit them. In effect, the Social Security program is a mandatory savings
account which has been set up for its employed citizens and residents by the government in
the way a parent might dole out an allowance to a child and demand that a percentage of that
allowance be put in a piggy bank rather than spent as the child desires. That type of treatment
might be OK when teaching a child to be thrifty and to save for a “rainy day”, etc. The point
here, however, is that we are not children and do not need the government to tell us how
much money should be saved toward a minimal retirement.
As was stated in Part One of this chapter, although Social Security may have initially
been begun to alleviate poverty in old age and to assuage the economic effects generated by
the Great Depression, these circumstaces no longer prevail. Social Security may have once
been an innovative and effective stopgap for a particular set of circumstances, but it has now
become a burdensome monolith of an institution, one that has outlived its primary directive.
An externality involved with releasing workers from forcibly depositing their money
with the government would be that far fewer government employees would be needed to
administer the program. This can be looked upon either negatively or positively, depending
on the direction from which it is viewed. On one hand, the number of people employed by the
Social Security program, i.e. the government, would be reduced, thus reducing the
government’s own payroll. On the other hand, these out-of-work individuals would create an
increase in unemployment statistics. It would be hoped that they could soon find employment
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in other areas.
Another externality is that there would be one less government intrusion into the
private lives of individuals if mandatory Social Security deductions were to cease. Governing
could become a bit less wieldy and focus more on governing rather than spreading itself thinly
by making forays into areas where its presence is neither required nor welcomed.
Ethical behavior and attitudes in the community. In Chapter Four we saw that a
community, as a whole, reflects the values held by its individual, corporate, and institutional
segments. Kaplan pointed out that, for most residents of a community, issues are seen as
being moral only if they raise questions about corruption, bribery, or other such sordid acts.
However, this leaves an array of social injustices or oversights, if one prefers a less abrasive
term, that nevertheless cause discomfort to certain classes or segments of a society. In my
opinion, a government that is overly involved in the lives of its citizenry to the point where
it dictates that a minimum amount of money must be withheld for retirement from earnings
(while not in itself immoral) sets the stage for immorality because:
* a ponderous administrate bureaucracy is created, thus causing a drain on public
funds in order to pay the salaries required,
* the wealthy and the poor (those at each end of the “benefits” scale) receive benfits
disproportionate to their actual needs; and
* the funds collected are often put to non-related use.
Consequently, we find that even though the highest of moral values were being considered
at the inception of the Social Security program, somewhere - perhaps many places - along its
lifespan the (metaphorical) flow of benefits it dispenses along its meandering course has
become polluted by misuse, and diluted by allowing it to wander off course due to inattention
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by administrators. It has become instead a rushing floodpath which now mindlessly sweeps
all who come near it (by earning wages) into its turbulent flow whether or not they wish to
get wet. This is not morally defensible, for it does not allow people to think and decide for
themselves whether or not they would maximally benefit by participating. Additionally, while
this torrent speeds on it becomes clogged by unneccessarily collecting from and spewing forth
benefits upon those who hardly notice its existence - high wage earners and the wealthy.
It is morally more respectful to treat individuals as if they are competent. Often, when
they are treated as if they do not have enough sense to handle their own affairs, this cripples
their initiative and they become dependent. I again refer back to my earlier quote from de
Tocqueville when he warns that such behavior by government “renders the exercise of the
fi’ee agency of man less useful and less frequent”... “and gradually robs a man of all the uses
o f himself’... It seems to me that we have the right and the fi'eedom to demand that we be
allowed, in this small instance, to take charge o f our own destinies and to withdraw from
mandatory Social Security participation. The structure of Social Security must be changed,
must become flexible enough so that, at the least, participation is the result of an informed,
voluntary choice.
The concept of allowing more fi'eedom to individuals needs, however, to be extended
to the area of policy implementation. While it is necessary that implementors operate within
the standards of specific guidelines relating to their particular programs, they too should be
allowed more freedom. A morally responsible implementor is not going to abuse ‘power’.
And having the ability to avert problems and stem the flow of negative externalities at the
moment they are discerned is necessary if a policy is to flow on its intended course. When
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implementors have to go through a lengthy chain of command to receive permission for even
the most trivial of adjustments, it is a time-consuming process that often wastes valuable time
that could have been spent applying a minor yet effective solution. In the meantime, while
awaiting direction from those highest on the command chain little problems often escalate to
the point that when the long-awaited permission to act finally does arrive, the ‘solution’ no
longer addresses the problem, for it has grown, mutated, or spawned dozens more problems.
A never-ending cycle of problems can then ensue. Against this type of policy management,
neither the best-designed policy nor the most technically adept and morally balanced
implementor could prevail. Consequently, the need for flexibility at the implementation level
is a rational and foregone conclusion.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This thesis has taken a carefully reasoned look at several diverse areas in an effort to
lead to arguments for changing or eliminating our current Social Security policies. We first
looked at the background upon which our perceptions of aging and the elderly have been
framed.
Wherever and whenever individual aging occurs, it consists of a complex interaction
among psychological aging, biological aging, and interchanges with the cultural and social
environment. Social roles are fi’equently linked to age. The process of aging cannot be
separated fi'om the cultural, social, and historic processes that surround it, and it can best be
understood in the dynamic terms that have been discussed. Aging has to be viewed from the
socio-cultural pattern perspective of the variability that is found across societies as well as
within societies.*
Although the idea of aging has become richer with the passage of time on the
biological, psychological, and social levels, negative stereotypes continue to be used. Even
if they are contradictory, they are mindlessly repeated. De Beauvoir sees the later years as "an
autumn filled with ripe fruit: it is also a barren winter, and we hear of its coldness, snow and
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frost. It has the sweet gentleness of a lovely evening. But it is also associated with the dark
sadness of twilight" .^
No harm would come from negative prejudice, according to Palmore, if people would
only keep it to themselves. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and prejudice usually
turns into discrimination.^ We can see where attempts to reduce negative ageism can result
in a type of backlash, with young people reacting with a more intense manifestation of their
prejudices and discriminations. And we also see where elders become defensive about their
special benefits and privileges when these are questioned.* However, we have also seen that
ageism is nothing new to the human experience. We have looked at several examples of how
elders have been treated in other cultures and across time, and have seen where ageism has
been exhibited to lesser, as well as to greater, degrees.
During every period of American history, ambivalent conduct and attitudes toward
the elderly have been characterized in one way or another. The past few centuries have
brought many changes, many of which have led to a deterioration in the prestige and authority
of the elderly. But it is naive and hazardous to social policy for changes in the situation of the
elderly to be viewed as "manifest destiny" or a fall from grace from a remote point, according
to Foner. The history of aging in the U. S. has contained too many exceptions, ironies, and
surprises to state that the status of the elderly has shifted only in one direction, is inevitable,
or uniform. In the latter case, there can be striking differences among the elderly across social
and economic lines. We carmot simply state that the condition of our aged has become worse,
or better, with the passage of time. In some cases it did become worse, and in others it
improved. The situation of elders, far from steadily worsening, has improved in many ways
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in recent decades. As a result, increased government health and welfare measures, along with
wider availability and size of retirement benefits, have improved their condition and given
crucial services to the elderly even though some elderly still suffer serious problems.* We
found, then, that historical changes dictate that no one perception of aging can realistically
prevail beyond a certain point in time. We also discovered that social changes can impact
negatively as well as positively upon a society.
The second section presented a close-up of the implementation process in policy
development. This is where we learned about the importance of externalities. We were shown
how policy effects can also “trickle down” and “bubble up” and thereby directly affect the
policy itself. Policy implementation is a process which is or can be affected by laws,
congressional activity, bureaucratic rivalry and, of course, interest groups. Often however,
the ends for which a policy is originally intended, somehow become lost. This is what we can
see has happened to the Social Security program. Ends were not evaluated and re-evaluated,
merely pursued. Old attitudes infringe upon new circumstances, and the fact that a policy has
lived its lifespan is ignored. It is forced to totter on haltingly and crippled, doing less and less
good. We tend to forget that policies too have their life-cycles, a beginning, a middle period,
and an end like everything else. In this section the discussion on ends and how we evaluate
and work toward them, points out that we must receive continual feedback from our actions then wisely plan a response that will correct or adjust the course of the policy accordingly.
Thirdly, we delved into the area of morality and how it is sometimes formed, how
perceptions of morality can and do differ, and how these perceptions can ultimately affect
policy decisions and the institutions that create and promote them. We found that a society
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sees a different view of morality than an individual, but that both are linked by the necessity
of their involvement and dependence on each other. We noted how ethical codes can differ
for various segments of the same society so that what may necessarily be ethical behavior for
a soldier may not be ethical behavior for a clergyman, while a politician may utilize a code
that clearly conflicts with that of an educator. The point here was to show that although we
may differ in the particular codes we follow, according to our personal and professional needs
and goals, this does not mean that we can label one social segment’s code ‘bad’ and another’s
‘good’. On the other hand, we have to realize that a professional code of ethics is ‘home
grown’, as it were, to fit a specific need and designation indigenous to the particular group
it governs and serves.
From this microcosmic viewpoint we went on to take an expanded look at the general
sense of morality felt in common by almost all members of a community regarding morally
responsible behavior. The many aspects of ‘fi'eedom’ were investigated and discussed. This
topic concluded with the finding that living in freedom encompasses and includes many
conditions of life, but that in order for freedom to be maintained we must be properly
equipped and trained so that we are able to support and maintain it. Thus, it is important that
policy implementors are qualified and able, but in addition they must have the freedom to act
so that they can aptly guide and correct a policy in the course of its objectives. Consequently,
freedom demands responsibility in return for the boons it bestows.
This section also emphasized the importance of knowing how to think critically so that
the individual can become able to judge well those moral challenges that are met in the course
of life. In so doing, it was stressed that a law may not necessarily be a moral instrument.
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Practical reality may demand that a law be rescinded in order to avert injustice or just plain
stupidity. Thus, morally questionable practices must be challenged.
The most important idea to coalesce out of this section is the recognition that many
individuals regard morality as a sort of fringe consideration seen on the edges of society but
not actually part of its fiber. Ethical behavior is often seen as merely a theoretical precept,
something separate from everyday life. This viewpoint can have a lot to do with how policies
are carried out upon implementation. The notion of morality, it was found, contains a whole
range of ethical views that mutate and recombine as the matrix of society reconfigures itself.
Consequently, rather than being a ‘thing’ separate from everyday life, implementors
must realize that the exact opposite is true. Ethics are so much a part of our life as eating and
sleeping; so much a part that it may be that some individuals have difficulty in seeing how
integral a role ethics play. Childhood lessons, religious sermons, peer pressure, community
standards, examples learned from responsible adults as well as (unfortunately) irresponsible
adults, all play into how well or how poorly one’s own actions turn out. All our actions are
based upon considerations that have come into play during the development of our moral
character. Thus, a morally weak implementor will not be able to recognize the danger implicit
in ignoring signals that portend impending injustices or other negative externalities stemming
from the policy or program he or she is supposed to be guiding; while an implementor who
has a fully developed moral character can successfully guide a policy around or through areas
of ethical dilemmas by being sensitive or attuned to potential weaknesses that may unfold.
The fourth section of this thesis devoted itself to similarities and differences between
ourselves nationally, and also contrasted us with other cultures. Ultimately, this process led
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to the fact that while we can look at other cultures for insight and even inspiration, we must
look to ourselves for answers on how to best care for our aging citizens. One of the best ways
is to train them to care for themselves, but this has to begin at a very early age and should
continue into mid-life. We must all become more self-sufficient and less reliant on government
when decisions affecting our personal lives are involved. To rely on government for those
things will lead only to mediocrity in government itself, since it is not equipped to, nor should
it, handle such decisions. Such a course will lead to further losses of freedom for the
individual. We need to be more creative, as a people, in this area. Life is a process that
requires constant vigilance in order to be maintained in freedom and optimum condition. This
process requires a background of knowledge of what is in the personal realm and what is in
the realm of government and must be reinforced with ethical values.
It was necessary to lay these separate areas out first, then pull them together and
evaluate them in order to present the argument that Social Security policy has outlived its
function and needs to be either scrapped or totally rehabilitated.

Policy Limits
The title of this thesis invokes the question, ‘Ts there a moral limit to policy?”. We
have looked at how policy is implemented, how it should be implemented, how morality is
perceived, aging policies in our country and various other cultures.
As indicated in Chapter Six, the moral limits of policy are called into question when
the citizens of this country begin to rely on government to direct their destinies and allow
government to take over aspects of personal lives that are better left in the hands of the
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citizens themselves. These private functions that are best left in the autonomous control of
individuals include such areas as when and how to save for retirement, and when to opt for
retirement. The role of government is to govern, not to babysit, its citizens; to see that rules
are enforced, to negotiate with other countries’ governments, and to set up a structure in
which a dynamic educational system can evolve and flourish. But where issues of morality are
concerned, due to the very nature of its being, the government and the policies it engenders
are not structured to legislate morality. This does not mean that the government is not obliged
to act morally or use ethical guidelines within the scope of its functions.
According to Elizabeth Wolgast:
Moral predicates belong to individual people, not to roles or abstractions.
Thus, government is an imperfect means of acting morally, even when it is
used to do things that are well justified and commendable, considered as
human actions.®
Wolgast suggests that we stop looking at the actions of governments in moral and human
terms and instead, look at these as what they in fact are - government actions.’ She quotes
Joseph Tussman who states that.
The government is a particular kind of entity, and its job is to govern, not to
serve us. If we elect it, fine; but whether or not we do does not affect its
function, which is to rule us. The theory of political representation ought
therefore to conform itself to this reality and not try to characterize an
impossible relationship of accountability.*
Consequently, we can become misled into surmising that politicians are morally accountable
to us. Wolgast, however, tells us that:
[Mjoral accountability doesn’t work that way; the concept of representation
interferes and frustrates it. Moral censure of official actions, as opposed to
private ones, often reflects our desire that government be our moral surrogate
and responsible for what it does. The desire is understandable but futile. [I]t
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is a continuing problem for citizens in democratic societies.’
De Tocqueville astutely noted that individuals in a democracy are often being buffeted
by two conflicting desires: they want to be ‘free’, but they also want to be led. Unfortunately
they try to satisfy both at the same time. This results in a see-saw type of existence. On one
hand they have the freedom to elect those who govern them, but on the other, after the
election is over, they are often content to once again be led.*® He cautions that:
It must not be forgotten that it is especially dangerous to enslave men in the
minor details of life. . .I should be inclined to think freedom less necessary in
the great things than in the little ones.**
And yet again de Tocqueville has stated my beliefs when he eloquently writes that:
Subjugation in minor affairs breaks out every day and is felt by the whole
community indiscrirniriately. It does not drive men to resistance, but it crosses
them at every turn, till they are led to surrender their own will. Thus their
spirit is gradually broken and their character enervated...It is in vain to
summon a people who have been rendered so dependent on the central power
to choose from time to time the representatives of that power, this rare and
brief exercise of their free choice, however important it may be, will not
prevent them from gradually losing the facilities o f thinking, feeling, and
acting for themselves, and thus gradually falling below the level of humanity.*^
When de Tocqueville refers to citizens without choice to govern the small details of their lives
as “falling below the level of humanity” I believe he is using this phrase in lieu of saying that
the people have lost their autonomy as individuals. They might as well be members of a
bovine herd! Thus, although having the government plan and execute the Social Security
program for enforced withholding from one’s wages toward retirement seems to be a minor
detail in our daily lives, it is one of many unnecessary interferences that have slowly impinged
on our personal sovereignty and taken away a portion of our abilities to plan for, act on and
prepare to be responsible for our own retirement and old age. This is not a necessary or
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ultimately helpful function of government, for it contributes to the individual forfeiting the
right and the challenge to guide her own destiny in a way that she sees as fitted to the
personal requirements and exigencies o f life.
It could be argued here that one of the main motives for the creation of Social
Security was to enhance consumer demands and increase sales . So if we are more free to
choose we might consume more and save less, hurting our futures. Or, we might save more
and consume less, shrinking the economy. These could be two possible negative outcomes.
However, it is doubtful that a heavy tilt in either direction would necessarily follow. True,
some individuals probably will slide in each direction, but I believe that the majority will be
likely to follow a more moderate path, and continue to do what they have always done
How can government policies that discourage self-sufficiency be seen as ethical?
Policies that encourage discrimination based on age and age-specific guidelines that feed into
business, industrial, and institutional practices are not morally redemptive. It does not matter
that such practices and policies as those of mandatory retirement at age sixty-five, and
enforced payroll withholding for Social Security may have been instituted for idealistic and
high-minded reasons. The facts appear to be that they have actually spawned unpleasant sideeffects or externalities. Moral actions have to be initiated by individuals, not governments. It
is far more a moral act for an individual to responsibly orchestrate his or her own retirement
options, thereby not placing any burden on society, than it can be considered ‘moral’ for a
governmental entity to dictate what and how an autonomous, self-sufficient individual should
be forced to ‘save’ toward retirement, as the federal Social Security program currently
mandates.
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Wolgast tells us that “others cannot be used as one’s surrogate without diminishing
their autonomy, which is to say their moral status, and without diminishing one’s own claim
to respect”.** She finds that there is a “conceptual barrier” by which business [and
government] separates itself from the humans within it. Thus, an amoral context develops
regarding the way individuals are thought about. This context does not acknowledge such
important areas as human obligations or relationships.**
It becomes easy, then, to see that even though Social Security policy may deal with
humans and strongly impact on their lives, most often the humans are treated as if they (rather
than the bureaucracy) were the abstract entities. Instead of being regarded as living sentient
beings composed of varying degrees of needs, all employed persons are lumped into one
category.
This depersonalization, according to Wolgast, extends nationally into most institutions
and corporations. Moral inferences are not a part of the language they use. Thus, we have a
situation where “thanks to this framework, economics and social theory, albeit unwittingly,
sanction the dehumanization o f persons and the neglect of them as moral entities”.**
Consequently, although government agencies, private corporations, and institutions cannot,
in and of themselves be considered to be moral, the individuals who operate them and
implement their policies not only can, but must be morally responsible.
Wolgast concurs with ideas presented in earlier chapters which point out that it is not
different institutions that are necessary, but different concepts within institutions that are
needed to conform to our current social structure and institutions.*® “In evaluating
institutions, we should consider not only their usefulness in producing wide social goods but
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also their moral effects on individuals within them, particularly the attitudes they encourage
in the name of their defined functions.”*’ If institutions are more sensitive to the impact they
have on society in general they can be positively utilized to effect new social concepts
required to foster better savings and spending habits, for instance; or to foster less
depersonalization and more caring toward those who are needy, but have that caring be on
the local community level rather than left in the hands of the federal government. So while we
cannot ascribe moral precepts to institutions, agencies, or policies, we certainly can hold them
responsible for their morality in the effects they produce on society in general.
In a sense this entire work has been leading us toward the definition of “the moral
limits of policy”, for, due to the complexity of the idea itself, there cannot be one allencompassing or defining phrase. In particular, and building upon what I presented in Chapter
Four regarding “perceptions of morality”, I believe that Wolgast’s contribution here clarifies
and puts a cap on that multi-faceted definition .

Findings and Assumptions
This thesis has attempted to show a correlation between perceptions of aging and how
they affect the policies we create; what, if any, effect individual and community moral stances
have had upon perceptions; and how the policy implementation process can succeed or fail
due to how the policy implementors are prepared and qualified to execute their
responsibilities.
Ageism has been found to contain both negative and positive cormotations. Its
negative aspects include unjust and demeaning depictions o f the elderly as physically and
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mentally feeble, inept, ugly, unable to adapt, poverty-stricken, easily victimized, lonely, and
irrationally irate, to name several. However, positive ageism portrays the aged as being the
beneficiaries of many programs and services which have been tailored specifically for them
in the areas of education, health, and recreation. Positive ageism also depicts the elderly as
being more law-abiding, involved in public offices, more consistent and frequent voters, and
active in donating their time and talents to voluntary service to the community. So while
senior citizens have been unfairly discriminated against by negative and careless
characterizations, we have found that this is somewhat offset by the positive characterizations
just enumerated. Additionally, in our society, the elderly benefit by being recipients of tax
reductions. Medicare, and free or reduced rates on such items as meals and housing. Many
receive retirement pensions in addition to Social Security, and many others also rely on
additional income received as the result o f prudent investments made during their younger
years.
A varying range of financial levels are seen among senior citizens, ranging from
poverty to wealth. Consequently it is senseless to attempt to categorize this segment of the
population by insisting on defining them as a homogenous group overall when we are
attempting to devise ways to help only the segment which is in actual distress.
By not shaping aging policy, or any policy for that matter, to be flexible and able to
adapt to shifting conditions, we run the probable risk of creating and maintaining institutions
whose infrastructures become not only brittle but top-heavy and therefore overly burdensome
to the society they purport to serve. This is what has happened with Social Security policy.
Its lack of foresight has created an inflexible system that draws on the resources of employed
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individuals without regard for whether or not they wish to participate. It has created some
positive and generous spin-off agencies that do not even serve the elderly poor. One such
service, for instance, gives monthly payments to drug addicts of any age. This outgrowth goes
against what the public generally believes Social Security was created for. It puts an
unnecessary drain on the general funds available for the upcoming pool of those destined to
become eligible for future retirement benefits; thus it contributes to the resentment the
younger generations feel about having to support a program that may soon be bankrupt and
of no use to them. Consequently, many unforeseen externalities have been created, for the
limits and benefits of Social Security have been extended further and further to include areas
of social concern that need to be address in other ways and by different means.
We must be careful about the types of changes we put into place by attempting to
chart out their long term consequences while, at the same time, casting these policy revisions
so that they remain flexible to the social changes that will inevitably follow. For, as Aristotle
has warned "...in many cases good things bring harmful results".** Durkheim states that
"Nothing is more flexible than ideas; they react to minor changes without difficulty and
sometimes evolve with extreme rapidity".*’ We should be sensitive to social changes,
anticipate them as best we can, but also build in both flexibility of concept and a greater
discretionary role to policy implementors than has been done so far. For even the morally
responsible implementor will find it difficult if not impossible to make workable a policy
which is iron-bound, and has restrictive regulations that are imposed by individuals or groups
that are remote from the actual daily issues.
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